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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated contributions as well as limitations of EU political aid in 
processes of political development in Kenya since the onset of political pluralism in the 
early 1990s to mid-2016. The study sought to advance extant debates about the role 
of exogenous versus endogenous factors during Africa’s third wave of democracy. 
Hence, the questions: What have been the contributions as well as limitations of EU 
political aid toward processes of political development in Kenya since the early 1990s?  
The study reveals that initially the EU supported liberalization in Kenya in the after-
math of the cold war. However, this support was of a very superficial kind; it could not 
sustain the difficult, yet necessary task of institution-building. In the specific Kenyan 
case EU political aid in the early 1990s focused on bolstering domestic civil society in 
its struggle against the Moi dictatorship. While this should have been the first phase of 
a multifaceted undertaking, the EU and others did not then move onto what should 
have been the next phase in this journey: institutionalization.  Whether this would have 
actually happened, given the fumbling that characterized the 1990s is an open 
question.  
In any case, the emergence of the war on terror on the global agenda after the events 
of September 2001 completely closed this avenue. Although the international 
community had quickly ogled institution development as the key international agenda 
for the 21st century in the wake of the attacks, between 2001-2007 there was no serious 
political aid effort towards institution building in Kenya, save for the construction of 
institutions keyed to the war on terrorism; how else, to explain the failure to press the 
Kenya government to effect constitutional and other institutional reforms as promised 
after the 2002 elections?  
This neglect would prove costly; it contributed in no small measure to the post-election 
crisis of 2007-08; after all, that conflict issued from a failure of institutions both during 
the contested tallying of votes, and the subsequent eruption of violence. It would 
require the NARA and then agenda number 4 to begin to address these issues, with 
the crisis having focused attention on the need for institution building, reminding even 
those with vested interests in Kenya that the status quo had become untenable. 
There is some irony here: in pursuit of self-interest the EU may actually now help erect 
robust institutions in the wake of the post-election crisis. If so, then it remains to be 
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seen what type of institutions and structures will emerge under realism—whether as 
the war on terrorism and the attendant institutional infrastructure suggests these will 
be repressive institutions, or whether perhaps self-interest and altruism will combine to 
help create both participative and procedural norms that will underpin a more robust 
state in Kenya. 
One of the main criticisms usually levelled against foreign aid—political aid included—
is that it is too narrowly focused on technical aspects to the exclusion of political ones. 
In other words, the claim is usually made that current foreign aid merely represents a 
reincarnation of foreign aid of old—that of the 1960s—in the Huntingtonian frame. This 
study has diverged from that school of thought to argue that currently foreign aid has 
actually swung in the opposite direction—it is overly focused on political aspects—
participation in this case—to the exclusion of technocratic aspects, conceptualized as 
institutionalization. Yet a better view of development and the role of foreign aid in it 
would have to reconcile the need for participation, on the one hand, and that of 
effectiveness, on the other—cognizant of the fact that development is a bi-product of 
the interaction between structure and agency. 
Thus, the study argues against the old Huntingtonian singular focus on 
institutionalization to the exclusion of participation—the failure of development 
administration, with its obsession with institutionalization to the exclusion of politics 
testifies to the short-comings of such an attempt. On the other hand, however, the 
study also cautions against current critiques, which seem to celebrate agency, while 
viewing institutionalization–structures—askance—or what such critiques have taken to 
pejoratively referring to as the “technical approach”. As the events from Kenya 
illustrate, a singular focus on participation to the neglect of institutions is likely to result 
in the elevation of process over structure—with dire consequences for political 
development. Thus to suffice, participation must go hand-in- hand with institution 
building. 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie studie ondersoek die bydrae sowel as die beperkinge van die Europese Unie 
(EU) se politieke bystand in prosesse van politieke ontwikkeling in Kenia sedert die 
aanvang van politieke pluralisme in die vroeë 1990’s tot middel 2016. Die studie 
probeer om bestaande debatte te bevorder oor die rol van eksogene- teenoor 
endogene faktore gedurende Afrika se derde golf van demokrasie. Daarom die vraag: 
wat was die bydrae, sowel as die beperkinge van die EU politieke bystand teenoor 
prosesse in politieke ontwikkeling in Kenia sedert die vroeë 1990’s? 
Die studie onthul dat die EU aanvanklik liberalisme in Kenia ondersteun het met die 
nadraai van die Koue Oorlog. Die ondersteuning was baie oppervlakkig van aard; en 
kon nie die moeilike, tog noodsaaklike taak van institusionele-ontwikkeling volhou nie. 
In die spesifieke Keniaanse geval fokus die EU politieke bystand in die vroeë 1990’s 
op versterking van binnelandse burgerlike samelewing in sy stryd teen die Moi-
diktatorskap. Laasgenoemde moes die eerste fase van ŉ veelsydige onderneming 
wees, maar die EU en andere, het nie aanbeweeg na wat die volgende fase in die reis 
moes wees nie, naamlik: institusionalisering. Dit bly ŉ ope vraag of dit sou realiseer, 
gegewe die foute wat die 1990’s gekenmerk het. 
Die begin van die oorlog teen terreur op die globale agenda het, na die September 
2001 gebeure, hierdie weg toegemaak. Alhoewel die internasionale gemeenskap 
institusionalisering as prioriteit op die 21ste eeu se internasionale agenda geplaas het, 
is geen poging tussen 2001 en 2007 aangewend om ernstige politieke bystand in 
Kenia te verleen nie. Instansies om terrorisme te beveg, het tot stand gekom. Hoe dan 
anders om die mislukking om die Kenia regering te druk om grondwetlike en ander 
institusionele hervormings te affekteer soos belowe na die 2002 verkiesing? 
Hierdie nalatingheid kom duur te staan. Dit het grootliks bygedra tot die na-
verkiesingskrisis van 2007-2008; toe konflik ontstaan vanuit ŉ mislukking van 
instansies gedurende die betwiste kontrolering van stemme en die daaropvolgende 
uitbarsting van geweld. Dit sal van National Accord Reconciliation Act (NARA) en 
agenda nommer 4 vereis om die kwessies te adresseer met die fokus op die krisis vir 
die noodsaaklikheid vir institusionele-ontwikkeling, wat selfs diegene met gevestigde 
belange in Kenia herinner dat die status quo onhoudbaar geword het. 
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Die ironie is: in die strewe na selfbelang kan die EU werklik nou help om stewige 
instansies op te rig in die nadraai van die verkiesingskrisis. Indien wel, dan moet daar 
nog gekyk word watter tipe instansies en strukture onder realisme sal verskyn—of die 
oorlog teen terreur en die gepaardgaande institusionele infrastruktuur daarop dui dat 
dit onderdrukte instansies sal wees, of selfs selfbelang en altruïsme sal kombineer om 
te help om beide deelnemende en prosessuele norme te skep wat ŉ sterker staat in 
Kenia sal ondersteun. 
Een van die belangrikste kritici wat gewoonlik op buitelandse bystand—politieke 
bystand ingesluit—gelewer word, is dat dit te nougeset gefokus is op tegniese aspekte, 
met uitsluiting van politieke aspekte. Met ander woorde, die beweging is dat huidige 
buitelandse bystand bloot ŉ reïnkarnasie van buitelandse bystand van ouds bied—dit 
van die 1960’s—in die Huntingtoniaanse raamwerk. Hierdie studie het afgewyk van die 
denkwyse om te argumenteer dat buitelandse bystand tans eintlik in die 
teenoorgestelde rigting geswaai het—daar is te veel gefokus op politieke aspekte—
deelneming in hierdie geval—tot uitsluiting van tegnokratiese aspekte, 
gekonseptualiseer as institusionalisering. Nietemin moet ŉ beter siening van 
ontwikkeling en die rol van buitelandse bystand met die behoefte aan deelname aan 
die een kant en die doeltreffendheid daarvan, versoen—bewus van die feit dat 
ontwikkeling ŉ byproduk is van die interaksie tussen struktuur en agentskap. 
Die studie argumenteer dus teen die ou Huntingtoniaanse enkelvoudige fokus op 
institusionalisering tot die uitsluiting van deelname—die mislukking van 
ontwikkelingsadministrasie, ŉ obsessie met institusionalisering wat politiek uitsluit en 
getuig van die tekortkominge van so 'n poging. Aan die ander kant waarsku die studie 
ook teen die huidige kritiek, wat lyk asof die agentskap gevier word, terwyl 
institusionaliseringstrukture—skepties bejeen word, of wat sulke kritiek verkleinerend 
na verwys as die "tegniese benadering". Soos die gebeure uit Kenia illustreer, sal 'n 
enkele fokus op deelname aan die verwaarlosing van instansies waarskynlik lei tot die 
opheffing van die proses teenoor struktuur—met ernstige gevolge vir politieke 
ontwikkeling. Om dus te volstaan, moet deelname hand-aan-hand gaan met 
institusionalisering. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The demise of the Cold War generated widespread optimism (Kupchan et al 1995) 
that the world would finally focus on pending problems (Oudraat 1996). For 
instance, a midst intensifying chaos in Somalia in 1992, the United Nations’ 
Security Council (UNSC) authorized, and the United States (US) agreed to lead 
what, in the words of then-UN Secretary General (UNSG) Dr Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, represented “a precedent-setting peace-enforcement operation to provide a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief” (UN Publication 1996: 11)1. However, 
no sooner had the international community articulated this new posture than “in a 
matter of months” (de Soto 1994: 151), laments one prominent analyst, “the 
background scenery seemed to cloud over, changing from uniform hope and 
justified expectation to crisis and danger” (ibid). 
Take Unified Task Force’s (UNITAF’s) involvement in Somalia, for instance. 
Successful in its humanitarian disaster effort, the mission did come unstuck2, 
however, when the UN sought to reconfigure it into the United Nations’ Operation 
in Somalia II (UNISOM II)3 (Hussein 2002). Indeed, repeated attempts to re-
stablish the Somali state have come to naught (Menkhaus 2008). The country 
appears to have reverted to a la—Hobbesian state of nature, with all that that 
portends—for the Somali—state and the region. Hence, as the Somalia case 
illustrates, the post-cold war era has witnessed “crises and regional conflicts, which 
are occurring all over the world” (Toure 1992: 22). 
                                            
1 Created under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the mission had the mandate to use force. Prior to the 
intervention, Chapter 7 had traditionally been interpreted as a mechanism intended to deter or repel acts of 
aggression directed against other sovereign, UN-Member States (Bratt 1996). 
2 The UN did not, for one thing, have any prior experience in this type of state building exercise; also the US 
ran what amounted to a parallel organizational structure (Adibe 1998: 67-90). 
3 UNISOM II grew out of UNISOM I, established by the UN Security Council on the 24th of April 1992, as a 
Peace-keeping mission, to counter Somali factional leaders’ opposition to the deployment of a small 
contingent of cease-fire observers (Bensahel 2003: 21-56). 
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In addition, post-cold war conflicts have witnessed a concomitant shift in locus, 
from ones of inter-state, now to hinge on conflict within4 states (Laremont 2000: 
3).Thus with respect to Africa5, for example, post-cold war democratisation has 
spawned “extremely intense internal conflicts6, which have resulted in thousands 
of deaths and the exodus and abandonment of millions of civilians” (Toure 1999: 
22). 
Since it launches plural politics in 1991 Kenya has witnessed repeated7 episodes 
of violence (Chege 1994). However, the violence that erupted following a disputed 
presidential election in 2007 was “by far the most deadly and . . . destructive” (The 
Waki Commission Report 2009, vii). Of course, those sympathetic to President 
Mwai Kibaki—now former—would take strong exception to the claim that the 2007 
violence stemmed from “derailment of the people’s right to vote” (Okia 2009: 259); 
specifically, a rigged presidential election (Brown 2010). They, instead, posit the 
violence as connoting a recondite scheme to extirpate members of one lager (Okia 
2009: 267). It is possible, however, that the two competing accounts are correct 
simultaneously. The post-election violence was “both pre-planned and 
spontaneous” (ibid). After all, the country’s elite has traditionally fomented8 and 
then benefitted from such violence, secure that it was immune from prosecution. 
Read alone, though, the competing accounts do not provide a complete vignette 
as to how Kenya came to coquette with disaster. Read in conjunction with a series 
of policy miscalculations over the years, however, it quickly becomes clear that the 
elections served merely as the proximate cause of the violence. Rather with an 
understanding of “the contradictions embedded in the country’s political economy” 
                                            
4 For the emergence of intrastate conflicts in the post-cold war era, see, among others Duffey (2000: 142-
168). As for theoretical attempts to comprehend the factors at play, see, for instance Brown (1996: 1-31) 
and Jack (2001: 3-27). 
5 For Africa’s conflicts, see Adebajo (2002), Bangura (2002: 143-169), Conteh et al (1999: 104-140), Ofuatey-
Kodjoe (2002: 117-142). 
6 However, for the role of colonial legacy in current African conflicts, see, for instance Kasfir (1989: 363-387), 
and Stedman (1996: 235-242). As for similar claims from elsewhere—the role of British colonial policy in 
current conflicts on the Indian sub-continent—see Ganguly (1996: 141-172). 
7 For Kenya’s conflictual political development, see, for instance the Law Society of Kenya (2010: 1-107). 
8 For a position that traces such conflicts to proximate factors—leaders in this case—see, among others 
Brown (1996: 571-601). As for the role that stereotyping plays in these conflicts, with elites using such tactics 
to mobilise; yet to resolve such conflicts, such negative stereotypes must give way to positive ones (Stein 
2005: 189-215). 
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(Kagwanja et al 2009: 261), it becomes clear that the root causes to the conflict 
were “complex, multiple and interrelated” (Kagwanja et al 2009: 263). 
This study examines the role of European Union (EU) political aid in Kenya’s 
political development since the early 1990s. I contextualize the disputed 2007 
elections and their aftermath—including the National Accord—in terms of historical 
tendencies in Kenya’s political economy. Drawing on foreign aid literature and 
democracy support literature, I seek to assess some of the claims usually made in 
the literature for and against foreign aid as a precipitate for Third World political 
development, conceptualized as “institutionalization of political organization and 
procedure” (Huntington 1965: 388)9, and participation, with the main problem10 
being “the necessity of developing simultaneously social support for the 
maintenance of different and even contradictory aspects of modern institutional 
frameworks” (Eisenstadt 1957: 302). Indeed, the need to address long-term 
problems—the nurturing of democratic states and institutions in this case—on the 
one hand, and amid limited resources, on the other, has brought foreign aid as a 
conduit for capacity building to the fore. In particular, in the wake of recurrent 
democratization challenges, funding to promote democracy has emerged as a 
major aspect of development aid (Siegle 2009: 409). 
The focus on capacity development draws on the view that institutional 
weaknesses constitute the main obstacle to structural change.  This implies that 
development activities must promote local ownership, participation and institutional 
strengthening and respect for local values for sustainability (Riddell 2007). The 
ogling of capacity development represents a critique of earlier economistic theories 
of development that neglected the impact of context as well as the role of 
ownership by local players (Chambers 1993: 82). Contextually, Kenya-EU 
interactions unfold within the EU-ACP framework—an arrangement between the 
EU and 79 former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific—the 
ACP countries—and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy 2007. ACP-EU relations are now 
governed by a revised arrangement: the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) 
                                            
9 For political development as institutionalization, see, also Maniruzzaman (1971: 221-238). However, for 
critiques of political development as institutionalization—especially the inherent bias against mass 
mobilisation/participation, see, for example Oberschall (1970: 5-22). 
10 On the challenges inherent to political development more generally, see, for example Palmer (1989). 
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signed in 2000. The revised CPA arrangement enunciates a number of agenda 
items for the parties’11 continued engagement, key among them “political dialogue 
and governance conditionality as the core strategies for promoting democracy and 
anchoring the rule of law in developing countries” (Sentyiso 2003: 148). Under the 
revised arrangement, moreover, the non-reciprocal aspects of Lome were to lapse 
in 2007; future ACP-EU relations would have as their goal integration of the former 
into the global economy. 
The change in ACP-EU relations derived from a changed international 
environment. When Lome II was negotiated, not much happened, especially given 
that the south was beginning to lose its strong bargaining position in the global 
economy. This became patently clear at the time of Lome III, which happened at a 
time when the ACP had been seriously weakened by the world Recession. This 
saw the north introduce aid conditionality, with a greater focus on rural 
development (Brown 2002). It was Lome IV, however, that marked a watershed in 
ACP-EU relations, with aid conditionality, in the form of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), taking centre stage. The EU rebuffed ACP states’ plea for 
such conditionality outside the purview of International Financial Institutions (IFIs).  
Lome IV negotiations unfolded in the context of the Third World debt crisis of the 
1980s12.  
The mid-term review undertaken in 1995-2000 introduced political conditionality; 
specifically the requirement that ACP countries “observe the rules of democracy 
and respect for human rights” (Olsen 2004: 429)13. Then in 1996 the EU 
Commission published a “Green Paper discussing further relations with the ACP” 
calling, in the main, for ACP states to be split along sub regional lines to create 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). This would then culminate with the 
signing of the CPA in 2000. 
                                            
11 On individual EU MS policy stances towards Africa, see, for instance Engel (2012: 471-476). In the main, 
Germany—and by extension the EU—views Africa as the springboard for self-definition in the world. 
12 One scholar traces the debt to what he calls “indebted development”; that is, an active policy of borrowing 
to industrialize rather than holding back, tracing the phenomenon to a reaction in the Third World to the 
perceived corrupting influence of FDI-led development (Frieden 1987: 298-318). 
13 The continent had signalled its desire to embrace these shifts even before the EU effected this policy shift 
(Sunmonu 2004: 63-71). 
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In addition, in the late 1980s the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT)—predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—had ruled that 
Lome violated multilateral trade rules. GATT had specifically ruled that Lome, by 
extending trade preferences to ACP countries while excluding other equally poor, 
but non-ACP developing countries, especially in Latin America, breached the 
multilateral trading system’s “MFN Principle and a 1979 enabling clause designed 
to support developing countries” (Gibb 2003: 890). 
The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle requires that a member country extend 
the same tariff preferences to all other members. Thus, in the face of the GATT 
adverse ruling, to continue with Lome, the two sides had had to obtain a waiver 
with respect to these principles and issues. However, the EU saw the waiver as a 
short-term measure only: it argued that for the long-term, Lome needed major 
revisions to bring it into compliance with GATT rules; hence the shift to reciprocal 
trade relationship, by way of the 2000 CPA. 
However, some critics opine, albeit in a slightly different context, that the EU overly 
elevated WTO rules for its own selfish ends that had nothing to do with multilateral 
trade rules. According to this line:  
The WTO was placed at the centre of the negotiations because the EU 
specifically wanted it there. And it wanted it there because it was in its 
best interests. The WTO is after all a political construct designed to 
support a regulatory system created and maintained by the world’s 
principal economic powers, in particular the USA and the EU. The EU is 
not a powerless spectator and the prioritization of the neo-liberal agenda 
is not a natural state of affairs. [Rather], the negotiations reflect a re-
ordering of development policy away from interventionism towards 
liberalization. (900)14 
Another critic, in an escalation, retorts:  
This obsession with WTO rules obviously is based on the dominant 
paradigm that the free market and the ACP countries “full participation 
in it will create conditions necessary for the eradication of poverty. This 
is a lie for the simple reason that trade liberalization—which is an 
offshoot of globalization—is not the route to economic salvation in ACP 
States, in particular Africa. Trade liberalization is not an end; it is not 
even an effective means to global prosperity, given that an essential 
ingredient—Social Justice—is lacking in its execution. (Udombana 
2004: 91) 
                                            
14 In fact, others see this insistence on transmuting ACP-EU relations as an adroit manoeuvre by the giant to 
reconfigure its attention so as to focus on Eastern Europe (Lightfoot 2008: 128-142). 
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The CPA fortifies an emergent commitment to human rights and democracy 
through regular political dialogue. The political aspects of CPA focus on the three 
issues as stipulated in Article 8 of Title II of the Agreement. If flagrant violations of 
the essential elements occur, Articles 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement call for 
consultations aimed at finding a common solution. The same articles call for “aid 
suspension if serious breaches of human rights and democratic principles occur” 
(Zimelis 2011: 390). The agreement does also acknowledge the role of civil society 
in development (Olsen 2004). 
Nevertheless, assertions of partnership aside, only one side—the EU—has the 
wherewithal to compel the other to hue to the demands of CPA. Indeed, the 
concept of good governance itself is a potent tool in EU hands. The EU uses this 
concept, contrary to what it claims, to forward its own normative preferences in 
ACP states. Specifically, the construction of a specific type of state there—a 
conservative state architecture—thereby eliding the distinction15 needed between 
good governance—an administrative concept—and democratic government—
form of state. Through this normative posture, the EU “attempts to establish a 
particular set of social norms and conventions to guide the decisions and actions 
of its development partners” (Slocum-Bradley et al 2010: 39), thereby seeking to 
dictate16 development, a direct contradiction of the partnership mantra. 
On development, the bloc claims that it is focused on combating poverty with the 
aim of achieving the Millennium Development Goals17 (MDGs (Feeny et al 2008)18. 
The EU has enthusiastically taken on board the various global enunciations on 
development—including MDGs. This is bolstered by the power that has accrued to 
the Commission following the coming into effect in 1993 of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
The Treaty of Maastricht gave development legal standing (Pere 2009: 264). 
                                            
15 For precisely this line of critique, see, among others, Jenkins (2001). 
16 On how core sates have allegedly historically dictated development in the periphery, see, for instance, 
Krieckhaus (2006). 
17http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r12533_en.ht
m 
18 This refers to a set of eight developmental goals adopted at the Millennium Summit of the UN in 2000, to 
be achieved by the year 2015: eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; the achievement of universal 
primary education; the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women; reducing child 
mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDs, malaria, and other diseases, achieving 
environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for development. 
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The European Consensus on Development of 2005—the document that gives 
expression to EU understanding of development—cognisant of the multifaceted 
nature that poverty takes, views the undertaking as a holistic process. In the new 
understanding of development, the EU and other actors claim to favour partnership 
with their southern counterparts. The European Consensus on Development 
makes a clear commitment towards delivering more and better aid through 
increased use of sector-based approaches, now integrated into EDF activities. As 
part of the European Consensus on Development, “in all activities, the Community 
will apply a strengthened approach to mainstreaming the following cross-cutting 
issues: human rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance” (Europe Aid 
Guidelines No. 2: Tools and Methods Serie: 2007. Support to Sector Programmes: 
European Commission, 32). 
The European Consensus on Development was really a response to The Paris 
Declaration on aid effectiveness. The Declaration “established international 
guidelines and targets for raising the quality of aid” (9-118). Adopted in March 
2005, the Paris Declaration strongly engages partner governments and donors 
“around the principles of ownership, alignment and harmonisation” (16). As a result 
of this focus on aid effectiveness, the EU has increasingly ogled sectoral budgetary 
support, (SWAPs). A response to the failure of SAPs (Barkan 2007: 72), SWAPs 
purportedly focus on achieving synergies among the various actors involved in 
development to achieve “coherent sector policies and strategies” (ibid). SWAPs 
seek to broaden government and national ownership over public sector policy and 
resource allocation decisions within the sector; increasing the coherence between 
policy, spending and results and reducing transaction costs (ibid). 
It took the launch of A Single European Act in 1986 for the liniments of a Common 
European Foreign Policy to begin to emerge. Maastricht Treaty of 198619 divided 
EU policy areas into 3: the 1st Pillar—this is where the European Community had 
full competence, and it focused on trade and agricultural policies. The EU 
Commission has full implementing powers for the 1st pillar. The 2nd and 3rd pillars—
intergovernmental in nature, they focused on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and 
                                            
19 The treaty that transformed the bloc into a single internal market (Jovanovic 1992; Mckibbin 1992: 422-
453). 
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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)20 (Mackie 2008: 144). Maastricht 
Treaty established a legal basis for development cooperation by acknowledging 
existing policies; it also “provided a Title (Title xvii) on development cooperation 
and specific articles” (1300-1304), setting out the objectives of European 
Community development cooperation and the principles of implementing them 
(Reisen 2009: 243-244). According to the same author, the document 
conceptualised Development cooperation “as a competence of the European 
Community, but which it qualified as complementary to the Member States” (ibid). 
The bloc felt compelled to develop a coordinated approach to the emergence of 
new non-security threats, such as migration to the EU, following the demise of the 
Cold War (Olsen 2002, 132). This would see the Commission ogle a posture of 
development cooperation policy that elevated foreign and security policy over 
development policy. The new posture was confirmed following the 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the US (Olsen 2004). In the wake of the attacks, international players 
have increasingly focused on state fragility and its implications for development, 
attributing such fragility to lack of state capacity. This led to the coupling of security 
and development, on the grounds that development needed “a secure and 
democratic environment, conducive to long-term investments” (Bagoyoko et al 
2009: 789). Major international players have increasingly bought into this agenda; 
with the EU in particular giving the combination special focus (ibid). Thus it was 
that in 2003 the EU unveiled its security and defence strategy (ESDP)21 under the 
armpit of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The ESS identifies major 
security threats to Europe, especially terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (W) 
and failed states. 
The EU called for a redefinition of security, in light of these challenges, from its 
hitherto state-centric focus. It sought a new approach that entailed a repertoire of 
policy tools: “military and civil instruments to defuse both political and socio-
economic crises” (Faust et al 2005: 425), with the aim of achieving stability and 
good governance (Schroeder 2009). This would see the EU establish its 
                                            
20 A British tactic to prevent a full blown EU foreign policy managed and run from Brussels, as well as a fitting 
repartee to post-cold war experiences, especially the wars in the Balkans. 
21 The road to ESDP began in 1992 with the signing of Maastricht Treaty; this first led to the creation of CFSP 
by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997; the EU Summit held in Brussels in 2003 further developed ESDP. 
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Instrument for Stability (IfS). Although the EU had other instruments and devices 
for addressing issues touching on the security-development nexus—such as the 
African Peace Facility (APF) “it is the IfS that has become the European 
Community’s key policy tool and rapidly funding assistance to countries in 
situations of (emerging) crisis and natural disaster—and thus its flagship to 
address the nexus at the level of policy instruments” (Ganzle 2012: 117). 
Historically EU-Africa relations focused on development cooperation through the 
EU-ACP arrangement. This vignette began to change in the early 1990s, with 
security and politics taking centre stage (Gibert 2009: 699). This would see the 
Community focus on state collapse and conflict prevention as a key priority area 
in the 1990s. This was the context within which the first EU-Africa summit unfolded 
in Cairo in 2000 (Cox et al 1997: 40; Crawford 2001: 237, qtd in Olsen 2004: 434). 
The relationship is currently framed by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy 2007, which 
focuses on matters of mutual concern; specifically, peace and security, migration, 
trade, regional integration, amongst others (Pere 2009). The new EU-Africa 
relationship “put the African Union at the centre of EU engagement with the 
continent” (Khadiagala 2009: 218). Initially, the EU had sought to re-evaluate its 
relations with the continent; the process would then see the EU Commission 
issue―EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate African 
Development, in 2005. 
The 2007 Lisbon EU-Africa joint partnership committed both sides to enhanced 
cooperation “based on Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and 
strategic objectives for the Future” (232). The unveiling of the Joint EU-Africa 
partnership in 2007 unfolded in the context of some recent positive developments 
on the African continent, including greater respect for democracy, the enunciation 
of The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), among others. Take 
adherence to democracy, respect for good governance and observance of human 
rights, for instance. In a radical departure from the OAU’s hitherto reactive modus 
operandi, “The AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000 allowed for interference in the internal 
affairs of its members in cases of unconstitutional changes of governments, 
egregious human rights abuses and genocide, and conflicts that threaten regional 
stability” (Adebajo 2009: 53). 
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Enunciation of NEPAD connoted an acknowledgement by Africans of their stygian 
situation and a concomitant commitment to transmute22 it through “a new and 
cooperative approach” (Steeves 2007: 495). Africans committed themselves 
through NEPAD to fight poverty and achieve sustainable development, thus 
launching the continent on the path to reclaiming23 its rightful place in world affairs. 
In this regard, NEPAD takes cognisance of the fact that to develop, Africans must 
look “inwards, redefine their priorities, empower their people and communities, 
promote new strategies of politics and development, and articulate new holistic 
transformative agendas” (Udombana 2004: 62). As part of this new commitment, 
Africans advanced a number of mechanisms, such as a Peer Review Mechanism 
(PRM), to assess NEPAD’s implementation, with a commitment to human rights, 
democracy and good governance, as well as achieving continental growth rates of 
7 per cent annually and halving poverty on the continent by 2015 (Chiroro 2010). 
EU-Kenya cooperation commenced in 1976, when Kenya became the first country 
to sign a National Indicative Programme for co-operation with the European 
Community under the first Lomé Convention. Currently, Kenya’s second largest 
development partner after the World Bank, the EU provides grants to the country 
from the European Development Fund (EDF) and from the development 
instruments of the General Budget of the EU. The EU posits itself as a major player 
in the country’s socio-economic transformation as well a major partner in the 
country’s integration into the global marketplace. The strategic relationship casts 
Kenya as a trusted partner within a troubled region, who supports peace processes 
and contributes to stability. 
Kenya’s development strategy as enunciated in documents such as Vision 203024, 
among others, has four legs: increased economic growth, development of the 
physical infrastructure, creating a democratic state responsive to the rule of law, 
human rights and good governance, and increased human capital. Consistent 
therefore with this posture, according to the Commission, the main thrust of Kenya-
                                            
22 For some of the strategies Africa is allegedly deploying to pull itself out of poverty, see, for example Ngara 
(2011: 60-77). As for the origin of NEPAD, see, for instance Sunmonu (2004: 63-71). 
23 For continuing Afro-pessimism, though—one that rejects these attempts as futile and with a concomitant 
invitation to the international community to come to the rescue, see, for instance Gilley (2010: 87-101). 
24 A blue-print for Kenya’s transformation into a mid-income country by 2030. 
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EU cooperation is designed to complement the Kenyan government’s efforts to 
eradicate poverty and improve the living standards of the population. EU 
development cooperation with Kenya has two focal points: transport infrastructure, 
especially as this relates to regional integration, and agriculture & rural 
development. Other areas in which EU funds are used are macroeconomic 
support, trade and private sector development as well as good governance and 
support for non-state actors. 
Special attention is given to improving livelihoods in the arid and semi-arid areas 
of the country. Concrete activities include the development and marketing of crops 
and fodder that can resist drought as well as the improvement of post-harvest 
storage. The programme also helps the government in developing better policies 
for drought management. The EU is signatory to the Kenya Joint Assistance 
Strategy in support of Vision 2030, as well as the National Accord. Signed by 
donors, the Kenya government and civil society in late 2010, the joint Assistance 
Strategy seeks to promote aid effectiveness, consistent with the Paris Declaration 
on donor aid harmonization and coordination. In the financial year 2009/10, the EU 
Member States and the European Commission disbursed more than EUR 400 
million (approximately Kshs. 39 billion) in official development assistance to Kenya. 
Most African countries experienced the Third Wave of democracy. Whereas the 
reforms have “helped to generate real political openings and eroded the ability of… 
authoritarian regimes to perpetuate themselves in power free of scrutiny” 
(Harbeson et al 1995: 259), as the 2007 events from Kenya suggest, Africa’s 
transition to democracy has faced some dolorous moments. However that students 
of comparative politics have continued to focus solely on the role of endogenous 
factors in these processes and developments, and “at best neglect25 the 
importance of international factors and in the extreme argue that they exert little, if 
any influence” (Schraeder 2002: 7), while remaining oblivious to other findings 
which, although acknowledging the “complexities and difficulties” (Prikic 1999: 
                                            
25 For rejection, though, of any attempt to blur the traditional line between foreign and domestic politics, 
see Hill (2000: 154). 
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107) attendant external26 support, also note that even under such circumstances, 
“opportunities can sometimes be created for democratization through external 
intervention” (109), is baffling27. An examination of EU’s involvement in Kenya’s 
political development since the early 1990s provides an excellent opportunity to 
analyse the role that that aid has played; after all, democracy support—in Africa 
has emerged as a major theme (Adedeji 1999). 
 
1.2 Statement of purpose and focus 
A major debate has erupted concerning the role of exogenous versus endogenous 
factors in post-cold war democratization in Africa. To advance this debate, drawing 
on foreign aid literature, on the one hand, and democracy support literature, on the 
other, I examine the role of EU political aid in processes of political development 
in Kenya. The EU has, after all, increasingly ogled governance-based approaches 
to international development on the grounds that human rights violations and lack 
of democracy constitute the main obstacles to development. It consequently has 
increasingly cast its activities largely in terms of the creation of “participatory 
governance structures, the development of new social norms, and the 
establishment of the rule of law and democracy” (Hampson 2005: 3). Hence, the 
question: What has been the role of EU political aid to in Kenya since the early 
1990s? I focus on the EU as one and, at present, the largest provider of democracy 
assistance to Kenya. For the purpose of analysis, the focus falls on multilateral, 
political aid provided by the EU through the European Development Fund (EDF). 
 
                                            
26 For a literature review of the factors responsible for this transition and also variations based on different 
regional authoritarian modal types, see Geddes (1999: 115-144), Gibson (2000: 201-221) and Prean (1990: 
79-85). 
27 For potential threats, mostly structural, to the world-wide sweep of democracy, consult, for example Kis 
(1990: 75-78) and Kolakowski (1990: 47-50). For similar challenges in mature democracies, see, for instance 
Soudriette (2001: 133-138). Others counsel a disaggregated approach to understanding democratization; in 
this formulation, the process would have two parts: transition and consolidation phases. For what is 
considered a classic in this respect, see Dankwart (1970: 98-109). 
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1.3 Rationale for the study 
The rationale for the study thus, is informed by the relative paucity in research on 
the dynamics of political change in Kenya since the 1990s and the role that one 
external actor—the EU—has played in that process, and the ways such aid links 
with political processes in the country. 
 
1.4 Research question 
Question #1: What role has EU political aid played in Kenya’s political development 
since 1990? 
 
 
1.5 Goals of the study 
The study aims to accomplish a number of complementary objectives: 
a. To trace the dynamics of Kenya’s recent political development; 
b. To describe and assess the role of EU aid; and 
c. To draw broader conclusions on the role of foreign aid in processes of 
political development in Kenya and, by extension, about the role of 
exogenous factors in post-Cold War political processes in Africa. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
This section discusses methodological and related aspects. I use qualitative 
methods—mainly secondary documents to analyse the role of EU political aid in 
political processes in Kenya since the early 1990s. 
1.6.1 Research design 
This is a case study—that of Kenya; specifically, the role of EU political aid in 
political processes in Kenya since the early 1990s to the 2013 elections. A single 
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case study is used in this investigation. Serious28 issues are usually raised about 
this approach in terms of scientific rigour and potential for generalizability, 
however.   Still, the case study method has a number of advantages and strengths 
that propose it as appropriate for research: for one, it is at times the only method 
available. In particular, the case study can make a unique contribution to our 
comprehension of otherwise complex political processes and events; also, it can 
provide crucial evidence for theory testing. In this respect, an important distinction 
needs to be made between statistical generalizability on the one hand and 
analytical generalizability, on the other. The latter implies that the findings and 
conclusions of single case studies may be generalized and even used in theory 
construction.  
 
1.6.2 Data gathering instruments  
As an exploratory study, the research relies on secondary data sources 
1.6.3 Secondary source of information 
This refers to research using already available data sources. This study relies on 
the following secondary data sources: 
1.6.3.1 Document analysis  
I conducted archival, thematic analyses of literature on EU political aid in Kenya, 
and institutional reform more generally. There exist extensive literatures on these 
topics; I therefore perused official public, archival, mass media and EU documents. 
At the national level, I examined government reports and records, official reports 
of public enquiries, among others. As for the EU, I examined publicly accessible 
agency records, organization documents, and so on. These documents provide 
more systematic accounts about “the respective assumptions, concerns, and 
activities of those who produce them” (Taylor et al 1998: 129); and, hence, the 
decisions taken. 
                                            
28 For the controversies attendant the case study approach in general and the single case in particular, see, 
among others  Krieckhaus (2006); Stillman (1999. 
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1.7 Significance of this study 
The significance of the study stems from the need to get a more complete account 
of the dynamics of political change in Kenya in the post-cold war era and the role 
of EU political aid in that effort. In this respect, this study is substantially different 
in that most, if not all, extant studies on Kenya’s political development since the 
early 1990s have tended to focus singularly on one period in that drama, say, the 
Moi Presidency, and so on. This study covers the entire period from the 1990s to 
the 2013 elections, by way of periodization of Kenya’s political development and 
then examining the role of EU political aid at each given juncture.   
In addition, most extant studies on Africa’s democratization have inexplicably 
tended to focus on only one-side of this equation—the role of endogenous, to the 
exclusion of exogenous, factors. This study aims to rectify this misnomer.  I hope, 
ultimately, that this study will advance our understanding of the role that political 
aid has played in Africa’s—and by extension the developing world’s—current 
political development more generally. 
 
1.8 Research results 
EU political aid has had mixed results: it was initially critical in helping launch plural 
politics in the early 1990s—animated largely by altruistic intentions attendant the 
demise of bi-polar rivalries of the cold war. However, with the onset of the so-called 
―War on Terror and thus the elevation of security considerations over 
governance, democracy, and human rights, previous commitment to altruistic 
goals has given way to self-interested concerns there, mostly security-related, 
such as the fight against Al Shabaab in Somalia, Piracy off the Somali coast, 
among others. However, in the wake of the 2007-08 post-election crisis altruism 
and self-interest have appeared to combine, with the EU and others now claiming 
to actively support political reforms in Kenya. 
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1.9 Limitations 
I have had to contend with both time and other resource constraints. Equally, I 
have to contend with the dynamic nature of Kenya’s political development; much 
scholarly literature has yet to emerge on the theme. This paucity of literature has, 
however, represented something of an opportunity; it has served as an extra 
incentive to prosecute the study—and thus contribute to that literature. 
1.9.1 Delimitations 
I will delimit my study to the onset of political pluralism in Kenya, early 1990s to the 
current Uhuru/Jubilee Administration, although I will transgress this as warranted, 
especially in my exposition on Kenya’s political economy. In addition, I focus on 
only one external actor, the EU as well as political aid.  
1.9.2 Key concepts: 
1.9.2.1 Foreign aid 
Foreign aid for Third World development traces its genesis to the immediate post-
World War II period (Riddell 2007). With the onset of decolonization after World 
War II, there emerged a feeling that for them “political independence without steady 
and broadly based improvement in economic29 capacities and in material levels of 
living30 would be a hollow achievement” (Myint 1980: 5). Buttressed by “the idea 
that international efforts could, or should, be undertaken to build the economies 
and societies of the other world” (Weatherby et al 2000: 37), political development 
had its focus on developing countries as “a teleological process” (Hagopian 2000: 
881). A number of key theoretical camps have therefore come to the fore (Therien 
2002: 449). 
Idealism posits foreign aid as springing from altruistic31 motives by donors (Zeylstra 
et al 1975). Espousing what amounts to “Humane internationalism” (Therien 2002: 
                                            
29 For lucid recapitulations of contending theories of development consult, among others Kindleberger et al 
(1983: 32-53) and Rapley (1996). 
30 Find a sampling in, among others Ward (1967: 88-104). 
31 For this view, albeit with a focus on the U.S., see, for instance Montgomery (1961: 544-560). 
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461), idealism conceives of aid as an essential ingredient in filling glaring resource 
gaps (Gounder 1999; Lumsdaine 1993). 
Dependency theorists posit foreign aid as the beachhead of a northern grand 
strategy to maintain its hold on the south by, for example, ameliorating some of the 
extreme manifestations of suffering there that would otherwise, if left to fester, 
ignite revolutionary action (Beckman 2001: 27). Seen so, argue they, aid has 
historically “served as a catalyst for stabilizing imperial rule and facilitating the 
transfer of riches, with the overall result of what we call reverse aid”—net gain for 
the imperial country or centre at a cost borne by the colonies (Petras et al 2002: 
283). Rich country objectives are primarily and overwhelmingly to use poor 
countries to further their own economic interests32. For example, in order to receive 
aid, Third World countries must usually be in “compliance with [Northern] neo-
mercantilist agenda, involving their elimination of subsidies… trade barriers, 
privatize state enterprises and end state regulations” (ibid. 284). 
Realists cast foreign aid as having a corrosive influence on development. Instead, 
viewing it as one part of the broader arsenal of national foreign policy, and 
therefore self-interested33, realists posit aid as being “simply an instrument used 
to achieve the strategic economic and political goals34 of the donors” (Cusack et al 
1994: 11); in particular, “development assistance, in reality, is payment for strategic 
services provided to the donor country” (Poirine 1999: 832). 
Liberalism: Liberalism vouches for the use of foreign aid to support democracy. 
This   on the grounds that democracy best serves the courses of peaceful 
coexistence and stability within nations. That democracy can eventually contribute 
to world peace (Bridoux et al 2012). 
 
                                            
32 Marxist orthodoxy held that internationalization of capital would lead to competition among capitalists 
along national lines—a view obviated by the rise of an international cross-national capitalist class (Stephen 
1987: 18-39). 
33 For this position, see, among others Zank (1993: 90-102). 
34 Realists insist that if true that aid aimed to tackle poverty, then it should go mostly towards the poorest 
countries; however, this is not normally the case. See, among others Barrett (2001: 335-349) and Schelling 
(1955: 606-626). 
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1.9.2.2 Election monitoring/observation 
Monitoring regimes, of which election monitoring35 is an instance, have an 
important role in ensuring adherence to international norms and commitments 
(Simpson et al 2012). 
Election observation has therefore emerged as a key strategy for democracy 
preservation and, hence, conflict prevention. Election observation undertaken by 
both local and international monitors, aims to guarantee the integrity of the 
electoral process by communicating the international community’s expectations 
(Teshome 2013: 1003). As Short-Term Observers (STOs), their larger numbers 
place election monitors “in an excellent position to render a comprehensive and 
accurate picture of the entire election, including potential patterns of discrimination” 
(Binder 2007: 231). 
Election observers contribute to democratization in a number of ways: first, they 
do documentation, by thoroughly scrutinising the conduct of the elections, through 
the generation and analysis of election-related data; they can then render a final 
verdict on the conduct of the elections. By so doing, election monitoring can in turn 
play an important role in institution building; for such external presence “can foster 
trust among rival parties by providing guarantees, clearing up misperceptions, 
relaying information back and forth and resolving key issues” (Chakand 1998: 
169). Such institutions, once established, could “help counterbalance state power, 
provide a context for developing civic skills, encourage norms of reciprocity and 
trust, articulate societal interests and create peaceful channels for the resolution 
of conflicts that might otherwise result in violence” (ibid). However, election 
monitoring by outsiders can frequently become a target of suspicion and outside 
hostility as neo-colonial, its advantages notwithstanding (168). 
Still, with its increased use governments that seek to cheat have developed other 
strategies36, including the staffing of strategic institutions such as the judiciary with 
                                            
35 On election Monitoring, see, for instance Peski (2013: 49-100). 
36 For this claim see, for example Lukinova et al (2011: 603-25). 
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cronies “practices that have far more damaging consequences on governance in 
the long run” (Simpson et al 2012: 501). 
In addition, election monitoring usually relies on hastily assembled data, thus 
precluding the rendering of a comprehensive verdict; instead what emanates from 
such data are superficial recommendations. Furthermore, while in theory, 
international election observers should not take their marching orders from the 
sending agency; this, however, is not always the case. More often than not, other 
considerations come into play thus colouring the ensuing evaluation (Teshome 
2013). 
1.9.2.3 Technical assistance 
Technical Assistance involves foreign experts working with their domestic 
counterparts, from both government and the NGOs, in support of the entire 
electoral cycle from pre-election preparations to post election capacity building 
(Mitchell and Phillips 2008). Viewed as an entry point for other desired reforms—
such as good governance, among others—the strategy can also help in the 
identification of other government entities that need assistance (Schroeder 2013: 
220). 
However, this is not merely a technocratic issue: technical assistance has clear 
political implications; specifically, it is focused on strengthening institution in order 
to promote participatory and effective electoral institutions. Seen so, technical 
assistance, as opposed to election monitoring, is focused on long-term institution 
building as well as promoting the participation of hitherto excluded groups such as 
women and social and ethnic minorities “in the political process,”—consistent with 
a number of international instruments concerning non-discrimination and 
participation of such groups (Binder 2007: 225). 
On the electoral front, technical assistance might involve training candidates; civic 
education, budgeting procedures, “computerizing voter lists… amending electoral 
regulations… and training electoral officials on new voting procedures “(Schroeder 
2013: 209-10). These activities are usually focused on creating credible electoral 
institutions and procedures, in the process increasing voter confidence in these 
institutions and processes (Binder 2007; Schroeder 2013). In addition, technical 
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teams normally have the chance to discuss with ‘authorities’ emerging issues, as 
well as providing protection for otherwise exposed local observer teams. 
Understood in this manner, technical training groups can immensely “strengthen 
and support local initiatives and civil society organisation” (Binder 2007: 231). 
Technical and financial support usually unfold within the armpit of targeted 
cooperation programmes; these activities can take anyone of many forms: election 
support teams; these are teams that can analyse key aspects of previous elections 
and make recommendations for future improvements; leadership training and 
networking for women, especially in rural areas. 
1.9.2.4 Political aid 
By the early 1990s the deleterious effects attendant indiscriminate neo-liberal 
attacks on the southern state edifice as the epitome of the so-called 
Neopatrimonial state had become so glaring. Critics responded that such a 
designation connoted states that were static in nature and thus failed to account 
for change (Turner and Hulme 1997). This opened the proscenium for an 
intellectual counter-offensive, on the grounds that “Only the state can organize 
power so as to harness flows of information, people, money, force and decisions 
necessary to regulate human behaviour” (Ghlain et al 2008: 4). Indeed, both 
scholars and practitioners have increasingly focused more generally on some of 
these agenda items as central to state effectiveness. 
They argue that failure to perform its routine functions is likely to render a state 
illegitimate in the eyes of its denizens even if “elections have been held and the 
attributes of formal democracy are in place” (Papagiani 2008: 55). In particular, in 
the face of the obvious failures attendant the state retrenchment of the 1980s, there 
has emerged a new thinking which acknowledges that the strength of state 
institutions, conceptualized as “the capacity to achieve the goals set by incumbents 
in chief executive positions” (Huber 1996: 165-6)—is more important in a broader 
sense than the scope of state functions (Fukuyama 2004: 198). 
Central to the shift was an emergent view that for even some of the hypothesized 
outcomes to occur, it was essential to have “state capacity to enforce the rule of 
law and to allocate state resources efficiently” (Huber 1996: 164). One expert 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
21 
 
explains the rationale behind this shift: “Without a minimally effective and legitimate 
state at least regulating alternative sources of authority and service delivery, peace 
is likely to prove unsustainable” (Call 2008: 365). After all, and contrary to neo-
liberal claims, “the enormous economic success of East Asian NICs is not simply 
the triumph of the market but also has much to do with strong state institutions” 
(Turner et al 1997: 49). 
Indeed, there is a growing acknowledgement that state failure provides a “fertile 
breeding ground not only for ethnic violence, but also other debilitating social and 
economic breakdowns” (Wright 2008: 81-2). This does illuminate the need not only 
to reinvigorate state capacity, “but also… to re-engineer its entire architecture” 
(Call 2008: 380), to erect an institutional framework founded on inclusive, 
participative processes that foster trust and compromise (Papagiani 2008), the 
more so because the state’s: 
Functions can’t be left to even a well-functioning society, any more than 
society abdicate its functions to the state. The state needs to be restored 
and its sovereignty needs to be reinstated as the criterion for 
accountability, short of which its government is not legitimate. (Zartman 
1995: 267) 
Current foreign aid has prioritized the institutional development37 of government, 
“thereby attempting to meet the need to build the capacity of the state to govern” 
(Hearn 2000: 824). Aid “has promoted and rewarded democratisation” (Brown 
2005: 179-80). The various actors in democracy promotion—northern states and 
their respective state agencies; NGOs; the private sector; international 
organizations, such as the UN; and regional organizations, such as the EU and AU 
(Diamond 1995), have sought to deploy aid “targeted at governmental structures 
such as parliament, the judiciary, and local government, as well as civil society 
organisations, with the aim of strengthening the institutions and culture of liberal 
democracy” (Hearn 2000: 815). 
Proponents of the new strategy contend that both the resolution and the prevention 
of lethal intrastate conflicts “require the nurturing of societal structures and 
                                            
37 For rejection of the institution-building agenda with regard to Africa, albeit from another era, on the 
grounds that the continent has already done enough and that Africa’s main problem is not one of lack of 
apposite democratic institutions but, rather, the challenge revolves around the need for behavioural 
modification and value re-orientation, see Ohrunsola (1986: 119-126). 
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institutions to assure each combatant group that their interests will be protected 
through nonviolent means” (Kritz 2005: 803). In their democracy promotion 
endeavours, these actors are buttressed by an emergent pro-democracy 
international ethos. As articulated in various international instruments, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
political rights. The new posture negates the hitherto obsession with the principle 
of non-intervention and state sovereignty (Bishop 1994). 
Central to the shift was the recognition that repressive approaches would no longer 
suffice in an increasingly fluid and turbulent post-cold war era. Instead, 
“[a]chieving… international stability, is now seen as lying in activities designed to 
reduce poverty, satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic self-sufficiency, create 
representative civil institutions, encourage thrift, promote human rights, gender 
awareness and so on: the name of this new security framework is development” 
(Duffield 2005: 305). Making this possible also was the fact that with the end of the 
cold war, globally “democracy is now perceived to be the only legitimate form of 
government” (Chakand 1998: 162). 
It needs emphasizing, though: although democracy assistance first came to the 
fore in the 1970s, it only came into its own in the 1990s following the demise of the 
cold war. Designed to fence against the various post-cold war threats to global 
order, such as terrorism, nationalism, and so on—and buttressing the democratic 
gains attendant the Third Wave—when it burst onto the scene in the 1990s, 
democracy assistance—known then as democracy promotion—focused on human 
rights, democracy and good governance—as part of the so-called New Policy 
Agenda. The demise of the cold war led to a shift in thinking, with the rejection of 
the hitherto orthodoxy view that authoritarianism was apposite for rapid economic 
development. To pursue the new policy agenda, foreign aid was posited as one of 
the key tools, with the state increasingly seen, contrary to neoliberal claims, as 
central to development. 
This study conceptualises political aid, whether “of a financial or technical nature,” 
as foreign assistance intended “to develop democratic institutions, practices, and 
capacities” (Diamond 1995: 39), and it takes three key forms: “helping to develop 
the formal political institutions of democracy; assisting the preparation, conduct, 
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and monitoring of elections and strengthening independent organizations in civil 
society” (40). Unlike orthodox assistance (foreign aid of the 1960s which focused 
on firming bureaucracies and so on), however, the current political aid is more 
explicitly focused on political institutions, such as legislatures, political parties, local 
government, among others” (44). 
 
1.10 Organization of the study  
The study falls into eight chapters. Chapter one, the introduction, previews the 
entire study. Chapter two undertakes a literature review as well as theoretical 
considerations. This chapter aims to review extant literatures on democratisation 
as well as undertake an exposition of the relevant theories. The literature review 
part is important in that it is through such a process that I am able to identify a gap 
in the existing knowledge on the subject, and therefore the need to undertake this 
research.  
Out of my literature review, it emerged that current research on Kenya’s 
democratisation tends to be overly focused on a given period, say, the Moi 
presidency, and so on, in assessing the role of external actors in this process. To 
correct this bias in the literature, the study has its focus on the role of EU political 
aid in Kenya’s political development since the early 1990s to 2013. It specifically 
seeks to assess the role of EU political aid in that process over time, 1990-2013. 
The aim is to understand the role of EU political aid as a way to begin to have a 
much fuller picture of the various factors and actors at play in Africa’s 
democratisation. To do so, I draw on both democracy support and foreign aid 
literatures, believing that these two streams of scholarship hold particular promise 
for a fruitful inquiry into the role that EU political aid has played in Kenya’s political 
development since the early 1990s. I couple and rely on the two streams of 
literatures because with the cold war over and democracy apparently in 
ascendance foreign aid became one of the main tools that developed countries 
deployed in their engagement with developing countries. The linking of foreign aid 
and democracy represented a growing acknowledgement that at the heart of post-
cold war democratisation challenges was the issue of weak state institutions. In 
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particular, Democratic Peace Theory postulates that “expanding democracy 
creates condition congenial to a better world in which conflict, disorder and poverty 
are replaced by peace, order and stability. Democracy thus contributes to the 
making of good societies” (Bridoux et al 2012: 1947). 
Chapter three discusses research methodology. This is a qualitative case study in 
which I use secondary documents to analyse the role of EU political aid in Kenya’s 
political development. I deploy the aforementioned strategy because it appears the 
best approach to gain a deeper understanding of EU policy on development 
cooperation in Kenya as this relates to political processes. Most of this material is 
already in the public domain. 
Chapter four focuses on the role of EU political aid in Kenya during the Moil-
administration, 1991-2002. The chapter attempts to trace EU-Kenya interactions 
during the Moi era, and even immediately before Moi’s ascension to the presidency 
in 1978. It aims, by so doing, to show how because of Cold War-related 
calculations from the 1970s up to the early 1990s, Kenya was ogled as a rare 
economic and political success story in an otherwise hopeless neighbourhood. 
These cold war-related calculations as well as stellar economic performance 
helped the new government avoid unnecessary scrutiny. Because of these two 
factors Kenya became a darling of the donors. It was the first country to sign the 
ACP-EU pact under Lome. Whereas the government’s repressive tactics were 
there for all to see, aid providers to the country either looked the other way at best 
or actively supported such tactics at worst.  The chapter does however show how 
this hitherto cosy relationship begun to fray as the Kenya government became 
increasingly repressive, first during the waning years of the Kenyatta Presidency, 
and then the Daniel Arap Moi Presidency, especially starting in the early 1980s. 
Then with the demise of the cold war—and thus the erosion of Kenya’s status as 
a valued strategic ally, the EU and other major donors increasingly decried 
‘mounting corruption’ and the attendant deterioration of social services as well as 
increased political repression. 
The chapter shows how with the end of the cold war, the Moi administration came 
under sustained pressure, both domestic and external, to undertake political 
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reforms. Moi—as his colleagues elsewhere on the continent—initially rebuffed 
calls for political change, moving to cast such calls as unnecessary external 
infringement of Kenya’s sovereignty. In addition, the chapter shows how Moi and 
his lieutenants then launched a vigorous national campaign against political 
pluralism, continuously warning that this would open the door to ethnic atavism. 
The chapter next shows that increased external pressure, especially the 
withholding of much needed aid in the early 1990s, forced Moi to relent and thus 
legalise multi-party politics. This would set the country on its first multi-party 
election in 1992. However, Moi and his government would use all manner of tricks, 
including ethnic violence as well as the fanning of divisions within opposition ranks 
to win the inaugural multi-party election. The chapter shows how Kenya’s foreign 
aid providers, including the EU, went ahead and endorsed the outcome of the 
election—although evidence abounded that Moi had actually manipulated the 
election—largely because of their own strategic calculations. 
In the wake of the elections and then Moi’s attempt to revert to his old authoritarian 
style, Kenyans increasingly called for major institutional reforms; specifically, a 
new constitution. Although Moi initially concurred with the opposition on the need 
for constitutional reform, reformers rejected his attempt to entrust the exercise with 
foreign experts, viewing this as a furtive move by the president to retain the status 
quo; this would initially lead to two competing constitution reform visions. Kenyans 
did consequently go into the 1997 elections under the old constitution, although 
again under pressure Moi had conceded to some minor electoral reforms, such as 
the cross-party nomination of electoral commission officials. Following the 1997 
elections and again amidst widespread allegations of electoral fraud—although 
again foreign aid givers elected to remain silent on the matter—after some 
mediation, the two groups would come together to embark on the process. 
However, Moi would prorogue parliament sine die in readiness for the 2002 
elections, in which he was constitutionally barred from vying, just moments before 
the constitution writing conference endorsed the new constitution. 
Moi had all along suspected that the agitation for a new constitution was merely a 
ploy to remove him and his party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) from 
power. His gamble flopped, however: an opposition alliance decimated KANU in 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
26 
 
the ensuing general election in December 2002, in the process propelling Mwai 
Kibaki to the presidency. 
Chapter five on the Kibaki/NARC administration, 2003-2008, attempts to explicate 
political processes in Kenya during the country’s pivotal transition from the long 
Moi—and by extension KANU—rule to the NARC/Kibaki era, and the role of EU 
aid in that process. The chapter aims to chart major events under the NARC 
administration with the aim of highlighting the role that EU political aid played at 
each given stage as well as the limitations that characterized that contribution. 
The chapter opens with a discussion of the euphoria that attended the NARC 
victory, and the palpable hope that many Kenyans and their foreign supporters had 
that the country had finally entered a new era, one that would herald the launch of 
major reforms as promised by the victorious party when campaigning for the 2002 
general elections.  Initially the NARC administration appeared to keep its promises, 
especially when it came to economic renewal, and some social policies, such as 
free primary school education. In addition, the country appeared to enjoy 
unprecedented levels of political freedom. 
However, as the chapter shows, with time, elite fragmentations, especially the 
failure by Kibaki and his wing of NARC to honour their pre-election Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with Odinga’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) began to 
sap reform momentum; these divisions would take a particularly dangerous turn 
on the issue of constitutional reform, with the two political camps vying to get a 
constitution that would best serve their personal and partisan interests, 
disregarding, in the process, the wishes of Kenyans. These elite divisions would 
undergird the 2007 elections. 
Odinga and his camp viewed the elections as offering them the best avenue to 
dislodge from power what they increasingly denounced as a corrupt, and ethnic-
oriented Kibaki-led administration. Kibaki and his wing of NARC were, however 
determined not to loss state power, fearful that a defeat would spell doom not just 
for themselves but also members of their ethnic community. This polarized 
atmosphere would help trigger post-election violence, with Odinga and his 
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supporters livid at what they saw as blatant electoral fraud perpetrated by Kibaki, 
working in concert with the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). 
The conclusion examines the role that the EU played in Kenya during this period, 
including its activities during the post-election violence; in the process, it also 
examines the limitations that characterised the EU’s involvement in the country 
during the period. 
Chapter six has its glare on the Grand Coalition Government formed in early 2008 
following international mediation efforts that ended the 2007-08 post-election 
violence. The chapter seeks to limn some of the key issues and controversies that 
characterised the Grand Coalition Government (GCG), 2008-13, political 
wrangles/elite fragmentation—both inter and intra-party. 
The next part shifts to an examination of reforms, with reform of Kenya’s Electoral 
Management Body in the wake of the 2007-08 crisis, as well as the inauguration 
of a new Constitution in 2010, as the main focus. The Kriegler Commission had 
identified the ECK as a major culprit in the post-election violence, finding that the 
electoral body lacked the requisite capacity to manage a free and fair election. The 
Commission had called, as a remedy, for the creation of a nimbler electoral body 
to replace the ECK. I next briefly mention the ICC versus Special Tribunal debate; 
the issue gets fuller treatment in the next chapter; the section closes by analysing 
the role of EU political aid in Kenya during the period, 2008-13, with the National 
Accord providing the context. 
Chapter seven discusses Kenya’s political development since 2013, including the 
period leading to the elections that saw Kenyatta declared the 4th president of 
Kenya. It aims to trace how the reforms launched following PEV, such as 
institutional and constitutional, are unfolding in practice under the Jubilee 
administration and the role of EU political aid in Kenya during this period. After all, 
the current administration is really the first one to preside over these reforms, with 
the grand coalition government having served merely as a transitional mechanism. 
The chapter opens with an introduction, including preparations for those elections, 
the elections themselves—here the focus is on the main campaign issues that 
framed the elections, and the political alliances that emerged in the run-up to the 
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elections. The section also examines the reaction, especially by the losing side to 
Kenyatta being declared the winner, especially the decision to challenge the 
results in the Supreme Court as well as the ensuing ruling by that court upholding 
Kenyatta’s victory. 
The chapter next turns to a discussion of some of the key events—themes—that 
have emerged under the Kenyatta administration, as a way to understand the 
dynamics of political change in Kenya since 2013. The section will therefore focus 
on among other themes, emergent calls for reform of IEBC; The ICC case that 
confronted Kenyatta and Ruto at the time of assuming office; and so on. 
The next substantive part of the chapter then turns to analyses of the role of EU 
political aid in Kenya from 2013-, the aim being to get a grasp of the contributions 
that that assistance has made towards Kenya’s political development during this 
period, as well as some of the limitations that have come to the fore in that effort. 
The chapter then closes with a few concluding remarks on Kenya’s political 
development to date and what the future might portend for the country. 
Chapter eight offers conclusions and recommendations that suggest themselves 
from this study. The conclusions part of the last chapter tries to limn the main 
lessons that this research has explicated as far as foreign aid and democratisation 
in Kenya go, the aim being to make broader statements about the role of foreign—
political aid—in democratisation more generally. The chapter, to this end, revisits 
the major theoretical arguments usually made for and against foreign—political aid 
and democracy support, trying to assess the fit between such arguments and the 
empirical facts as seen in Kenya. 
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CHAPTER 2: Theoretical points of departure and literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literatures on foreign aid and democratization. It seeks to 
comprehend the nexus between them and also find a gap that would warrant this 
study. The chapter falls into five sections. The first section gives an overview of 
foreign aid more broadly and then political aid more specifically. The section does 
so by tracing the evolution of scholarly thinking on foreign aid right from its 
inception after WW II to the present. The second section turns to an examination 
of extant literatures on democratisation. The section explicates the literatures on 
post-cold war democratisation, especially as these relate to Africa.  
Section three attempts to link democratisation and foreign aid. This part specifically 
examines the rationale behind the coupling of the two phenomena. Section four 
reviews the literatures that focus on EU and political aid more generally; this is 
followed by an examination of the scholarship on EU political aid and Africa. The 
section then closes with an examination of the literatures that deal with EU political 
aid and Kenya. 
 
2.2. A Literature Review of Foreign Aid 
Foreign aid for Third World development38  traces its genesis to the immediate 
post-World War II period (Riddell 2007). With the onset of decolonization after 
World War II, there emerged a feeling that for them “political independence without 
steady and broadly based improvement in economic capacities and in material 
levels of living would be a hollow achievement” (Mint 1980: 5). 39   Foreign aid 
hinged on the idea that international efforts could, or should, be undertaken to build 
the economies and societies of the other world (Weatherby et al 2000: 37). Political 
                                            
38 For theories of development consult Rapley (1996). 
39 Find a sampling in, among others Ward (1967). 
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development focused40  on developing countries as “a teleological process”41 
(Hagopian 2000: 881). 
Given the magnitude of the posited developmental challenge, a view developed 
that the market mechanism could not get the job done.   Rather, drawing important 
lessons from successful state-led efforts in economic recovery first during the 
Great Depression in the 1930s and then the reconstruction of both Western Europe 
and Japan after WW II, a consensus emerged on the need for a robust state. 42  
Development economists,43 bolstered by both Keynesian44 views and social 
democratic ideology, posit the state as the precipitate of development, especially 
for late-developer45 countries (White 2002: 97).  
Myrdal (1956: 460) forcefully articulates the need for an activist state. He first 
rejects the equilibrium view that trade works “towards equality in remunerations to 
development factors of production, and, consequently, in income”.  He cautions, 
instead, that trade actually serves as an agent of unequal exchange between the 
developed and developing countries. He, therefore, counsels: “economic 
development has to be brought about by policy interferences” (Myrdal 1956: 463). 
Development theorists, consistent with this thinking, rejected laze-faire 
assumptions with the onset of decolonization in the south. 46 Historically when 
confronted with issues of structural transformation, economists had contended 
                                            
40For critique of the attempt to elide the fact that “a people can enjoy an unparalleled material 
plenty with a low standard of living’, see, among others: Sahlins (1997: 3-21). 
41 As for the Western model as the archetype, see, among others Almond (1965: 183-218); Willner 
(1964: 468-482). 
42For rationales informing state-led development, Lal (1996: 29-36); (Ward 1962). 
43 On the evolution of development economics, consult, among others Basu (1984). 
44From the end of WW II up to around 1979 Keynesianism served as the organizing global economic 
theoretical model; beginning in the late 1970s the approach came under sustained neoclassical assault; see, 
for instance Pressman (2006), pp. 113-38.  
45 On the state as the precipitate of development in late-developer states, consult especially 
Gerschenkron (1995), pp. 72-4. 
46Find a discussion of orthodox views and the rationales for their rejection as obstacles to 
development in, among others Sannwald et al (1959). 
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themselves with countries exploiting their particular comparative advantages 
(Harris 1986).  Rebuffing orthodoxy, however, development economics argued that 
only the state had the capacity47  to oversee the development effort in less 
developed states. 48 
A number of economistic theories of foreign aid in the liberal mould did come to 
the fore. In stages of development theory W. W. Rustow, drawing on the Harold-
Domar model of long-term economic growth conceptualized lack of savings/capital 
as the main constraint on growth (Rosenstein-Rodan 1961). By positing the need 
for a net investment as central to economic development, Rostow thereby made a 
connection between foreign aid and development. Net inflow of foreign resources 
would augment domestic resources and thereby facilitate development (Meier 
1995; Stern 1991).   
Chenry and others focused on the requisites of structural transformation.  They 
cautioned that two views exist on the way economic growth happens: a neo-
classical camp, on the one hand, and a more expansive approach, on the other 
(Chenry 1986: 95). They observed that neo-classicists assume that the economy 
is already operating at Pareto optimum.  
The structural view, focused on the theory of the second best, postulates that 
developing and developed countries have “dissimilar sets of growth factors” 
(Chenery 1986: 310). Under structural theory, a lot of room exists for economic 
improvement.  The theory traces structural transformation to a movement of 
resources from lower productivity activities and into higher productivity ones. 
Scholars therefore investigated the amalgam of strategies that southern countries 
could deploy to tackle the various structural rigidities that they faced. They 
                                            
47 Consult, for example LaPalombara (1966: 86-88). 
48 But the model’s appeal was not restricted to the newly independent states; for example, in 
their bid to address their country’s late development Japanese leaders erected a number of institutions, 
key among them MITI. See especially Johnson (1982). 
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therefore posited that external resource flows could serve as a short-term solution 
to this problem. However, in the long-run, domestic resources would suffice.  
Southern countries faced two major structural rigidities: one, with respect to 
“investment-limited growth, skills and savings are in short-supply. In the second, 
trade-limited growth, foreign exchange is in short-supply because export earnings 
are lower than import needs” (Riddell 1987: 90). The theorists contended that 
southern countries would embark on self-sustaining growth after passing through 
key phases. 
 In phase-one, southern countries are characterized by a paucity of skills, although 
they face no balance of payments problems. It is this skills' shortage that “hampers 
potential investment levels reaching the level required for the target growth rate to 
be achieved. Inflows of foreign resources help to close “the gap between the 
increment in investment and in domestic savings until such a time as the rate of 
investment is high enough to sustain the target growth rate” (idem).   
In phase two, which is brief, foreign aid is mainly focused on the rate of increase 
of investment due to skills bottlenecks. In addition, because of other rigidities in 
the economy, a trade gap ensues—due to the fact that the economy is not yet able 
to react promptly to the loss of foreign aid. Finally, in phase three the savings gap 
is closed. The main concern now is one of tackling the trade gap—due to lingering 
rigidities—which continue to hinder self-sustaining growth; this serves as the main 
reason for continuing foreign aid infusion. 
Over time, however, a pessimistic view that cast the state as inimical to 
development did come to the fore (Howell et al 2005). This pessimism issued from 
the state’s perceived failure to accomplish the agenda mapped out for it at the 
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outset (Evans 1985). Critics increasingly called for a paradigm shift in development 
theory (Nettl 1969). They maintained that extant theories had left the problem or 
problems largely unsolved. From the right a revitalized neo-classical counter-
movement led the assault on statism, citing the alleged ills attendant Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI), inefficiency for example (White 1995: 163-164).  
Dependency theorists similarly faulted orthodoxy for focusing overly on economic 
growth. They wanted the glare on the more vexed issues of economic development 
(McKay 2004; White 1992).  Leftists, in an amplification, called for a more 
expansive definition of aid effectiveness, beyond the mere technical macro-
economic concerns. They urged “quantifiable relationships that attempt to capture 
the patterns of poverty and distribution and, relatedly social and political aspects 
of the development process” (Riddell 1987: 129). This critical appraisal paved the 
way for a new approach towards aid: 
The basic needs strategy.  The work of Hollis Chenry and Paul Streeten, 
both associated with the World Bank, contributed mightily to this 
intellectual revolution. The former emphasized the need to reconcile the 
objective of growth and social equity. The latter drew attention to the 
notion that development assistance should concentrate ‘on the nature 
of what is provided rather than on income. (Therien 2002: 455) 
The basic need’s’ thrust and] its impact on the international agenda was 
such that the 1970s were said to have been, albeit briefly, the era of 
dependency theory. (Therien 2002: 456) 
 
 
Critiques focused increasingly on the classical view of administration. The theory 
conceptualizes49 organizations as “relatively closed systems, dependent largely for 
their success on internal efficiency of operations” (Miles 1980, 189). According to 
                                            
 49For a classification of organizations, consult Berkley (1984). 
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this perspective, “structures and processes were presumed to serve stable tasks 
and enduring goals” (idem). However, critics warn that the “organizational aspects 
of development cannot be distilled down to a technological fix,” (Turner et al 1997: 
2). Organizations are not mechanical entities.  There do not exist universal 
management menus. 
Modern organization theorists see organizations “as open … systems struggling 
to perform and survive in a larger context that is both complex and dynamic” 
(Miles 1980: 189). Organizational environments50 play key roles in the 
performance of public sector organizations. Such organizations operate within 
open, dynamic environments, framed by social, cultural, economic and political 
factors (Turner et al 1997).  Behaviorists cautioned in particular that formal 
structures never “succeeded in conquering51 the non-rational dimensions of 
institutional behavior “(Litterer 1974: 388). Formal structures “interact with the 
environment thus deviating from officially stated goals” (Allison et al 1999: 150).  
Applied to development administration, critics argued that development planning 
elided a number of key considerations (Hagopiani 2000: 889). Some maintained, 
for example, that the state was a class project. Others argued that development 
planning failed to conceptualize the process as complex —running from policy 
formulation to implementation (Pressman et al 1979). Conceptualizing policy and 
politics52 as two entirely separate 53 spheres (Turner et al 1997: 3), such plans 
quickly ran into trouble once they moved from the formulation to the 
                                            
  50See, for instance Costello (1994: 345-364). 
 51 Subordinates do not automatically comply, See, for example Kaufman (1973). 
52 Esman (1966: 59-112).  
53 For rejection of the politics/administration dichotomy, in favour of the view that a synthesis of 
administrative and political theory is essential to better understand government, consult, among others 
Waldo (1990: 73-83). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
 
implementation phase (Chambers 1983; Pressman et al 1979). The model failed 
to appreciate “the engagement of social groups with the state, and the mutual 
transformation that entails” (Magdal 2001: 250).  This impasse implied that:  
Administration was not an independent variable; rather, it could only 
facilitate development under a different political constellation of forces 
or arrangement. In other words, the critics rejected the logic implicit in 
modernization theory of administration as neutral technology—rather; 
the implication was that what was needed was a contingency model of 
development. (Turner et al 1997)  
 
The critics maintained that as a result of this circumscribed 54 understanding of 
change, “centralized urban and professional power, knowledge and values ha [d] 
frowned out over and often failed to recognize the knowledge of rural people 
themselves” (Chambers 1983, 82).55 Other critics maintained that hierarchical 
social transformation was apt to display the full range of standard bureaucratic 
pathologies, contending that, by themselves, such arrangements, simplified as 
they are, cannot: 
Generate a functioning community, city, or economy. Formal order, to 
be more explicit, is always and to some considerable degree parasitic 
on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not recognize, 
without which it could not exist, and which it alone cannot create or 
maintain. [The root of the problem is that formalistic approaches do not 
pay enough attention to] precisely the practical skills that underlie any 
complex activity. (Scott 1998: 310-311) 
 
 
                                            
54This represented a revisionist view of liberal democracy, See Gendzier (1985).  
55 For an earlier critique in this vein, albeit addressed to developed-country economic experts 
venturing in the South, see Bekerman (1956). 
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In the face of this perceived failures, critics 56 increasingly decried the state in 
general, but the African one in particular. They simultaneously called for a shift 
from a macro—development planning—to a micro—project-planning—approach 
to international development.  They, in the main, offered that the ‘rigidities’ and 
bottlenecks which supposedly vindicated the intervention of the state were in fact 
the results of earlier public interventions or distorted prices. Arguing that the 
market57 “constitute(s) the prime vehicle for achieving economic growth” 
(Pedersen 1992: 617), they counseled that one advantage attendant: 
Involving the private sector is that doing so will help to build institutions 
in developing countries. Institutions such as a market economy, a fair 
and enforceable legal system, and basic infrastructure are vital to 
development. Yet traditional foreign aid, if it focuses on institution-
building at all does so from the top-down… The trouble with this 
approach is that it does not rely on a genuine desire by constituents 
within states to reform. (Justin et al 2008: 20) 
 
The critiques opened the proscenium for the launch of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) (Riddell 2007). SAPs focused on dismantling import-
substitution Industrialization trade regime58s (Berg 1988). In fact, however, critics 
insist that in most instances, the nostra actually represented a misdiagnosis of the 
malady that they sought to cure. 59 They opined that “[i]n at least some cases the 
                                            
56 At another level, though, this debate has to do with the fact that ultimately every society has to 
come to grips with the allocation of otherwise scarce resources, consult Middleton (1996). 
57For this line, see de Soto (989). Still, critics, insists that the superiority is not to be assumed; rather 
it depends on the specific context; others reject the uncritical march towards free markets on equity 
considerations, Ma (2003); Moore (2003).  
58 For liberalization, and especially the role of the IMF, see David (1985). As for strident advocacy of 
liberalization, see Thorbecke (1988). 
59 Institutional economists originally focused on the economy as both culturally and historically 
embedded, with the focus on problem solving and not abstract thought-- a view given special articulation 
by Karl Polanyi in his The Great Transformation, Waller (2006). 
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[state] had, in fact, fostered substantial structural change (Evans 1992: 140). They 
maintain that neo-liberals distort60 the historical circumstances that led to the 
emergence of the state as the locus of development and the global shifts that frame 
the anti-state agenda.  
Critics traced the shift from the state as the solution to the state as the problem a 
changed definition of structural change due to events exogenous to the third world; 
the oil shocks for example. They sought to limn what they saw as a major 
contradiction in neo-liberal thought. Namely, “despite [its] disdain for the wisdom 
of politicians [it] contained the paradoxical expectation the state (the root of the 
problem would be able to become the agent that initiated and implemented 
adjustment programs (become the solution)” (idem).  He continues:  “It was not 
that this expectation was unrealistic” (Evans 1995: 140).    
Amidst mounting criticism over SAPs, the “Washington-Consensus” 61  group then 
began to drain its collective gaze on governance. 62  When the World Bank issued 
its first ever document on the theme in 1989, titled Sub-Saharan Africa: From 
Crisis to Development, it made a link between development failures in Africa and 
public institutions (Leftwich 1995; Pierce et al 2005). The Bank understood 
governance as implying the manner in which public authority was exercised in 
managing national socio-economic development (Dixon 2003). The formulation 
                                             
60  Others trace the ebbs and flows of the role of the state in development to the tendency in 
development economics to first have exalted the virtues of the state and then to have shifted to the market 
as the panacea. See Klitgaard (1991); Werner et al (1993).  
61 This refers to a plethora of policy measures pushed by the IFIs and the US government, and 
derided by critics as neo-liberalism. See David (1985). 
62 A claim in recent years posits that good political management leads to good economic outcomes. 
Critics question the operative logic here, arguing instead that changing economic and social structures 
produce social change. 
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drew instant fire, however. Critics complained that not only did it fail to recognize 
SAPs as part of the problem. They also lamented that to blunt increasing 
opposition to neoliberalism by doggerels:  
Regimes have frequently resorted to ruling or legislating by decree63. . . 
. 
Threats and psychological intimidation accompany the implementation 
of harsh anti-popular, so-called ‘economic reforms’ and accompanying 
loans-foreign aid. There is a growth of neo-authoritarianism in which 
non-elected foreign functionaries and local executive officials (most of 
them non-elected or representing a small fraction of the electorate) 
govern. In short, foreign aid strengthens authoritarian tendencies in the 
executive branches of government, undermining popular support for the 
electoral process and representative government, and thus 
‘democracy.’ (Petras et al 2002: 290) 
 
 
Faced with these escalating critiques, coupled with the global policy shifts 
occasioned by the “war on terrorism,” neo-liberalism has given way to development 
management64 so that the “new watchwords and metrics [that frame international 
development] are now civil society, social capital, participation, policy coherence, 
good governance and democracy” (Carmody 2007: 12). 
 
 
 
                                            
63 See Treisman (1991). 
 
64 For extant theoretical debates in development literature, see McGregor (2007). For the 
management aspects of development, consult Esman (1991).  
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 2.3 Foreign aid and democracy promotion 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The objective is to understand the role of EU political aid in Kenya’s 
democratization. I draw on both democracy support and foreign aid literatures. I 
believe that these two streams of scholarship hold particular promise for a fruitful 
inquiry into the role of EU political aid in Kenya’s political development. I couple 
and rely on the two streams of literatures because with the cold war over and 
democracy apparently in ascendance foreign aid became one of the main tools 
that developed countries deployed in their engagement with developing countries 
(Agresto 2012; Russett 1994).  
The linking of foreign aid and democracy represented a growing acknowledgement 
that at the heart of post-cold war democratisation challenges was the issue of lack 
of state capacity or weak state institutions. In particular, liberal theory posited 
democracy as the best form of government for realizing human development and 
global peace. This would see political aid—in terms of resources specifically 
focused on institution building and civil society development assume 
unprecedented prominence in international affairs.  
 
2.3.2 Foreign Aid and Democratization 
Extant analyses focus on aid’s economic aspects; rarely do they accentuate its 
potential “to promote and support democratization” (Heckelman 2010: 558). 
However, Huntington (1991: 65) identifies the role of external actors as one of the 
major precipitants of what he has characterized as the third wave of democracy. 
Aid as a political tool is used to cajole and induce in a bid to gain “concessions and 
bringing about change in the potential recipient’s policy behaviour” (Soderberg 
2006: 433). Overall, however, aid has mixed effects on democratization. Some of 
it can help institutional strengthening and other indicia conducive to democracy, 
such as education. However, “foreign aid can also insulate elites and, by 
increasing the rent-seeking of retaining or obtaining power… [it can] actually 
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increase the incentives to consolidate power and limit competition and information” 
(Grossman 1992, qtd in Heckelman 2010: 558). 
Aid giving during the cold war issued from geo-strategic calculations (Brown 2005). 
However, the easing and then the end of the Cold War radically changed the 
governance terrain in the developing world, with most autocratic regimes there 
coming under sustained domestic and international pressure65. One percipient 
observer has noted the recent nature of this shift: In the area of “human rights, for 
example, it was not until the 1980s that rights-based issues began to receive 
prominence, and then not through the activities of donor countries but rather 
through the efforts of such groups as Amnesty International. Similarly, it has only 
been since 1989 with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the East 
European and Soviet state systems that democracy has become a new emphasis 
within the Third World” (Steeves 2007: 492-3).  
After 1989 major international agencies, for example the World Bank, quickly 
appropriated and then ogled the theme as a major plank in their engagement with 
developing countries, including aid giving. This shift saw the principle of state 
sovereignty so central to international affairs for centuries come into question. 
Critics argued that the principle did not suffice for a turbulent post-cold war 
environment (Koskenniemi 1998). 
It deserves mentioning: the Westaphalia state system had undergone change over 
the years. However, the principle of state sovereignty remained sacrosanct. 
Indeed, despite their strategy of fostering dependency66 during the Cold War as a 
way to draw countries into their respective camps, even the super-powers paid 
some homage to the principle of state sovereignty. 
With the Cold War over, however, the principle did come into sharp focus. Critics 
contended that the principle did not suffice for a fluid post-cold war international 
environment. As such, on taking office, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then newly 
appointed United Nation’s secretary-general, insisted that, “the time of absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed” (Quoted in Bishop 1994: 77). 
                                            
65 See, for instance Kalyvas (1999). 
66 See, for example, Gibson (2002). 
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A number of factors account for this change. First, with the Cold War over, and in 
a rather stunning turn of events, the self-same external powers that had usually 
used the principle as a pretext to support repression in the developing world now 
quickly rejected it. In its stead they appropriated democracy—now perceiving it as 
“the only legitimate form of government” (Chand 1998: 162). This shift in thinking 
resulted in a change in the discourse; this saw foreign aid now become a tool for 
“promoting democracy through conditionality… through support to on-going 
processes of democratization… and through contributions to the consolidation of 
new democracies by strengthening various institutions considered central to 
democratic governance” (Mkandawire 2010: 1153). In fact, as a result, in large 
part, of these post-Cold War changes, key players in the international arena, UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan--[now former UNSG]—for example, did make 
respect for human rights the lodestar of international action (Leonard and Straus 
2003). 
The focus on democracy emanated from an emergent belief that “support and 
promotion of political democracy is not only a valued end in itself, but one that will 
also contribute towards regional stability and security” (Hurrell 1998: 529). The 
interest in furthering democracy and stability in the developing world was in turn 
informed by the emergence in the post-Cold War era of a universal consensus, 
albeit a fickle one, about acceptable minimum standards of civilized human life 
(Leonard et al 2003). 
Second, the demise of the cold war led to increased internal demands for 
democracy in the third world, part of the Third Wave of Democracy, which 
commenced67 as the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s. Thus faced with 
this changed internal situation, most developed countries decided to cast their lot 
with the ascendant champions of democracy in the developing world. This shift 
rested on a recognition that repressive approaches would no longer suffice in a 
changed global environment. This saw political conditionality-- “the linking of aid to 
administrative and political reforms in recipient countries, in the pursuit of what is 
termed ‘good governance” come to the fore (Robinson 2011: 90).  
                                            
67 Find a sophisticated approach to understanding the transition in terms of regional variations based on 
different regional authoritarian modal types in, among others Geddes (1999: 115-144). 
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Current “foreign aid has [therefore] prioritized the institutional development of 
government” (Hearn 2000: 824), especially given that by the early 1990s, the 
deleterious68 effects attendant indiscriminate neo-liberal attacks on southern state 
edifice as the epitome of the so-called Neopatrimonial69 state had become so 
glaring. Critics argued that such a designation connoted states that were static in 
nature and thus failed to account for change (Turner et al 1997). This implied that 
“Only the state can organize power so as to harness flows of information, people, 
money, force and decisions necessary to regulate human behaviour‖ (Ghlain et al 
2008: 4). In particular, in the face of the obvious failures attendant the state 
retrenchment of the 1980s, there has emerged a new thinking which acknowledges 
that the “strength of state institutions,”70 conceptualized as the capacity to achieve 
the “goals set by incumbents in chief executive position” (Huber 1996: 165-6)—is 
more important in “a broader sense than the scope of state functions” (Fukuyama 
2004: 198). 
The shift issued from an emergent view that for even some of the hypothesized 
outcomes to occur, it was essential to have “state capacity to enforce the rule of 
law and to allocate state resources efficiently” (Huber 1996: 164)71. After all, and 
contrary to neo-liberal claims, “the enormous economic success of East Asian 
NICs is not simply the triumph of the market but also has much to do with strong 
state institutions” (Turner et al 1997: 49). Perhaps cognizant of these extant 
realities, funding to promote democracy has emerged as a major aspect of 
development aid. In more specific terms, there has been funding directed towards 
supporting democracy, with: 
[t]he EU [a]s the largest single funder of democracy-promotion activities, 
with over US$1 billion in Annual commitments… The European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the sole multilateral 
                                            
68 For the implications, especially on state building, of neoliberalism in Africa, see, for instance Laird (2007: 
465-486). 
69 This refers to a state that is traditional and not rational/ legal as defined by Weber. For a revealing critique 
of the patrimonial state formulation when it comes to Africa, especially the failure to account for differences, 
change, as well as the implication that there exists only one type of state across the continent, see, for 
example John (2010: 10-30). 
70 By this I mean norms of behaviour, formal and informal institutions. I therefore conflate three streams of 
institutionalisms: Sociological, historical, and rational choice. For the first, see DiMaggio et al (1991). For 
Historical Institutionalism, see Pierson (1996) and March et al (1989). For Institutional Rational Choice, see 
Green et al (1994). 
71 See, for instance Warner et al (2002: 70-89). 
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development bank established after the end of the Cold War, has also 
been a leader in pushing for democratic reforms. Unique among the 
multilateral development banks, the EBRD explicitly lists the expansion 
of democratic governance as one of its two overarching objectives (the 
other being the development of market economies. (Siegle 2009: 409) 
Aid “has promoted and rewarded democratisation” (Brown 2005: 179-80). In 
particular the  various actors in democracy promotion—northern states and their 
respective state agencies; NGOs; the private sector; international organizations, 
such as the UN; and regional organizations, such as the EU and AU, among others 
(Diamond 1995: 38), have sought to deploy aid “targeted at governmental 
structures such as parliament, the judiciary, and local government, as well as civil 
society organisations, with the aim of strengthening the institutions and culture of 
liberal democracy” (Hearn 2000: 815).  
Proponents of the new strategy contend that both the resolution and the prevention 
of lethal intrastate conflicts “require the nurturing of societal structures and 
institutions to assure each combatant group that their interests will be protected 
through nonviolent means” (Kritz 2005: 803). In this respect, in their democracy 
promotion endeavours, these actors are buttressed by an emergent pro-
democracy international ethos as articulated in various international instruments, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on Civil and political rights; this new posture negates the hitherto obsession with 
the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty. 
Central to the shift was the recognition that repressive approaches would no longer 
suffice in an increasingly turbulent post-cold war era. Instead, “[a]chieving… 
international stability, is now seen as lying in activities designed to reduce poverty, 
satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic self-sufficiency, create representative 
civil institutions, encourage thrift, promote human rights, gender awareness and 
so on: the name of this new security framework is development” (Duffield 2005: 
305). Making this possible also was the fact that with the end of the cold war, 
globally “democracy is now perceived to be the only legitimate form of government” 
(Chand 1998: 162). It needs emphasizing, though: although democracy assistance 
first came to the fore in the 1970s, it only came into its own in the 1990s following 
the demise of the cold war, with a focus on human rights, democracy and good 
governance—as part of the so-called New Policy Agenda (NPM), designed to 
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tackle the plethora of emergent threats to the global post-cold war order. The 
demise of the cold war led to a shift in thinking, with democracy and economic 
reforms now being seen as linked. To pursue the new policy agenda, foreign aid 
was posited as one of the key tools, with the state increasingly seen, contrary to 
neoliberal claims, as central to development. 
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2.3.3  Major themes 
A number of themes have come to the fore in the foreign aid debate in general and 
democracy support in particular. The interplay between foreign aid and national 
economic development; specifically, the connection between foreign aid and 
economic reforms, has come to the fore (Brynen 2008: 232). A number of experts 
have increasingly argued that intrastate conflicts erupt out of perceptions, whether 
imaginary or real, of economic injustice. Still, observers have increasingly warned 
of the inappropriateness of rapid economic reforms. They caution that rapid 
economic reforms have the potential to increase instability (Doorbos 2005; Zaum 
2006).   
Critics have particularly taken umbrage at the simultaneous launch of political and 
economic reforms (Ake 1996).  Scholars arguing in this vein insist that economic 
evisceration blunts the move towards democracy. They opine that while even poor 
countries can make the transition to democracy, such economic scarcity is likely 
to undermine democratic consolidation. Citizens could increasingly begin to 
question the utility of democracy, given their continued economic plight (Diamond 
1995).  
Scholars writing in this vein opine that whereas neo-liberalism is too narrowly 
focused on economic growth, what is, instead, needed is a comprehensive 
strategy for development (Commins et al 1998).  They contend that by 
circumscribing the policy options open to leaders, neo-liberalism may actually 
contribute to political instability. What happens in this type of environment, they 
warn, is that out to gain political mileage, politicians exploit latent signs of economic 
discontent, along ethnic lines (Heilman 1999).   
Other studies have sought to question the type of democracy being promoted. 
They argue that current foreign aid is focused on developing procedural 
democracy (Pinkney 1999). Liberalism views the challenge as one of developing 
political and institutional mechanisms for structuring political contestation (Dahl 
1971). Critics argue that based on this thinking the so-called democracy promotion 
has unduly focused on political and civil rights to the almost total neglect of the 
cultural, economic and social aspects of democracy (Bishop 1994; Craig 1998).  
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The critics do however argue that developing countries deserve substantive 
democracy, democracy that focuses on the delivery of material benefits. They warn 
that absent this, while even poor countries can make the transition, they are 
unlikely to consolidate democracy (Pinkney 1999; Suttner 1999). They therefore 
contend, contrary to neo-liberal orthodoxy, that democratic government “can be 
the instrument wielded . . . to attenuate the effects of the destructive side of 
economic development” (Wilber 1994: 137). 
Still others have sought to understand the link between democratic consolidation 
and the constitution or governmental system. Some comparative politics scholars 
have increasingly made the rather tantalizing argument that parliamentary systems 
are better suited to democratic consolidation than presidential ones. They insist 
that because of their fused nature, parliamentary systems make for better 
aggregation of interests (Linz 1990). 
The link between foreign aid, security, and democracy has also emerged as a 
major theme in the literature. During the Cold War, motivated by economic, political 
and security calculations, great powers made foreign aid the spearhead of their 
agendas in the developing world (Harbeson et al 1995). However, with the demise 
of the Cold War foreign aid lost its original rationale and much of its remaining 
support. Critics had long charged that foreign aid had no discernible impact on 
economic development and only enriched “the pockets of corrupt dictators, while 
funding the salaries of a growing, bloated bureaucracy” (Radelet 2010: 107). 
Contrary to these claims, “[i]t should hardly be surprising aid did not always spur 
development … since that was not its principal aim. Some of its basic goals, such 
as the support of today’s strategic allies greatly contradicted the interest in longer-
term development—contributing to the perception that aid is ineffective” (ibid). 
However, with the end of the Cold war, foreign powers quickly appropriated 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law as key criteria for continued 
engagement with the same countries (Sherman 2008). In particular, since the 
demise of the cold war, some have sought to emphasis what they perceive as a 
close nexus between security and development; this assumed added urgency in 
the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US (Ganzle 2012: 116). International 
engagement with troubled states underwent a sea change in the wake of the 11 of 
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September 2001 terrorist strikes on the US; in fact, some located state atrophy at 
the heart of some of the world’s most vexing problems, terrorism key among them 
(Fukuyama 2004: ix; Milliken et al 2005: 12); it was this calculation that animated 
international efforts in Afghanistan following the ouster of the Taliban regime in the 
early 2000s, for example. 
As part of this changed menu of goals "the U.S. now claims to prioritize democracy 
as a key element in its foreign policy engagements” (Travis 1995: 541). America’s 
new commitment to democracy rests on four key motives, “the war on terrorism; 
projection of soft power; fighting global poverty; and finally an attempt to further 
U.S. values of equality” (Radelet 2010: 109-10). Thus, because of the 11 
September 2001 terrorist strikes on the United States, “development assistance 
has now a new lease on life” (Dichter 2005: 293). 
Still, critics argue that it is not easy to conceptualize the security-development 
nexus, given that security is not a development goal in and of itself—as opposed 
to security in security proper (Ganzle 2012: 118). They, for one, argue that 
establishing a strong state attuned to the dictates of fighting terrorism may not 
necessarily advance the democratic agenda. 
They therefore warn that the current obsession with order and security poses a 
real threat to third world political development. They worry that repressive regimes 
will enjoy much latitude in defining domestic opponents as security threats and 
dealing with them harshly (Hadiz 2004: 67; Harbeson 2005: 278). Indeed, some 
critics have faulted the strategy as connoting furtive imperialism (Cox 2008), 
specifically a strategy designed to create new post-cold war client states. 
The issue of endogenous versus exogenous factors in democratisation has also 
come to the fore. Champions of democracy as an endogenous matter insist that 
domestic actors must assume the lead role for purposes of accountability and 
legitimacy. They counsel that the emphasis ought to rest on “the capability of 
national actors and their interactions with the populace. Although international 
actors have an important role to play, their engagement is rarely the key to 
ensuring the effectiveness of states” (Call 2008: 366).  They insist that because 
domestic actors have a vested interest in the long-term viability of the state, they 
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are likely to insist on good governance from their leadership (Fukuyama 2004; 
Papagiani 2008).  
The critics do therefore decry what they currently see as “a grand experiment in 
liberal imperialism in the use of international authority” to erect democratic polities 
(Cox 2008: 250). They insist that available evidence does not vindicate this 
strategy as efficacious for the task (Caplan 2006). However, supporters of greater 
external involvement posit this as necessary to augment otherwise meagre 
domestic resources (Bose 2006; Brynen 2008; Ottaway 2005: 246). 
Other scholars have sought to question the motives and effectiveness of such 
assistance. They posit the strategy as a self-serving posture by sender countries 
(Bosin 2012). Those who question the motives and effectiveness of democracy 
support cast that effort as selective at best and outright manipulative at worst. They 
observe that when the strategic interests of democracy promoters are at stake, 
those countries are likely to sacrifice democracy. Very seldom do values such as 
democracy matter (Olsen 1998). Indeed, other scholars writing in this vein have 
assailed democracy promotion as propaganda designed to gloss over historical 
domination (Ake 1992). 
Another theme centres on the impact of foreign aid on sovereignty. Specifically, 
the legitimacy of foreign intervention to promote human rights, democracy and 
good governance versus the need to protect state sovereignty. Supporters of the 
shift point to a growing acknowledgement of the responsibility to protect those 
under oppression by their own states as part of humanitarian law (Bishop 1994).  
However, as supporters of the status quo see it, the modern, sovereign state-
based system arose in direct reaction to this situation. Others argue, moreover, 
that the conceptualisation of human rights has proved difficult and controversial. 
Critics offer that such a circumscribed definition elides social, economic and 
cultural rights (Crawford 2009: 67). Other critics contend that such externally-led 
efforts, besides being motivated by ulterior motives, may also work to blunt the 
potential for the organic development of the states in question (Himes 1994; 
Menkhaus 2008).  
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Another set of literatures has focused on what it views as a furtive attempt to 
reduce development to a managerial undertaking. The literatures caution that 
issues of programme design are political and not technical (Brynen 2008; 
McGovern 2008: 340). They in particular posit that development comprehensively 
understood is multifaceted, as enunciated at recent World Conferences and then 
encapsulated in MDGs. They consequently counsel, “Organising policy for global 
development is thus far from being a mechanistic or technocratic exercise” 
(Grimme et al 2012: 4). The literatures posit that to promote stability, development 
must ogle both managerial and political aspects of development. 
However, critics aver that the focus on governmental processes leads to an 
inherently hierarchical process—due to the implicit narrow definition of democracy. 
Indeed, according to this stance, the main flaw inherent to the model of 
development that predominated in the 1960s was that it focused on bureaucratic 
efficiency while eliding the fact that states create winners and losers. This implied 
the need to build popular support for policy-making. Yet under the extant 
managerialist strategy, continue the critics, issues of participation receive short-
shrift. As a result, issues of political development in the Third World “‘that need 
mediating’ are then quickly criminalized to be punished” (Chandler 2006: 6). 
Instead to suffice, maintain proponents of this stance, foreign aid policies should 
facilitate: 
[T]he building of legal infrastructure and participatory mechanisms, and 
that they take into account local perceptions, realities and responses. At 
the very least, donors must discontinue support of non-inclusive ‘private’ 
organizations and reform by decree. Rather, donors should broaden the 
base of recipients and support structures to include all relevant parties. 
Indeed… th[e] evidence… shows that aid projects that implicate 
sensitive political processes are very difficult to administer effectively 
without engendering negative consequences for recipients and/or 
donors. (Wedel 2001: 202) 
 
2.4 The nature of political aid: Election monitoring/observation 
Monitoring regimes, of which election monitoring is an instance, have an important 
role in ensuring adherence to international norms and commitments (Simpson et 
al 2012). Election observation has therefore emerged as a key strategy for 
democracy preservation and, hence, conflict prevention in recent years. Election 
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observation, undertaken by both local and international monitors, aims to 
guarantee the integrity of the electoral process by communicating the international 
community’s expectations (Teshome 2013: 1003). As Short-Term Observers 
(STOs), their larger numbers place election monitors “in an excellent position to 
render a comprehensive and accurate picture of the entire election, including 
potential patterns of discrimination” (Binder 2007: 231).  Such observation helps in 
a number of ways: first, they do documentation, by thoroughly scrutinising the 
conduct of the elections, through the generation and analysis of election-related 
data; they can then render a final verdict on the conduct of the elections (Chakand 
1998: 169).  
Still, its increased use has seen governments that seek to cheat develop other 
strategies, including staffing strategic institutions such as the judiciary with 
cronies—practices that have far more damaging consequences on governance in 
the long run (Simpson et al 2012: 501). In addition, election monitoring usually 
relies on hastily assembled data, thus precluding the rendering of a comprehensive 
verdict; instead what emanate from such data are superficial recommendations. 
Furthermore, while in theory, international election observers should not take their 
marching orders from the sending agency; this, however, is not always the case. 
More often than not, other considerations come into play thus colouring the 
ensuing evaluation (Teshome 2013). 
 
2.5 The nature of democracy assistance: Technical assistance 
Technical Assistance involves foreign experts working with their domestic 
counterparts, from both government and the NGOs, in support of the entire 
electoral cycle from pre-election preparations to post election capacity building by 
supporting the establishment and reform of EMBs (Mitchell et al 2008: 161-2). 
Usually seen as an entry point for other desired reforms—such as good 
governance, as well as the building of relationships—the strategy can also help in 
the identification of other government entities that need assistance (Schroeder 
2013: 220). However, this is not merely a technocratic issue: technical assistance 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
has clear political implications; specifically, it is focused on strengthening institution 
in order to promote participatory and effective electoral institutions. 
On the electoral front, technical assistance might involve among other activities 
training candidates; civic education, budgeting procedures, “computerizing voter 
lists… amending electoral regulations… and training electoral officials on new 
voting procedures” (Schroeder 2013: 209-210); these activities are usually focused 
on creating credible electoral institutions and procedures, in the process increasing 
voter confidence in these institutions and processes (Binder 2007; Schroeder 
2013). In addition, technical teams normally have the chance to discuss with 
‘authorities’ emerging issues, as well as providing protection for otherwise 
vulnerable local monitoring teams. Understood in this manner, technical training 
groups beyond observing, as LTOs can immensely “strengthen and support local 
initiatives and civil society organisations” (Binder 2007: 231). 
 
2.6 The EU and political aid 
2.6.1 The EU’s emergence as a Global Player 
The end of the cold war necessitated a more robust foreign policy posture by the 
EU. This led to the widening of the policy menu, to encompass issues that “related 
to foreign and security policy” (Olsen 2004: 426).  The bloc placed a big premium 
on “democracy promotion and human rights” in this transformed security 
environment (Olsen 2002: 132).  This policy shift called for a coherent and 
coordinated strategy. This would see the EU develop a number of policy 
instruments/institutions, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for 
example (Olsen 2004: 376). 
The liniments of a Common European Foreign Policy had begun to take shape 
with the launch of SEA in 1986.  SEA called for the EU "to act as a cohesive force 
in international relations" (Carbone 2008: 324). To this end, Maastricht Treaty of 
1986 divided EU policy areas into 3: the 1st Pillar—this is where the European 
Community had full competence. The pillar focused on trade and agricultural 
policies, with the EU Commission having full implementing powers. 2nd and 3rd 
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pillars—these are intergovernmental, with Member States in control. The 2nd and 
3rd pillars focus on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) (Mackie 2008: 144).  Maastricht established a legal basis 
for development cooperation by acknowledging existing policies. It also “provided 
a Title (Title xvii) on development cooperation and specific articles (1300-1304), 
setting out the objectives of European Community development cooperation and 
the principles of implementing them.   
Development cooperation was defined as a competence of the European 
Community, but was qualified as ‘complementary’ to the Member States. This left 
full power with Member States to continue their own policies in this area, alongside 
those of the Commission” (Reisen 2009: 243-244). EU development cooperation 
would now pivot on the promotion of social and sustainable development; the 
campaign against poverty, as well as the integration of southern states into the 
global economy.  
The changes found expression in broader policy statements, such as the 
Statement of Development Policy (SDP) (2000), European Consensus on 
Development (ECD) (2005)—and a series of accompanying administrative 
reforms. In particular, the EU sought to cast itself as a normative power in 
international affairs. Deriving allegedly from universal norms, the EU's normative 
power is “founded on and has as its foreign and development policy objectives the 
consolidation of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” (Manners 2002: 241, qtd., in Storey 2006: 331).  
The EU has made democracy promotion a major plank in its international relations. 
For example, the bloc adopted political conditionality for its eastward expansion in 
the early 1990s.  The bloc has, consequently, increasingly cast its activities largely 
in terms of the creation of participatory governance structures, the development of 
new social norms, and the establishment of the rule of law and democracy” 
(Hampson 2001: 393). The bloc posited these as pivots of security, governance, 
and development on the basis of enhanced political dialogue” (Pere 2009: 266).  
A number of themes have come to the fore on the issue of EU democracy support 
more generally. Some scholars have attempted to assess the EU's attempt to cast 
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itself as a normative power. Critics counter that in practice the norms are hollow. 
They aver, for example, that the EU is ready and willing to sacrifice these avowed 
values if and when the circumstances so warrant. In particular, some of the studies 
have consistently found that there exists a conflict between the avowed goal of 
democracy support, on the one hand, and strategic calculations, on the other. The 
studies report that whenever the two conflict, strategic calculations always trump 
the democracy support agenda. Critics have looked askance at this development 
(Bagoyoko et al 2009), arguing that it reflects a retreat into cold war thinking when 
geostrategic calculations reigned supreme. 
Other scholars have focused on explicating the origin of the aforesaid gap. Biondo 
(2010) finds that that inconsistency may also issue from a conflict between the 
overarching EU goal of promoting development--conceptualised as eradicating 
poverty, on the one hand, and democracy support, on the other.  Whenever the 
two conflict, the EU, she shows, is wont to focus on development while eliding 
democracy. The EU rationalises its actions on the grounds that in the long run, 
with development, democracy is likely to emerge organically. 
Other studies have sought to limn what they view as the EU’s pursuit of 
contradictory policies. They, for example, observe that whereas the EU is pledged 
to advance democracy and human rights, “its implementation has at best been 
weak and inconsistent,” characterized by the fact that “the amount of aid 
channelled into promoting democracy and respect for human rights was 
remarkably limited and the implementation . . . flawed” (Cox et al 1997: 40; 
Crawford 2001: 237, qtd in Olsen 2004: 434).  
They opine, moreover, that while the EU “Provided substantial assistance to 
processes of democratic transition [it provided] considerably less to subsequent 
democratic consolidation” (Crawford 2009: 150-1). Most of the aid went to the 
electoral process and political and civil rights. 
Yet other studies find that the fragmented nature of EU policy making blunts its 
democracy support agenda (Olsen 2008). According to this line, the EU's attempt 
to act under the CFSP framework faces stiff opposition from those wedded to MS 
bilateral involvement. Opponents of EU multilateralism view it as an encroachment 
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on MS sovereignty. However, champions of multilateralism offer otherwise. To 
them, the EU "'offers a global presence, policy coherence (particularly in regard to 
trade), a crucial role in facilitating coordination and harmonization, in promoting 
‘best practice’ across the EU and offering particular experience in the areas of 
governance and democracy promotion'” (Dearden 2008: 121). 
Other studies find flaws in EU's governance recreation agenda. The studies offer 
that the EU began the process of governance recreation as enunciated in Country 
Strategy Papers (CSPs). However, critics claim that there exists a major 
disconnect between the political and economic analyses of CSPs and actual EU 
support. According to the critics, the EU is too narrowly focused on technocratic 
aspects of state capacity; it elides the more crucial political aspects. The studies 
claim the EU has sought to focus on public sector reforms and public finance. It 
ignores the key political aspects of governance, such as power distribution, 
ethnicity, and so on, at play. Critics maintain that the strategy epitomizes the 
current securitization of development (Hout 2010).  
 Indeed, other studies have, in similar vein, endeavoured to elucidate the 
disjuncture that exists between the EU’s rhetoric of good governance and the 
actual, negative results. They observe that the EU uses this concept, contrary to 
what it claims, to forward its own normative preferences in ACP states. The 
construction of a specific type of state there—thereby eliding the distinction needed 
between good governance—an administrative concept—and democratic 
government—form of state (Slocum-Bradley et al 2010). 
 
2.7 EU Aid and Africa: From Lome to Cotonou and the AU 
2.7.1 Introduction 
 
EU-Africa cooperation has its roots in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, the legal 
document establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) (Gibert 2009: 
621). In particular, growing nationalist agitations in the colonies for independence 
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signalled the need for “new economic orientations and a different shaping of 
relations with developing countries” (Reisen 2009: 84). Under part I, the Treaty 
made “Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) associates of the EEC” (ibid. 
37); these involved mostly French colonies or possessions in West Africa. The 
arrangement lasted from 1958 to1962. The arrangement was reconfigured in 1963 
into preferential trading arrangements for newly independent former French 
colonies (Archer et al 1992: 120; Gibert 2009: 621). Known as the “Yaoundé 
Agreements”, and in effect between 1963 and 1975, the arrangement focused on 
economic cooperation in francophone Africa to develop infrastructure in the wake 
of decolonisation.  
The Yaoundé Convention led to the extension of EEC relations with Associated 
states for an additional five years (1964-1969). The Convention was renewed for 
another five years. At this earlier stage the agreement focused on trade and 
financial and technical cooperation with the EU, but later broadened to encompass 
economic cooperation (Reisen 2009). The signing of the second Yaoundé 
Convention was accompanied by the Arusha Agreement. Signed between the EEC 
and East African states, Arusha was a reciprocal trade agreement that did not 
provide for financial and technical assistance from the EEC (Gruhn 1976). This 
would then undergo further changes over the years (Udombana 2004).  
Enlargement of the EEC in 1973, necessitated expanding the scope of Community. 
The change sought to extent development policy to former British overseas 
colonies and territories. This led to the establishment of the Lome Convention in 
1975 to replace pre-existing arrangements. Lome 1 came into effect on 1st April, 
1976 (Gibert 2009: 621). The north—including the EEC—was in a particularly 
vulnerable position vis-à-vis the south at the time. The north faced pining post-WW 
II economic boom, as well as the oil shocks. Southern states were also pressing 
for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).  
When negotiations for Lome I commenced, southern states had a much stronger 
bargaining position. They therefore pressed for non-reciprocity in trade. They also 
sought a commitment by the EEC to stabilize their export earnings as well as 
industrial cooperation, among others. The new arrangement introduced a separate 
protocol covering sugar to provide guarantees for ACP exporters to EEC—in terms 
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of a negotiated price and quantity. It also sought to stabilize export earnings for 
certain ACP exports in times of fluctuations—through STABEX—thus providing 
some amalgam of security to ACP states (Archer et al 1992: 125). Lome was more 
extensive in its terms than any other arrangement between the developed and the 
developing world. Legally binding; and occupying the second place at the apex of 
the pyramid of EU’s relationships, Lome would govern the relationship between 
the two sides for most of the cold war.  
Lome received mixed reviews over the years. Whereas some detected signs of 
progress, others denounced what they saw as dominance and failure (Brown 
2002). For example, contrary to the expectations of ACP countries that the 
allocation of EDF resources would involve joint negotiations, actually the EU 
remained in control. The final decision to fund actually rested with the EDF 
Committee—an EEC body, meaning that the EEC actually had veto power over 
any proposed project. Lome has particularly come under searing critique for 
allegedly having done nothing to promote the balanced development of ACP 
(Udombana 2004).  
The relationship is now governed by a revised arrangement: the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement (CPA). CPA is presented by its proponents as aimed at 
fast-tracking ACP socio-economic development so as to promote “peace, security 
and to promote a stable and democratic political environment” (Udombana 2004: 
71).  Based on ‘equality between the partners and ownership of the development 
strategies,’ CPA took effect in 2000 (idem). CPA enunciates a number of agenda 
items for the parties’ continued engagement, key among them “political dialogue 
and governance conditionality as the core strategies for promoting democracy and 
anchoring the rule of law in developing countries” (Sentyiso 2003: 148). The CPA’s 
main objectives are the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty and the 
gradual integration of ACP States into the global economy, in the context of 
sustainable development (Mackie 2008: 144).  
The change in ACP-EU relations derived from a changed international 
environment. When Lome II was negotiated, not much happened. The south was 
beginning to lose its strong bargaining position in the global economy. This 
became patently clear at the time of Lome III. Lome III happened at a time when 
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the ACP had been seriously weakened by the world recession. This saw the north 
introduce aid conditionality. The bloc had a greater focus on rural development. 
This connoted a shift from non-interference in ACP affairs. The EU now sought to 
define priority areas for cooperation (Brown 2002).  
It was Lome IV, however, that marked a watershed in ACP-EU relations. Aid 
conditionality, in the form of SAPs took centre stage. The negotiations for Lome IV 
unfolded in the context of the Third World debt crisis in the 1980s. The ACP states 
pressed for such conditionality outside the confines of the IFIs. The EU easily 
rebuffed the posture, however (Gibert 2009: 699). It was the mid-term review 
undertaken in 1995-2000 that introduced political conditionality in the relationship. 
The requirement that ACP countries “observe the rules of democracy and respect 
for human rights,” (Olsen 2004: 429). The review also introduced performance-
based aid rules. Then in 1996 the EU Commission published a “Green Paper” 
discussing further relations with the ACP—calling, in the main, for ACP states to 
be split along-sub regional lines to create Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs). This would then culminate with the signing of the CPA in 2000 (Olsen 
2004). 
On the political front, the CPA fortifies the emergent commitment to human rights 
and democracy in ACP-EU cooperation (Zimelis 2011: 390). CPA calls for regular 
political dialogue, aimed at strengthening cooperation and promoting an effective 
system of multilateralism; peace-building policies, conflict prevention and 
resolution. The EU insisted on political reform in the ACP states as a precondition 
for continued engagement (Brown 2002: 116).  The EU, in shifting to ogle political 
conditionality, was actually responding to a number of developments.  The demise 
of the USSR undercut EU and US rationale for giving succour to oppressive 
regimes as bulwarks against the Communist menace (Udombana 2004). In 
addition, the drive towards greater EU integration, compelled the bloc to ogle 
complementarity between its own policies and those of its Member States (Gibert 
2009: 624). 
 
2.7.2 EU Policy-Making and ACP   
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EU policy-making differs from the process characteristic of sovereign states. It is 
one of a mixed system of common actors, involving both the EU and the individual 
Member States.  
Analysing EU decision making must, therefore, take into account the following 
factors: acknowledge multilevel decision making; different actors need to be 
specified; modes of bargaining and rationalities; different types of decisions; what 
actors dominate what stage of policy making. The EU’s foreign policy process 
comports with “a system of external relations, a collective enterprise through which 
national actors conduct partly common, and partly separate, international actions” 
(Hill et al 1996: 5).  
The Commission is the executive arm of the EU and has the formal agenda setting 
powers. It is the main actor in the relationship on the EU side in the EU-ACP parley. 
In particular, the following Directorates are directly involved, “Development and 
Relations with the ACP States –responsible for development policy; Directorate 
General External Cooperation Programmes (EuroAid)—responsible for the 
implementation of development programmes and projects; Directorate General 
responsible for external relations; Directorate General for trade; and “echo”—
responsible for humanitarian aid, directorates which operate independently and 
are also based on different interpretations of the “objectives enshrined in the 
European Consensus on Development (ECD). ECD is the document that gives 
expression to EU understanding of development as a holistic process. 
 
2. 7.3  Supporting Resources for ACP/OTC Development: The EDF 
The European Development Fund (EDF) is the main instrument for providing 
Community development aid to the ACP and OCTs. Focused on three key areas: 
economic development, social and human development, and regional cooperation 
and integration, the EDF has a number of resource streams and instruments: 
grants managed by the Commission, risk capital and loans to the private sector, 
managed by the European Investment Bank under the Investment Facility, the 
FLEX mechanism, aimed at remedying the adverse effects of instability of export 
earnings. An extra-budgetary fund, and therefore funded by EU Member States 
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according to a specific contribution key, and subject to its own financial rules and 
managed by a specific committee, the EDF is concluded for a multi-annual period 
(usually 5 years) and is implemented within the framework of an international 
agreement between the European Community and the partner countries.  
The establishment of EDF served another goal. As a multilateral fund managed by 
the EU, it helped share the burden of supporting those countries among EU 
members. This was not possible under bilateral arrangements, given that some 
EU Member States did not believe they had direct interests in the ACP states (Enzo 
1993). 
Recipients favour multilateral—EDF in this case-- over bilateral aid—Member 
State bilateral aid in this case. However, EU Member States take the exact 
opposite view, perceiving bilateral aid as a major tool of foreign policy. Hence, the 
Member States when confronted by calls for more aid through EDF, view it as a 
tactic by the Commission to usurp their foreign policy prerogatives (Mackie 2008). 
Most EDF resources for ACP aid programmes unfold in four stages. Indicative 
programmes identify overall priorities before money is allocated via global 
commitments to specific projects. Then, contracts with third parties to deliver 
projects are agreed through individual commitments. Payments are then made to 
the contractors for the delivery of projects (Udombana 2004). 
Increasingly, however, EDF aid has undergone “reform”, which now entails giving 
the recipient “countries greater responsibility for determining objectives, strategies 
and operations and for programme management and selection” (From “European 
Development Fund (EDF).” The EU embraced the new approach in the early 2000s 
“when the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers approved the 
communication of the Commission on the Policy of the European Community for 
development cooperation. 
 This new policy thrust then received a major boost following issuance of European 
Consensus on Development of 2005, which makes “a clear commitment towards 
‘delivering more and better aid’” through increased use of sector-based 
approaches, now integrated into EDF activities. As part of the European 
Consensus on Development, “In all activities, the Community will apply a 
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strengthened approach to mainstreaming the following cross-cutting issues: 
human rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance” (Europe Aid 
Guidelines No. 2: Tools and Methods Serie, 2007. Support to Sector Programmes: 
European Commission: 32). 
The European Consensus on Development was really a response to “The Paris 
Declaration on aid effectiveness, adopted in March 2005,” (ibid. 9-118).  The Paris 
Declaration established “international guidelines and targets for raising the quality 
of aid” (ibid. 9-118). The Paris “Declaration strongly engages partner governments 
and donors around the principles of ownership, alignment and harmonisation” 
(ibid.16). The DAC of OECD “has become increasingly active in promoting 
common policy orientations and shared learning with respect to what it has termed 
‘Participatory Development and Good Governance’ (PDGG) “(Diamond 1995: 61). 
The EU has increasingly ogled sectoral budgetary support, (SWAPs). A response 
to the failure of SAPs (Barkan 2001: 72), SWAPs purportedly focus on achieving 
synergies among the various actors implicated in development to achieve 
“coherent sector policies and strategies” (idem). The strategy aims, allegedly, to 
broaden government and national ownership over public sector policy and 
resource allocation decisions within the sector; “increasing the coherence between 
policy, spending and results and reducing transaction costs” (idem).  
According to the EU, “Budget Support involves policy dialogue, financial transfers 
to the national treasury of the partner country, performance assessment and 
capacity-building. Based on partnership and mutual accountability,” Budget 
Support is keyed to achieving “sustainable development objectives,” through a 
process of “fostering partner country ownership of development policies and 
reforms.” The focus on institution building stems from a recognition that to achieve 
development in these countries, there is need to tackle “the source, not just the 
symptoms, of under-development” (ACP Overview: Aid Funding—Investing in a 
Better Future). 
Based on this sector-based approach, the government gradually develops a sector 
programme. Such sector approaches have three legs—namely: sector policy and 
strategy; sector budget and its medium term expenditure prospect; and sector 
indication framework through which the sector strategy, action plans and budgets 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
61 
 
are reviewed and updated. In a reformulated version issued in 2010, such 
budgetary support as a vehicle for structural change, now focuses on 5 priority 
areas: democracy and human rights; improved financial management; promotion 
of sectoral reforms; state building in fragile states; and improving tax systems. To 
reinforce this new thrust the EU committed to provide two different types of budget 
support programmes. Namely: “Good Governance and Development contracts to 
replace general budget support, sector performance contracts to provide sector 
budget support to support sector reforms and service delivery. State-Building 
Contracts to provide budget support in fragile situations” (ACP Overview: Aid 
Funding—Investing in a Better Future). 
The EU increasingly relies on so-called Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) to identify 
the priorities for its development assistance. The EDS represents the first instance 
of EU enunciating an overall development policy statement. The statement calls 
for “introducing greater focus and clear objectives,” in the way the bloc’s aid is 
given. The EDF programming under Cotonou calls for concentrating Country 
Strategy Programmes on only two or three focal sectors.  When it comes to 
managing EU aid, CSP calls for “the establishment of the single implementation 
agency EuropeAid and the devolution of much decision-making and programme 
management to the EC Delegations in the field” (Mackie 2008: 145).   
An innovation in the 10th EDF is the creation of “incentive amounts”, extra 
resources which countries can earn by improving their governance (in particular, 
management of their financial, tax and legal systems). The 10th EDF has a budget 
of €22 682 billion, divided as follows: €21 966 billion to the ACP countries (97% of 
the total), €286 million to the OCTs (1% of the total), €430 million to the 
Commission as support expenditure for programming and implementation of the 
EDF (2% of the total). The amount allocated to the ACP countries is further divided 
as follows: €17 766 billion to the national and regional indicative programmes (81% 
of the total), €2 700 million to intra-ACP and intra-regional cooperation (12% of the 
total), and €1 500 million to Investment Facilities (7% of the total). The Commission 
claims that whereas its funding for ACP development has grown, it still faces a 
plethora of challenges. For example, it claims that its activities must contend with 
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the EU’s complex decision making processes (ACP Overview: Aid Funding—
Investing in a Better Future). 
 
2.7.4 The EU and Africa: The post-cold war era 
Historically EU-Africa relations focused on development cooperation. The scenario 
began to change in the early 1990s. Security and politics took centre stage (Gibert 
2009: 699). The EU, in its attempt to play a global role perceived Africa as the best 
staging ground for that goal. This would see the Community focus on state collapse 
and conflict prevention as key priority areas. It was with this calculus in mind that 
the first EU-Africa summit unfolded in Cairo in 2000 (Crawford 2001: 237, qtd in 
Olsen 2004: 434).  
The relationship is currently framed by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy 2007; which 
focuses on matters of “mutual concern”. Specifically, peace and security, 
migration, trade, regional integration, amongst others (Pere 2009).  The AU-EU 
Lisbon Summit of 2007 came in the wake of then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
“Commission for Africa” of 2005 report which had sought to refocus world attention 
on Africa under British chairmanship of G8 and the Presidency of the EU. The 
Summit led to transmutation in AU-EU relationship through “a joint EU-Africa 
Strategic Partnership. The Summit "put the African Union at the centre of EU 
engagement with the continent" (Khadiagala 2009: 218).  
Initially, in the wake of the Blair initiative, the EU had sought to re-evaluate its 
relations with the continent. This process would then see the EU Commission issue 
“EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate African 
Development,” in 2005. The EU-Africa joint partnership committed both sides to 
enhanced cooperation “based on Euro-African consensus on values, common 
interests and strategic objectives for the future” (ibid. 232).  
The shift in EU-Africa relations drew sustenance from some recent positive 
developments on the Africa. Take adherence to democracy, respect for good 
governance and observance of human rights in Africa, for instance. In a radical 
departure from the OAU’s hitherto modus operandi, “The AU’s Constitutive Act of 
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2000 allowed for interference in the internal affairs of its members in cases of 
unconstitutional changes of governments, egregious human rights abuses and 
genocide, and conflicts that threaten regional stability” (Adebajo 2009: 53). Indeed, 
on the security and peace dimension, the focus of AU-EU engagement is 
continent-wide efforts in this sphere, such as support to Africa Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) agenda (Pere 2009). 
The renewed post-September 2001 EU engagement with Africa is emblematic of 
the extant attempt to link “security, governance and development” (Pere 2009: 
257). The security-development nexus assumes added salience in the context of 
Africa’s vast natural resource endowments. These resources serve as a stimulus 
for an inevitable battle between traditional players there, on the one hand, and new 
entrants, such as China, on the other. Still, it is the emergent attempt to link 
security, governance and development that has opened new vistas of opportunity 
in EU-Africa parleys.  The continent’s current weaknesses make it a particularly 
inviting target. This despite current attempts to change this situation, as denoted 
by the articulation of The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
agenda (Udombana 2004: 60).  
The enunciation of NEPAD connoted an acknowledgement by Africans of their 
stygian situation (Steeves 2007: 495). Through NEPAD, Africans committed 
themselves to fight poverty and achieve sustainable development, thus launching 
the continent on the path to reclaiming its rightful place in world affairs (Udombana 
2004: 62). As part of this new commitment, Africans did advance a number of 
mechanisms, such as a Peer Review Mechanism (PRM), to assess NEPAD’s 
implementation (Chiroro 2010). 
 
2.7.5  EU Political Aid and Africa’s post-cold war democratization 
 
Africa is the second most important arena of EU democracy promotion after East-
Central Europe (Olsen 2002). The EU, as previously noted, sought to play a more 
prominent role globally following the demise of the Cold War. The bloc ogled Africa 
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as the best avenue for launching that ambitious global agenda (Olsen 2004: 376). 
EU-Africa relationship has increasingly focused on four priority areas: “first, the 
integration of Africa into the world economy. . . second, the promotion of human 
rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and the rule of law; 
third, support for peace building and conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution… as well as combating terrorism and eliminating small arms and land 
mines; and, fourth, a focus on development” (Pere 2009: 266-267).  
The 2000 CPA between the EU and ACP focuses on “political dialogue and 
governance conditionality as the core strategies for promoting democracy and 
anchoring the rule of law in developing countries” (Sentyiso 2003: 148). The CPA 
fortifies an emergent commitment to human rights and democracy through regular 
political dialogue (Zimelis 2011).  A number of studies have therefore sought to 
assess the EU's new mission of democracy support in Africa. 
Some of the studies have examined the challenges that come to the fore in any 
attempt to analyse EU democracy support agenda in Africa.  The studies point to 
the fragmented nature of EU policy making as an obstacle in this respect. 
According to the studies, EU African policy consists of 3 policy sub-fields—with 
different institutional arrangements as well as different decision making rules: 
CFSP/ESDP, development aid and trade policy.  
Although Maastricht elevated the CFSP/ESDP in relation to the other policy 
arenas, development policy “has for many years had a fairly high degree of 
autonomy due to its legal basis in the treaty of Rome, and its own Commission and 
DG” (Olsen 2008: 159). Trade policy also has a strong basis. The studies do 
maintain that the EU’s agenda in Africa in this regard issues from intra-institutional 
competition within the bloc. The institutions are attracted to Africa because of the 
continent’s weaknesses; it is an excellent site for experimentation. The institutions 
hope to use Africa to garner additional resources and legitimacy. 
Other studies have limned the disjuncture that exists between the EU’s rhetoric 
and actual policy stances. They note, for example, that a number of problems have 
come to the fore in attempting to establish CFSP for ACP. The studies note that 
the strategy cannot mask the pursuit of contradictory policies—especially that 
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between policy declarations and actual actions. They note, for example, that 
whereas the EU is pledged to advance democracy and human rights, “its 
implementation has at best been weak and inconsistent,” characterized by the fact 
that “the amount of aid channelled into promoting democracy and respect for 
human rights was remarkably limited and the implementation . . . flawed” (Cox et 
al 1997: 40). 
They, in addition, limn the forms of governance being pushed by the EU for 
adoption by the ACP states under the CPA of 2000, finding that the EU aims to 
construct a specific type of state structure in the ACP-- a conservative state 
structure. 
Other studies find that the EU has prioritized the development of procedural 
democracy on the continent (Pinkney 1999). However, critics offer that the role-
back of the state inherent to plural democracy may circumscribe governmental 
policy autonomy.  By so doing, they caution, the model may paradoxically 
undermine itself as “citizens may see even less stake in the system” (Pinkney 
1999:  2).   
Indeed, in a rhetorical escalation, other studies conclude that the EU has tended 
to equate democracy with transition; it pays little heed to democratic consolidation 
(Crawford 2009: 150-151). In doing so, however, the EU thereby fails to see the 
process in a holistic fashion. 
Other studies maintain that, in fact, security and foreign policy--and not 
democracy-- have become the key anchors of EU policy towards Africa (Olsen 
1998). They claim, for example, that it was with this calculus in mind that the first 
EU-Africa summit unfolded in Cairo in 2000. According to this scholarship, it is only 
in rare instances-especially when the EU’s vital interests are not at stake-- that 
values such as democracy assume any meaning. 
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2.8 EU Political Aid and Kenya's Democratisation 
2.8.1 Introduction: The history of foreign aid to Kenya 
 
The trajectory of foreign aid to Kenya is one of high levels of volatility. Whereas he 
1980s witnessed huge volumes of aid inflows, the 1990s saw steep declines 
(Mweiga 2009).  Things did change again with the coming of NARC to power.  
Enthused by what they envisioned as a more reformist government, donors 
increased aid allocations to Kenya. Nonetheless, foreign aid has continued to lose 
its once high profile in Kenya, thanks to the entry of other players such as China. 
It is true that the post-election crisis saw aid assume new prominence, albeit briefly.  
In this regard, Kenya is not an aid dependent state; foreign aid constitutes only 4 
per cent of GDP. Of the aid given to the country, two-thirds came from bilateral 
sources as grants, with multilateral aid mainly in the form of loans (86%), and with 
International Financial Institutions, IFIs, as the main source of the latter form of 
funding. 
The volatility that has historically characterised foreign aid to Kenya issues from a 
myriad of factors. For example, during the 1970s and early 1980s the high aid 
inflows stemmed from Kenya’s standing as the darling of the West in Africa. 
However, with the Cold War over, at the donors’ Consultative Group Meeting 
(CGM) in Paris in 1991, aid to Kenya was suspended pending meaningful political 
and economic reforms. This would see President Daniel Arap Moi abandon his 
intransigent position and legalize political pluralism. As part of the pressure on Moi, 
“between November 1991 and December 1992 [Kenya] was subjected to frequent 
suspension of disbursement of on-going aid programmes and pledges of new aid” 
(Gibbon 1995: 7). 
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2.8.2. EU-Kenya Cooperation 
 
EU-Kenya cooperation commenced in 1976 when Kenya became the first country 
to sign a National Indicative Programme for co-operation with the European 
Community under the first Lomé Convention. Currently, the EU is Kenya’s second 
largest development partner after the World Bank. The EU provides grants to 
Kenya from the European Development Fund (currently 9th and 10th EDF) and 
from the development instruments of the General Budget of the EU.  
 
Kenya’s development strategy as enunciated in documents such as Vision 2030 
has four legs: increased economic growth, development of the physical 
infrastructure, creating a democratic state responsive to the rule of law, human 
rights and good governance, and increased human capital. The EU casts itself as 
a major player in the country’s socio-economic transformation as well a major 
partner in the country’s integration into the global marketplace. In particular, 
according to the Commission, the main thrust of Kenya-EU cooperation is 
designed to complement the Kenyan government’s efforts to eradicate poverty and 
improve the living standards of the population.  
EU development cooperation with Kenya as outlined under the 10th EDF, Country 
Strategy Paper for Kenya (2008-2013) focuses on two key sectors: transport 
infrastructure, especially as this relates to regional integration, and agriculture & 
rural development. Other areas in which EU funds are used are macroeconomic 
support, trade and private sector development as well as good governance and 
support for non-state actors.  
The EU is signatory to the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy in support of Vision 
2030, the Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2008-2012, as well as the National Accord.  
Signed in late 2010, KJAS focuses on achieving aid effectiveness consistent with 
the Paris Declaration on donor aid harmonization and coordination. The KJAS 
aims to support the Government of Kenya’s efforts to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals and the targets that the government has set for itself in its 
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national and sector development strategies. The KJAS therefore informs donors’ 
efforts on the greatest challenges facing Kenya today.  The larger donors of the 
EU are partners in the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS). In the financial 
year 2009/10, the EU Member States and the European Commission disbursed 
more than EUR 400 million (approximately Kshs. 39 billion) in official development 
assistance to Kenya. 
 Although all KJAS sectors receive some EU development assistance, such 
sectors as agriculture and rural development, democratic governance, roads and 
transportation, decentralization, among others receive the most attention 
(Development Cooperation in Kenya - How the EU member states and the EC 
contribute to Kenya’s development (07/09/2010).  
The Kenya CSP was signed in December 2007; this is the framework that informs 
“the general approach to cooperation for the period 2008-2013,” consistent with 
EDF’s policy stance of engaging ACP countries for 5 year phases (Republic of 
Kenya—European Community: Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme 
for the Period 2008-2013).  
In all, during the period the EU committed a total of Euro 400 million, divided into 
two parts, A & B allocations, with the former receiving Euro 383 million “to cover 
macroeconomic support, sectoral policies, programmes and projects in support of 
the focal and non-focal areas of Community assistance; allocations in the latter 
camp, totalling Euro 16, 4 million, to cover unforeseen needs, such as emergency 
assistance where such support cannot be funded from EU budget “(ACP Overview: 
Aid Funding—Investing in a Better Future). For example, the EU has undertaken 
a number of projects in the country’s arid and semi-arid areas to promote long term 
development and increased resilience. With regard to agriculture, for example, 
during the current EDF, the EU has committed to support agriculture and rural 
development in Kenya to the tune of €119.7 million.  
As for rural development, during the same period the EU has allocated €66.4 
million, with a focus on improved “food security by increasing crop productivity, 
improving food marketing and increasing drought resilience of local communities 
in arid and semi-arid lands. It covers agricultural research, spreading knowledge 
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on high-yielding and drought-resistant crops and technologies as well as better 
access to seeds, fertiliser, and markets for small-scale farmers. Special attention 
is given to improving livelihoods in the arid and semi-arid areas of the country. 
Concrete activities include the development and marketing of crops and fodder 
that can resist drought as well as the improvement of post-harvest storage. The 
programme also helps the government in developing better policies for drought 
management. 
 
2.8.3  EU Political Aid to Kenya, 1990-2013: A Review of the Literature 
Olsen (2002) focuses on the disjuncture between EU’s tough pronouncements vis-
à-vis the Moi regime and the actual tepid pro-democracy policy stances taken. 
According to Olsen, Kenya came under EU pressure to democratize immediately 
after the demise of the cold war. This would see President Moi move with alacrity 
to legalize plural politics and hold elections in 1992, which he won—although the 
polls were adjudged, by some, including the EU, as not fair. In this environment, 
the EU was reluctant to resume funding Kenya through aid. 
 However, by 1993 the EU and others claimed to detect some reforms underway 
in Kenya, although perhaps this meant “macroeconomic reforms, economic 
liberalization, and the regime’s accountability to international financial institutions, 
rather than political reform (Ajulu 1998: 284, qtd in Olsen 2002: 143). This 
development would see the two sides sign a “memorandum of understanding,” that 
“recognized the success of economic reforms,” this would see the EU support 
various development initiatives, with “priority” given “to road rehabilitation; it also 
provided support to various NGO initiatives” (Olsen 2002: 143).  
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In extending such support to the Moi regime, the EU was at loggerheads with the 
stances of some of its members such as Sweden which refused to offer bilateral 
aid. However, with new elections on the horizon in 1997 and with abundant 
evidence that no serious reform inaugurated by previous foreign aid, the EU did 
again move to focus on democracy in Kenya anew, including the suspension of 
aid. However, again once Moi pretended to embrace reforms—including IPPG 
reforms—the donors again quickly gave in; this would again lead to flawed 
elections that year. In all, then, the 1990s were characterized by "inconsistent EU 
policies in Kenya”, characterized by a major disjuncture between rhetoric and 
reality.  
Gibbon (1995) focuses on explicating how the end of the cold war led to a review 
of EU-Kenya relations. He shows how the changed post-Cold war environment led 
to the abandonment by donors, including the EU, of the then extant view that 
Africa's main problem was the threat of socialism. In place of this, came a belief 
that that there were certain deeply-rooted organic features of African social and 
political organization (for example patrimonialism) which were responsible for its 
economic and political difficulties. He opines that this shift was remarkable in that, 
in the 1970s and 1980s Kenya was ogled as an economic and political success 
story in Africa.  
Pinkney (1999) claims to identify the existence of a trade-off between stability, on 
the one hand, and democracy, on the other, in EU democracy support in Kenya. 
He concludes that while the EU and other donors played a key role in Kenya's 
transition to multi-party politics, consolidation of democracy in Kenya remained an 
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outstanding issue. He traces the lack of democratic consolidation to the fact that 
“there are other considerations (Pinkney 1999). 
Barkan (1994) examines how the EU and others deployed political conditionality 
in the early 1990s to force an otherwise obdurate President Moi to legalize plural 
politics. He goes on to show how this political conditionality and the ensuing 
multiparty elections contributed to dramatic economic atrophy in Kenya in the early 
1990s. 
Maina (2000) examines the role of conditionality by the EU and others in Kenya's 
transition. She finds that while important, it alone could not suffice, however. 
Rather, it needed coupling with domestic pressure to usher in political pluralism. 
Brown (2009) concludes that while the EU and others have rhetorically pledged 
their support for democracy in Kenya, economic and security interests have in fact 
always held sway. He does, however, find that the EU did vacate this position 
during the contested 2007 elections, insisting that it would not countenance a 
manipulated poll. 
Bello (2011), claiming that the role of foreign aid in Kenya’s development has 
continued to atrophy, calls for a recalibration of EU-Kenya relations, from one that 
revolves around such themes as democracy, good governance, and so on, to 
focus on the pursuit of more strategic objectives. 
Kanyinga (2004) examines the changing patterns of foreign aid in Kenya and the 
motives. He finds that geostrategic calculations informed the vast aid inflows that 
Kenya received during the cold war.  He does, however, note a shift with the 
demise of East-West rivalries and the onset of the third wave of democracy. The 
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EU and others appeared to shift attention to supporting democracy in Kenya, 
although in practice geostrategic calculations still loomed large. 
Ndung'u (2012) examines the role and effect of external actors in Kenya’s’ 
democratization. She in particular examines the tools of diplomacy actors such as 
the EU used to promote democracy in Kenya. 
 
2.8.4 The African setting 
Colonialism had a baleful influence on the development of the African state (Mbaku 
et al 2003: 1). It is true that the vested interests of powerful social groups in Africa 
helped to block any moves toward a more transparent and democratic politics in 
the post-independence era (Adedeji 1994). Even so, the unequal and anti-
democratic structures established by the colonial powers are also responsible for 
the lack of sustainable development in the region (Huntington 2006). Rather than 
creating an environment conducive for democratic governance, colonial regimes 
stifled civil and political rights and precluded the development of representative 
governments. These political systems were manipulated by colonial powers to 
advance their economic interests and to solidify their authority. African states, in 
short: 
Inherited legacies from colonialism [that] predisposed them to violent 
conflicts over the distribution of resources and societies’ access to 
political power and basic political identities. Such legacies helped to 
create a pattern of state and class formation in which African political 
leaders relied on external support to reward internal allies and ignored 
the needs of citizens. (Stedman 1996: 24) 
The status quo did come under severe assault after World War II, however, with 
most African nationalists—as their counterparts farther afield, lambasting it as both 
alien and unrepresentative (Sandbrook 2001). However, with colonialism in retreat, 
the new African leaders, fired by modernization theory on the one hand, and the 
dependency school on the other, saw autonomous associations, and by implication 
democracy, as inimical to rapid economic development (MacLean et al 2003), 
given that tackling “the three demons of poverty, ignorance, and disease required 
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the mobilization of all national energies behind the incumbent regime” (Young 
2002: 38). One analyst notes: 
Self-government and independence were granted to the new nations, 
but the revolution was hijacked by the new indigenous leaders. The 
African people were never handed their full sovereignty. In the name of 
national unity and rapid economic development, many basic human 
rights and democratic rights were sacrificed. Dictatorships, minority 
governments, and single party regimes became the new order of the 
day. The people of Africa watched helplessly as their countries became 
the new oppressors. Country after country suffered as oppression, 
tribalism and gross injustices ran rampant. (Muna 1991: 61) 
It is worth noting, though, that the erection of one-party system “engendered little 
hostile commentary externally. Indeed, it was celebrated by a segment of the 
academic analysis” (Young 2002: 38), due to a circumscribed understanding of 
change inherent to the then extant ideology of development (Chambers 1997). As 
part of this thinking, for example, while no one vouched openly for authoritarianism, 
there existed a tacit international understanding that state leaders “should not be 
obstructed by groups in society that were ignorant, tribalistic, or ‘premodern’” 
(Pinkney 2003: 93). As a result, although some semblance of pluralism existed 
during the era, as the state became the main engine of development, there quickly 
developed “a pattern of patrimonial politics so that … [o]ffice holders appropriated 
state resources to consolidate their power bases” (Stedman 1996: 241). 
Over time most African states proved unable to provide people with basic services 
and lacked legitimacy, thereby illustrating how the mythology of the state fails to 
suffice when in practice governments prove incapable of exercising control over 
territory under their purview, coupled with lack of legitimacy (Clapham 1996: 13). 
Yet, “Democratic stability requires both a strong state and societal strength based 
upon the values of civil society and democratic institutions embedded in a wider 
network of state and societal organizations” (Picard 2005: 8). 
The continent joined the global clamour for democracy72 by the early 1990s 
(Bratton et al 1992: 419). In Africa the Third Wave emerged rather suddenly (Ndue 
1994).  As the movement gathered pace, “there emerged a continent-wide 
democratic movement that accorded no immunity to any form of oppression, 
                                            
72 On the role of the decay of communism, but especially that of the USSR system, in this shift, see, for 
instance Bukovsky (1990). 
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whatever the race, religion, or identity of the perpetrators” (Joseph 1991: 13-14). 
As a result of these changes, in a span of 10 years “Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed 
70 presidential elections spread across most of the regions and countries, 
involving more than one candidate. Only Congo-Kinshasa, Eritrea, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Swaziland, and Uganda held no multiparty elections whatsoever” (de 
Walle 2002: 66). 
The shift issued from a confluence of factors, key among them the increasing 
“weakening of African states by the end of the 1970s.  As the magnitude of the 
economic impasse became evident, and the legitimacy of once-seemingly potent 
regimes frayed” (Young 2002: 39), coupled with “active demands, spontaneous 
and organized, from a loose, multiclass assemblage of indigenous protest groups” 
(Bratton et al 1992: 420), as well as a growing acknowledgement that the 
continent’s “crisis was essentially political in origin and character, though it has 
serious socio-economic consequences” (Adedeji 1994: 124-125). 
This change has “helped to generate real political openings and eroded the ability 
of “authoritarian regimes to perpetuate themselves in power, free of political 
opposition and Scrutiny” (Harbeson et al 1995: 259). Still, “electoral politics has 
proven disappointing as corruption, abuse of power, and economic crises continue 
to plague national life” (de Walle 2002: 66)73. Indeed, “regular elections are not 
changing the nature of politics in many countries, away from politics of exclusion, 
ethnicity, regionalism and corruption” (Kabemba 2008: 31)74. Thus “on the 
evidence to date, African countries are experiencing a liberalization of authoritarian 
rule, rather than a full-blown transition” conceptualized as instances in which “free 
and fair elections are held to choose national political officeholders” (Bratton et al 
1992: 422). Rather, these new systems are characterized by “[a] coexistence of 
partial democracies and persistent manifestations of authoritarian rule in what had 
been describes as hybrid or ‘grey ‘democracies” (Harbeson 2005: 275-6). 
                                            
73 For the challenges to and opportunities for democratic consolidation, see, for instance Kohli (1992: 52-64); 
Dahl (1992: 45-59) argues that to function, democracy requires a certain level of citizen sophistication; 
Bolivar (spring: 72-87). He argues that Brazil faces major challenges on the road to consolidation, 
impediments stemming from an institutional architecture that―features an uneasy blend of plesbisciterian 
and consociational procedure, practices and symbols. 
74 Cape Verde defies this characterization; however, having successfully consolidated its democracy, see 
Maynes (2002). 
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Not surprisingly, extant analyses have sought to explicate the origin of these 
obstacles.  A number of studies have, for example, sought to illuminate how the 
question of power sharing and the role of traditional institutions has framed Africa’s 
post-cold war political development. They warn, “there are bound to be serious 
setbacks… if careful attention is not paid to a country’s history, political traditions, 
culture, symbolic meanings and economic circumstances” (Owusu 1997: 129-30). 
Regionalization of conflicts, and the attendant regional instability, is another 
problem that has received immense coverage in the literature on post-cold war 
processes of political development in Africa.  According to this scholarship, “[f]ew 
situations are more threatening to the process of democratization than the violent 
reverberations of ethnic strife from state to region and back again” (Lamarchand 
1992: 102), The Democratic Republic of the Congo as the epitome of this 
phenomenon. The regionalization of post-cold war African conflicts would seem to 
comport with the finding that, actually in the “transitional phase of democratization, 
countries become more aggressive and war prone, not less,” (Mansfield and 
Snyder 2001: 113). 
Other scholars and analysts have decried lack of vibrant civil societies as a major 
obstacle to post-cold war processes of political development in Africa. They 
contend that respect for associational life, conceptualized as the ability of “citizens 
to organize in defence of their own interests or identities without fear of external 
intervention or punishment has long been identified as a key ingredient for 
democracy” (Fox 1994: 151-152). This empowerment, in turn, they maintain, helps 
such groups transmute relationships of dependency, replacing them with a new 
order infused with a greater respect for citizenship rights by the state. In the end, 
such activities permit “community groups to grow in awareness, to increase their 
commitment to the common good and better to defend the needs and the rights of 
the excluded” (O’Gorman 1995: 194). By so doing, civil society can serve “a crucial 
role in providing effective channels of interest representation for the marginalized 
[and] thereby assisting in integrating them into the democratic … system” (Heinrich 
2001: 3). 
Civil society can also play a crucial role as a facilitator of conflict mediation. Civil 
society can accomplish this, they contend, through its ability to attract people from 
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different social backgrounds “on a constant and voluntary basis… thereby 
mitigating cleavages” (Heinrich 2001: 10). Hence, Africa’s ability to successfully 
navigate its current political development voyage will crucially hinge on “how well… 
democratizing African governments are able to negotiate in good faith… with those 
who represent the important and influential social forces” (Owusu 1997: 148). To 
that end, then, the existence of strong civil societies in Africa “would provide a 
foundation for sustainable development, both participation and development” 
(Shaw 1990: 21). 
Another set of literatures has sought to illuminate another major obstacle to post-
cold war political processes in Africa: “a history of structural social-economic 
factors” (Bratton et al 1997: 234). The literatures, cognizant of a number of external 
constraints they claim impinge upon African polities contend that the singular focus 
on internal variables—for example the claim that on the political front “reforms at 
the constitutional level of politics occur when two circumstances combine: a state 
elite runs out of politics resources, and an alternative ruling coalition emerges with 
an articulate political program” (Bratton et al 1992: 434). They caution that such 
claims ignore the degree to which “the global structures of power and great-power 
policies have had a profound effect on the process of, and the prospect for, 
democratization in the third world” (Ayoob 2005: 195). 
Critics contend that at a macro level, when it comes to this approach, moreover, 
although supposedly disinterested, actually “the end product is meant to be a 
specific version of democracy, that of formal, representative democracy without 
substantial social and economic transformation, or significant popular involvement” 
(Suttner 1999: 757). Ayoob amplifies the critique75: 
[I] t is regrettable that the majority of the literature on democratization 
produced in the past two decades has concentrated almost exclusively 
on internal dynamics, and the causes of the reversal of the 
democratization process have also been sought in the domestic sphere, 
to the near total exclusion of external influences. This attitude is a 
carryover from the assumptions of the now largely discredited 
modernization theory, popular in the 1960s, which attempted to explain 
Third World Underdevelopment by focusing exclusively on domestic 
factors. Its critics made the compelling case that modernization theory 
was an historical exercise that also failed to appreciate the connection 
                                            
75 However, for the exact opposite view that in fact traces Africa’s transitions to exogenous factors, see, 
among others Geddes (1999: 122). 
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between the domestic situation in the third world and systemic 
conditions, economic, political, and military—that to a significant degree 
determined the domestic context. In short, there has been nothing purely 
‘domestic’ in the domestic politics and economics of third world 
countries. This debate demonstrates that one-dimensional 
explanations… provide an incomplete picture of the obstacles to 
democratization in the third world. (Ayoob 2005: 187) 
 
The scholarship does therefore counsel that, “development and democracy in 
Africa must involve a struggle to reform the existing patterns of economic 
globalization as well as to reform domestic policies and governance” (Sandbrook 
2001: 17), given that it is the “interplay and at times the connivance of local and 
external factors that have undermined accountability in Africa” (Mkandawire 2010: 
1149). One expert notes, for example: “French President Francois Mitterrand 
welcomed Ould Taya [psedo-democratic president of Mauritania] in a business-as-
usual fashion only a few months after the fraudulent 1992 elections” (N’diaye 2001: 
92). 
According to the critics, the utility of taking such international factors into account 
in any serious discussion of Africa’s development becomes obvious: “for weak 
states and nascent democracies of the late 20th and early 21st centuries external 
support facilitating their alignment with applicable international regimes may be 
essential in ways that existing democratic and State theories all but ignore” 
(Harbeson 2005: 277). This strategy, to help align, otherwise weak African states 
with applicable international norms, stems from mounting evidence that a number 
of transnational challenges that have surfaced in the post-Cold War era “have 
flourished primarily in weak, fractured, or collapsed states such as Sudan, 
Somalia, Condo (sic), which has suggested broadened recognition that the 
persistence of such dysfunctional states is not in the interest of the state system 
as a whole” (276). 
The issue of foreign aid as a conduit for capacity building has come to the fore in 
international development in the new millennium (Riddell 2007). With respect to 
Africa, for example, increasingly it was acknowledged that decades of 
development policy had not produced desired outcomes; fingers began to point at 
lack of domestic institutional capacity as the culprit. Hence, the need to focus on 
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institution building, although critical voices question the efficacy of this strategy, 
especially its ability for “building sustainable institutional capacity and promoting 
self-reliance” (Bossnyt et al 1992: 1). 
Political processes in Kenya since the early 1990s to date provide an excellent 
opportunity to test these claims. In particular, the study seeks to elucidate one 
aspect of foreign aid that has not received adequate coverage in the literature—
namely, an assessment of the role played by multilateral political aid in political 
processes in the developing world. Thus, to remedy that lacuna the study 
examines the role of EU political aid in Kenya’s political development since the 
early 1990s to the 2013 elections.  Extant studies either usually focus on too many 
actors, or cover too short a period when assessing the role of a single actor, such 
as the EU.   
 
 
 
2.9 Theoretical Framework: Liberal Theory  
 
A theoretical framework provides the lenses through which a scholar can 
comprehend the phenomena under examination. This implies, in practical terms, 
that the scholar must situate his or her work within an appropriate theoretical 
framework. I find Liberal –or what I variously refer to as Democratic Peace---theory 
an appropriate theoretical framework for this study. Liberal theory provides the 
framework that has informed democracy support efforts in the post- cold war era 
(Agresto 2012; Barry 2012).  
The demise of the Cold War heralded the ascendancy of liberalism in international 
affairs (Pinkney1999). The rise of liberalism issued from an emergent view that 
participatory governance is good for both domestic and international peace. 
Liberals have increasingly made the argument in international relations that 
democracies do not fight each other. Liberal theorists argue that democracy “has 
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proven to be the best system of governance in which to realize universal human 
aspirations for freedom and to support human development” (Mitchell et al 2008: 
161-162). Liberal theory contends that democratic regimes are characterized by 
norms and structures that preclude them from going to war against each other. 
Such norms predispose democratic regimes to peaceful conflict resolution over 
war. Once such regimes are framed by these mechanisms domestically, contends 
Liberalism, they are likely to externalize the same attributes (Allison et al 1999). 
As a philosophy when deployed as a foreign policy and international relations 
theory, Liberalism hearkens back to Emmanuel Kant’s 1795 theory of Perpetual 
World Peace. Kant’s had three components: Domestic political regimes –
Republican states in which governments sought consent of the governed, that is, 
regimes in which citizens have rights. Two, free market economies –these would 
promote international division of labour and, with that, there would issue greater 
international interdependence. Third and finally, a pacific union among republics 
would have a snowball effect in international affairs (Russett 1994).   
Liberalism’s main thesis is that “societal ideas, interests, institutions, influence 
state behaviour by shaping state preferences (Allison et al 1999: 40).  The theory 
focuses on government because “[t]he state is a fiction, a concept employed by 
certain groups masking their interest under the cloak of the public 
interest…Historically pluralism has mostly been a theory of society rather than a 
theory of the state” (Dunleavy et al 1987: 42). 
Opposed to state centralization, the theory vouches for diversity within the state. 
Dating back to classical thinkers such as Locke, Montesquieu, among others, the 
theory posits diversity as the best bulwark against absolutism. Liberal theory 
celebrates vigorous interest group activity, viewing policy as an outcome of such 
clashes (Turner et al 1997). Liberalism assigns the state the role of mere arbiter of 
interest group confrontations (Dunleavy et al 1987). 
Major players in the international arena have pushed particularly vigorously for the 
global adoption of liberal political and economic agendas. Liberalism vouches for 
democracy on the grounds that it best serves the courses of peaceful coexistence 
and stability within nations. That democracy can eventually contribute to world 
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peace. Promotion of democracy becomes one avenue of globalizing liberal values, 
both political and economic (Bosin 2010; Russett 1994). In particular, Democratic 
Peace Theory postulates that “expanding democracy creates condition congenial 
to a better world in which conflict, disorder and poverty are replaced by peace, 
order and stability. Democracy thus contributes to the making of good societies” 
(Bridoux et al 2012: 1947). 
However, critics contend that the model is overly focused on procedure to the 
almost total exclusion of the substance of democracy (Diamond 1993). They argue 
that while such systems might suffice for developed countries, they would not work 
in the developing world (Pinkney 1999). There, they counsel, the substance of 
democracy matters a great deal.  They argue, moreover, that although the theory 
presents itself as disinterested, actually, at a macro level, “the end product is meant 
to be a specific version of democracy. That of formal, representative democracy 
without substantial social and economic transformation, or significant popular 
involvement” (Suttner 1999: 757).  
Equally, others deride it as merely descriptive and, thus, serves as apologia for the 
status quo (Ake 1996). Formal procedural democracy can exist alongside "massive 
material inequality because it is outside the definition of polyarchy to address the 
economic sphere” (Hearn 2000: 881). The theory, contend critics, glosses over 
inequality, positing it as a necessary price to pay for increasing production. They 
trace liberalism’s increasing acceptance of inequality to Bentham and James Mill. 
The two made “the first formal separation between the organization of the state as 
a political democracy and the organization of the economy as a class-based, 
unequal, capitalist production” (Carnoy 1984: 32). 
Persistent critiques of procedural liberal democracy have yielded the Maximalist 
model. The model focuses on the reality and experience of electoral democracy. It 
seeks to broaden the definition of liberal democracy. Most of the scholarship of the 
Maximalist model came to the fore in light of the experiences gleaned from the 
third wave, especially the challenge of democratic consolidation (see, for example, 
Ake 1996; Pinkney 1999). Proponents of the Maximalist model caution that third 
wave experience shows that elections alone democracy do not make (Hearn 
2000). According to this scholarship “the social and economic needs of the 
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populations of developing countries must be addressed if democracy is to take root 
and succeed in the developing world” (Bridoux et al 2012: 1948). Still, the model 
has received criticism, especially on empirical grounds.  
Critics have inquired as to how the model proposes to empirically measure 
democracy. The procedural model is focused on empirical or measurable aspects 
of democracy, such as the use of electoral procedures and institutions, fair 
competition and participation, among others, as mechanisms of governance.   
Democracy is a means to an end--a vehicle for realizing better lives--in terms of 
enhanced welfare. At the normative and policy level I view democracy as a 
precipitate of enhanced human welfare--in terms of human rights, peace and 
security, cultural and social welfare.  I do therefore eschew the distinctions 
between the maximalist versus minimalist camps. I focus, instead, on analysing 
how the liberal model of democracy unfolded in Kenya in practice. 
 
 
2.9.1 Analytical Framework: The Democracy Template  
 I use some of the items gleaned from Thomas Carothers’s (1999) classification--
the Democracy Template as the analytical framework (See the diagram). Based 
on the template, democracy assistance is assessed on three dimensions: the 
electoral process, state institutions, and civil society (Carothers 1999). These foci 
comport with the way I conceptualized political aid in this study.  
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Sector Type of Aid Sector Goal 
Electoral Process 
Free and Fair Elections 
Strong national political 
parties 
Electoral Aid 
Political Party building 
State Institutions 
Democratic 
Consolidation 
Independent, effective 
judiciary and other law-
oriented institutions 
Competent, 
representative 
legislature 
Responsive local 
government 
Pro-Democracy Military 
Constitution Assistance 
Rule-of-law Aid 
Legislative 
Strengthening 
Local government 
development 
Civil Military Relations 
Civil Society 
Active Advocacy NGOs 
Politically educated 
citizenry 
Strong Independent 
media 
Strengthening 
Independent Institutions 
NGO Building 
Civic Education 
Media Strengthening 
Union Building 
 
Analytical Framework: The Democracy Template (Source: Thomas Carothers, 
Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 1999. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 88). 
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CHAPTER 3: Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses methodological and other related aspects keyed to meeting 
the goals and objectives of the study. Namely, an explication of the role that EU 
political aid has played in political processes in Kenya since the early 1990s to the 
2013 elections. I use qualitative methods—mainly document analyses to 
undertake an analysis of the role of EU political aid in political processes in Kenya 
since the early 1990s to the 2013 elections. By qualitative research, it is meant an 
inquiry: 
Process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions— 
[biography, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case 
study] — that explore a social or human problem. The research builds a 
complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of 
informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting. (Creswell 1998: 
98) 
 
3.2 Research paradigm: Social science research 
Social science research is framed by a number of philosophical considerations, 
assumptions that then inform the type of research design that emerges (Creswell 
1998). In particular, problem selection in social science research is informed by a 
researcher’s sociological paradigm76: “a perspective or frame of reference for 
viewing the social world, consisting of a set of concepts and assumptions” (Bailey 
1978: 18; Hall et al 1996: 28), with such assumptions taking five major forms: [first, 
the ontological theme] focuses on the nature of reality; at the epistemological level 
the focus is on the relationship between the researcher and his or her study 
objects; the axiological assumption focuses on the role of values in research; the 
rhetoric of research assumption has its glare on the appropriate language for 
research—whether to deploy an informal literary style or a more formal writing 
                                            
76 However, for critique of obsession with paradigms as a hindrance to understanding, see, for example 
Hirschman (1970: 329-343). 
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style; the methodological assumption deals with the issue of the appropriate 
strategy for research, that is, whether this is best served by an inductive or 
deductive strategy (Creswell 1998). 
Methodology77 refers to the philosophy or general principles behind research; 
methods, on the other hand, refer to “the practices of research in terms of 
strategies and techniques” (Hall et al 1996, 29). The conflict between social and 
physical sciences is over methodology, not method—after all: 
A researcher’s methodology determines such facts as how he or she 
writes hypotheses and what level of evidence is necessary to make the 
decision whether or not to reject the hypotheses. The methodology of 
the physical sciences is currently somewhat more rigorous and elegant 
than the methodology of the social sciences, but this may not always be 
the case. Specifically, physical scientists are more likely than social 
scientists to state the relationship between variables in exact terms, 
usually in the form of mathematical equations. The social scientist is 
often satisfied to be able to prove [demonstrate] the existence of a 
relationship between two variables, while saying nothing about the 
nature of the relationships… The question whether social science 
methodology will ever duplicate physical science methodology is a 
philosophical issue that we cannot attempt resolve here… The main 
point is that there is a wide range of alternative methodologies or 
approaches and criteria for understanding social phenomena in social 
science. These methods range from qualitative to quantitative. (Bailey 
1978, 26-27) 
 
3.3 Research design 
This is a single case study---Kenya. Serious issues are usually raised about this 
approach in terms of scientific rigour and potential for generalizability, however.   
In particular, according to King et al (1994: 124), “No issue is so ubiquitous early 
in the research design phase of a research project as the question: which cases 
(or more precisely, which observations) should we select for study?” That question, 
they observe, has potency, especially for qualitative research since it has a bearing 
on “the outcome of the research and the degree to which it can produce 
determinate and reliable results” (King et al 1994: 125).   
Large-n studies can avoid selection bias if observations are randomly selected. 
However, in qualitative studies random selection is not always possible given that 
                                            
77 See, for example Fischer (1980). 
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the phenomena under investigation are not usually “clearly specified” (King et al 
1994: 21). Even in those instances where random selection is possible, they 
explain, “it is not necessarily a wise technique to use. Qualitative researchers often 
balk (appropriately) at the notion of random selection, refusing to miss important 
cases that might not have been chosen by random selection . . . Indeed, if we have 
only a small number of observations, random selection may not solve the problem 
of selection bias but may even be worse than other methods of selection…. 
[R]andom selection of observations in small-n research will often cause very 
serious biases” (King et al 1994: 125-126). They explain that taking these two 
factors into account—that is, the danger of selection bias coupled with 
inadvisability of random selection in small-n studies, “selection must be done in an 
intentional fashion, consistent with our research objectives and strategy” (King et 
al 1994: 139). 
The decision to focus on Kenya was informed by the unique nature of the events 
that shook the country in late 2007 and early 2008.  These events took most people 
by surprise. Most observers did not expect such cataclysmic events to happen in 
a select number of African countries, namely Kenya, Ghana Tanzania, Zambia, 
Namibia and Botswana, (I exclude South Africa). Analysts saw these countries as 
largely immune to such events.  Indeed, most, if not all, of the other aforementioned 
countries have not witnessed events similar to those that unfolded in Kenya, even 
though some have in fact had what amounted to highly contested, and volatile 
elections, Zambia being the best example.  
I use the case study approach because it dovetails with one of the objectives of 
my study—description of the role of EU political aid in Kenya. As King et al (1994: 
44) explain, case studies are “essential for description, and are, therefore 
fundamental to social science. It is pointless to seek to explain what we have not 
described with a reasonable degree of precision”. They continue: the main 
advantage of “the in-depth case study method is that the development of good 
causal hypotheses is complementary to good description rather than competitive 
with it” (King et al 1994: 45).  
In addition, I deploy the case study approach because it allows me to employ 
qualitative methodology. Qualitative methodology is far much superior in this 
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specific study because I want, as another objective, to analyse the role of EU 
political aid in Kenya’s democratization. As King et al (1994: 44) argue, “Disciplined 
qualitative researchers carefully try to analyse . . . rather than to merely report what 
observers say”. 
Lastly an important distinction needs to be made between statistical 
generalizability, on the one hand, and analytical generalizability, on the other. The 
latter implies that the findings and conclusions of single case studies may be 
generalized and even used in theory construction.  I aim, as another objective of 
the study, to use the findings of this single case to draw broader conclusions on 
the role of external aid in Africa’s current democratization. 
In conclusion, it is true that serious issues are usually raised about the utility of 
single case studies. Still not only can the approach make a unique contribution to 
our comprehension of otherwise complex political processes and events; single 
case studies can provide crucial evidence for theory testing.  
 
3.4 Secondary sources of information  
 
This refers to research using already available data sources—namely, public 
documents and official records; private documents, such as diaries and 
autobiographies; mass media; physical, non-verbal material; and social science 
data archives (Black et al 1976). Secondary sources provide an immense body of 
data (Stacey 1969; Taylor et al 1998). In particular, such sources add an “historical 
dimension [to] primary data that [are] necessarily bound to the present day” 
(McNeill 1985: 104). This study relies on the following secondary data sources: 
 
3.4.1. Document analysis  
Documentary analyses are categorized in terms of the structure of the document 
itself; hence, “the relatively unstructured and non-quantitative case study approach 
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and the structured content-analysis approach that yields qualitative data from 
verbal documents” (Bailey 1978: 272).  
I conducted archival analyses of literature on EU political aid in Kenya, and 
institutional reform more generally. There exist extensive literatures on these 
topics; I therefore perused official public, archival, mass media and EU documents. 
At the national level, I examined government reports and records, official reports 
of public enquiries, among others. As for the EU, I examined publicly accessible 
agency records, organization documents, and so on. These documents provide 
more systematic accounts about “the respective assumptions, concerns, and 
activities of those who produce them” (Taylor et al 1998: 129); and, hence, the 
decisions taken. 
Use of secondary documents for research opens up research of otherwise 
inaccessible subjects, facilitation of the study of those long since deceased for 
example. I rely, in my case, on analytical history, by which I mean an attempt to 
look beyond mere descriptions so as to focus on the “sequence of past events to 
illuminate the present” (Dixon et al 1987: 413). Such an historical analysis would, 
in practical terms, entail: 
A reconstruction of past events with an eye on accuracy; applications of 
a general theory to the… [Kenyan case], which focuses on how the 
theory applies… and use history to understand present, or explain 
how… particular phenomena came to be. (414) 
 
3.5.   Assumptions underpinning this study 
It is a key assumption of this study that the EU is a key player in Kenya’s political 
development. Furthermore, it is assumed in this study that as part of its being a 
key player in Kenya’s political development the EU has provided the country with 
political aid since the onset of political pluralism in the early 1990s. The two 
assumptions rest on a belief that the EU’s engagement in Kenya’s political 
development draws sustenance from a liberal theoretical paradigm, one that views 
political development as encompassing both institutional development and 
participation.  
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3.6. Delimitation (Scope) and limitations of this study 
I delimit my study to the onset of political pluralism in Kenya onwards—although I 
will transgress this as warranted, especially in my exposition on the Kenyan 
political economy.  
My study had to contend with both time and other resource constraints. Equally, I 
have to contend with the dynamic nature of Kenya’s political and institutional 
reforms; in some respects, this process has just begun. In any event, these 
limitations do not pose too big a challenge: in some canny way, they provide me a 
golden opportunity to prosecute the study and, thereby, contribute to scholarly 
literature in this area.  
 
 3.7 Significance of this study  
The utility of this study stems from the fact that unlike extant studies that focus on 
endogenous obstacles—and to some extent exogenous ones as well—to Africa’s 
democratization, I examine the dynamics of political change in Kenya since the 
early 1990s and the role that one external actor—the European Union has played 
in that process. Indeed, there exists a major lacuna in the literature on the relative 
roles of endogenous versus exogenous factors and influences in these reform 
processes, with some findings showing that foreign interventions have a long 
lineage in Africa, but with a mixed record. 
On the issue of foreign aid in particular, whereas some find that it has had 
beneficial effects in Africa, others maintain that it has had a corrosive influence. I 
therefore hope that a dynamic analysis of Kenya’s political development since the 
early 1990s to date will help illuminate the role that EU political aid has played in 
that process and, by so doing, help thus, advance our understanding of the role 
that political aid has played in Africa’s—and by extension the developing world’s—
current political development more generally. The study transgresses disciplinary 
boundaries, thus drawing on other fields in social science, such as history, 
economics, public administration, sociology, among others, in a bid to gain a fuller 
understanding of the issues under investigation. 
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3.8. Rationale of the study 
The rationale for the study is informed by the relative paucity of dynamic analyses 
of Kenya’s political development since the early 1990s and the role that one 
external actor—the EU—has played in that process and the way such aid links with 
political processes in the country. In this respect, this study is substantially different 
in that most, if not all extant, studies on Kenya’s political development since the 
early 1990s have tended to focus singularly on one period in that drama, say, the 
Moi Presidency, and so on; none of those earlier studies have thus far attempted 
analyses that cover the entire period. To fill this void, this study covers the entire 
period from the 1990s to 2013 by periodicizing Kenya’s political development and 
then examining the role of EU political aid at each given juncture in that reform 
process.  
In addition, whereas most extant studies on Africa’s democratization limn the 
various obstacles that stand in the way of democratization, most of those earlier 
studies have, however, inexplicably tended to focus on only one-side of this 
problem—internal, to the exclusion of external, obstacles. Again, this study aims 
to rectify this misnomer by examining the role that EU political aid has played in 
political processes in Kenya since the early 1990s to the present. 
 
3.9 Research results  
EU political aid has had mixed results: it was initially critical in helping launch plural 
politics in the early 1990s—animated largely by altruistic intentions attendant the 
demise of bi-polar rivalries of the cold war. However, with the onset of the so-called 
War on Terror and, thus, the elevation of security considerations over governance, 
democracy, and human rights, previous commitment to altruistic goals has given 
way to self-interested concerns there, mostly security-related, such as the fight 
against Al Shabaab in Somalia, Piracy off the Somali coast, among others. 
However, in the wake of the 2007-08 post-election crisis altruism and self-interest 
have appeared to combine, with the EU and others now claiming to actively support 
political reforms in Kenya. 
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CHAPTER 4: The Moi Administration, 1990-20021 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces political processes in Kenya during the Moi Presidency, 1990-
2002, in the process illuminating the unfolding domestic political scenario in the 
country during this period and the role that the EU and others played in that 
process. It aims, by so doing, to show how, because of Cold War-related 
calculations, from the 1970s up to the early 1990s, Kenya was ogled as a rare 
economic and political success story in an otherwise hopeless neighbourhood. 
These cold war-related calculations as well as stellar economic performance in the 
years immediately after independence helped the new government avoid 
unnecessary scrutiny.  Because of these two factors Kenya became a darling of 
the donors—capped by the fact that it was the first country to sign the ACP-EU 
pact under Lome. Indeed, as the chapter shows, although the government’s 
repressive tactics were there for all to see, aid providers to the country either 
looked the other way at best or actively supported such tactics at worst.  
The chapter does however show how this hitherto cosy relationship begun to fray 
as the Kenya government became increasingly repressive, first during the waning 
years of the Kenyatta Presidency, and then the Daniel Arap Moi Presidency, 
especially starting in the early 1980s. Then with the demise of the cold war—and 
thus the erosion of Kenya’s status as a valued strategic ally, the EU and other 
major donors increasingly decried ‘mounting corruption’ and the attendant 
deterioration of social services as well as increased political repression. 
The chapter shows how with the end of the cold war, the Moi administration came 
under sustained pressure, both domestic and external, to undertake political 
reforms. Moi—as his colleagues elsewhere on the continent—initially rebuffed 
calls for political change, moving to cast such calls as unnecessary external 
infringement of Kenya’s sovereignty. In addition, the chapter shows how Moi and 
his lieutenants then launched a vigorous national campaign against political 
pluralism, continuously warning that this would open the door to ethnic atavism. 
The chapter next shows how increased external pressure, especially the 
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withholding of much needed aid in the early 1990s, forced Moi to relent and thus 
legalise multi-party politics. This would set the country on its first multi-party 
election in 1992. 
Moi and his government would use all manner of tricks, including ethnic violence 
as well as the fanning of divisions within opposition ranks to win the inaugural multi-
party election. The chapter shows how Kenya’s foreign aid providers, including the 
EU, went ahead and endorsed the outcome of the election—disregarding, in effect, 
evidence that Moi had actually manipulated the election—largely because of their 
own strategic calculations. 
In the wake of the elections and then Moi’s attempt to revert to his old authoritarian 
style, Kenyans increasingly called for major institutional reforms; specifically, a 
new constitution. Although Moi initially concurred with the opposition on the need 
for constitutional reform, reformers rejected his attempt to entrust the exercise with 
foreign experts, viewing this as a furtive move by the president to retain the status 
quo; this would initially lead to two competing constitution reform visions.  
Kenyans did consequently go into the 1997 elections under the old constitution, 
although again under pressure Moi had conceded to some minor electoral reforms, 
such as the cross-party nomination of electoral commission officials. However, 
following the 1997 elections and again amidst widespread allegations of electoral 
fraud—although again foreign aid givers elected to remain silent on the matter—
after some mediation, the two groups would come together to embark on the 
process. However, Moi would prorogue parliament sine die in readiness for the 
2002 elections, in which he was constitutionally barred from vying, just moments 
before the constitution writing conference endorsed the new document. 
Moi had all along suspected that the agitation for a new constitution was merely a 
ploy to remove him and his party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) from 
power. His gamble flopped, however: an opposition alliance decimated KANU in 
the ensuing general election in December 2002, in the process propelling Mwai 
Kibaki to the presidency. 
The government of President Moi came under sustained critique beginning in the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s. Critics claimed that the regime had transmogrified 
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into a corrupt and brutal outfit (Sabar-Friedman 1995). Most of the critiques initially 
focused on economic mismanagement78, but then broadened following the end of 
the cold war to include calls for the legalization of multi-party politics (Mahamdu 
1996). One partisan captures the events then animating the country: in recent 
years “a battle has been raging over political pluralism in Kenya, pitting multi-party 
agents against Moi, a long time enemy of free political competition” (Kuria 1991: 
115). 
In particular, critics decried the fact that the president had destroyed Kenya’s 
governance realm. That is, a certain level of political maturity that the country had 
attained in the first two decades of independence, characterized by two factors 
“that determine the relationship between the rulers and the ruled: one, an actor 
dimension—expectations that individuals have of each other denote . . . agency; 
[and] the institutionalized procedures, or rules of the game—at play in that 
system—structures” (Barkan 1992: 168).  According to one scholar, champions of 
change had the President’s “leadership style of personal rule, his government’s 
ethnic-oriented policies, and the patronage networks of the regime as the top 
grievances” (Chege 1994: 48). 
On the economic side, by the early 1980s Kenya’s economy long hailed as a model 
of success faced dolorous circumstances (Kanyinga 1995). Whereas some 
scholars emphasize the role of political mismanagement under Moi in Kenya’s 
economic atrophy (Barkan 1992), others argue that the decay had in fact set in 
much earlier—during the Kenyatta presidency (Hyden 1994). Politically, Moi 
initially received widespread acclaim on assuming the presidency, especially in 
light of the cronyism and crudities that characterized the waning years of the 
Kenyatta regime (Throup 1987). 
Faced with pining economic fortunes and limited political legitimacy, however, he 
increasingly ogled exclusionary tactics. He initially sought to develop an alternative 
base of support by exploiting the “Harambee”79 movement (Gibbon 1995); these 
                                            
78 For the view that economic decline can actually serve as a precipitate for political mobilization, see, for 
example Laumonnier (1992: 88-92). 
79 This refers to a once formidable nation-wide self-help movement, since largely jettisoned as the seedbed 
of corruption. For corruption of the Harambee spirit, especially evisceration of participation and thus 
empowerment, see Ngau (1987: 523-538). 
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would gather pace in the 1980s. With this goal achieved, he then sought to cement 
his hold on power, by now shifting to a divide-and-rule strategy vis-à-vis his 
erstwhile allies (Sabar-Friedman1995).  He would crown this in the late 1980s by 
jettisoning the secret ballot method in favour of queue voting80. Calls81 for political 
change intensified in the wake of these events (Kanyinga 1995), led by an 
increasingly alienated elite.  
Still, the president held firm82 insisting that a turn to multiparty politics would divide 
Kenyans along ethnic lines. Moi and his supporters made the astute theoretical 
argument that for multi-party democracy to work, a society requires crosscutting 
cleavages. Absent this, society would be racked by conflict, with politics being 
fought solely along the only line of cleavage—ethnicity. 
Consequently, amidst intensifying calls for change, Moi and his lieutenants 
adopted a double-pronged strategy. Increased repression (Bratton et al 1992: 
427), on the one hand, and febrile denunciation of the nascent democratic 
movement, on the other, consistent with vehement denunciations of pro-
democracy campaigns by other African leaders, warning that multi-party politics 
would destroy the country (Barkan 1992) 83. Nevertheless, in the face of mounting 
domestic and international pressure, in December 1991, the Moi government 
acceded to the demands and legalized pluralism. However, in doing so: 
[I]n a situation where it was unlikely to be able to gain a majority of votes 
or seats, the ruling party either had to resign itself to losing power (and 
possibly worse), or was obligated to bring about a favourable outcome 
by political engineering. The latter cause of action was adopted, with 
consequences—notably the so-called ‘ethnic clashes’ in the Rift Valley. 
(Gibbon 1995: 14) 
The events unfolding in Kenya derived in part from a changed international 
environment, specifically changing EU-ACP relations. When Lome IV was 
negotiated, it marked a watershed in ACP-EU relations; with aid conditionality, in 
                                            
80 Voters literally stand behind their candidate, cast by proponents as consonant with African notions of 
democracy, but assailed as an affront to democracy; it lacks secrecy and written records in case of disputes. 
81 For an interactive model of how authoritarian regimes attenuate and especially the role of the democratic 
opposition in that change, see, for instance Stepan (1990: 41-49). 
82 For an example of an entrenched and intransigent ruling party, see, for instance Wayne (1990: 61-70). 
83 Some scholars detect an unstated assumption here—namely, that traditional African polities resembled 
one-party systems, a claim which ignores the changes wrought with the advent of the colonial state. For this 
critique, see, for instance Nyong (1992: 90-96). 
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the form of Structural Adjustment programmes, SAPs, taking centre stage. Kenya 
“received its first structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) from the World Bank in 1980 in 
the context of delays in the finalisation of a Kenya government-IMF agreement, 
itself a response to a balance of payments crisis” (Mosley 1991, qtd in Gibbon 
1995: 11). 
At this initial stage, however, and with the country still held in high esteem as a 
valued ally, Kenya was not asked to undertake macro-economic reforms; rather, 
the loan aimed to support “a more outward-oriented industrial strategy” (ibid). 
Although the government then undertook a number of reform initiatives on its 
own—given that the country then still had a lot of policy autonomy vis-à-vis IFIs, 
all the same, “the World Bank undertook a comprehensive review of the. . .  
economy (WB 1983), which formed the basis for the conditionality attached to a 
second SAL in 1982, “which was focused on “trade liberalisation and agricultural 
sector reforms,” (ibid), two items that would henceforth structure subsequent 
interactions between the sides.  
Agricultural sector reforms proved difficult, however; indeed, the sector was to 
emerge as a major site of Kenyan government—donor conflicts in the 1980s, due 
to its importance to Kenya’s political economy (Ikiara et al 1995: 31). In this 
environment, donor frustration with lack of reform in the agricultural sector quickly 
spread to other sectors so that whereas: 
Kenya would agree to conditionalities, bank the resulting flows of 
programme aid and then find reasons for non-compliance. Other than 
with regard to trade liberalisation, where compliance did occur it tended 
to be in sectors or sub-sectors basically to the interests both of 
government and donors, or in areas where the Kenya government was 
already planning change… (Another trend was for the Kenya 
government to use conditionalities to actually tighten presidential control 
over state or semi-state institutions which had previously enjoyed a 
degree of independence from central interference. (Gibbon 1995: 13) 
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4.2. Legalisation of plural politics, the first multi-party elections and the 
aftermath 
The president did manage to cling onto power in the ensuing elections in 1992.  
One line of critical scholarship holds that it is the “interplay and at times the 
connivance of local and external factors that have undermined accountability in 
Africa” (Mkandawire 2010: 1149). The scholarship does therefore counsel that, 
“development and democracy in Africa must involve a struggle to reform the 
existing patterns of economic globalization as well as to reform domestic policies 
and governance” (Sandbrook 2001: 17). A number of factors accounted for Moi’s 
victory, key   among them lack of serious commitment by donors, divisions within 
the main opposition formation, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy, 
FORD, and the president’s adeptness at both fanning and then exploiting 
dissensions within opposition ranks 
In addition, throughout his tenure, although not explicitly stated, Moi had always 
sought to cast himself as the protector of minority ethnic groups from domination 
by their bigger counterparts (Holmquist et al 1992). This posture harkened back to 
his days as a key figure in independent Kenya’s official opposition party: The 
Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU had as its remit protection of 
ethnic minority interests against majority domination—a euphemism for perceived 
Kikuyu and Luo ascendance in the post-independence state (Boone 2009). 
Therefore, with the emergence of FORD on the scene, Moi and his strategists 
worked over time to portray the new outfit as a re-incarnation of the pre- and 
immediate post-independence alliance between Kikuyus and Luos84. 
Similarly, consistent with the President’s warning that multi-party politics would 
augur ethnic divisions; “bands of armed Kalenjins attacked Luo, Luyha, Kisii, and 
Kikuyu farmers within or just beyond the border of the Rift Valley between 
December 1991 and March 1992” (Chege 1994), in “a process of ethnic cleansing” 
to throw out non-Kalenjin… from parts of the Rift Valley” (Ikiara et al 1995: 66). 
The government sought, by way of this tactic, to demonstrate to the migrant 
communities the futility of supporting the opposition (Barkan 1994). As part of their 
                                            
84 See, for instance Mboya (1964: 6-12). 
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campaign against political reform, KANU stalwarts had sought to make Rift 
Valley—the President’s home province—an exclusive KANU zone. They sought to 
do so by exploiting latent land grievances there—the goal being to intimidate pro-
opposition supporters, for in such instances, “ethnicity emerges as a major vehicle 
of state-instigated violence designed to intimidate opponents and thwart 
challengers to the status quo” (Lamarchand 1992: 104)85. 
The suspicions seemed to gain further credence with a number of organizations, 
including a Parliamentary Select Committee, concluding that leading figures in 
KANU had played a major role (Kanyinga 1995). This is not surprising, however: 
in the face of mounting calls for change, “powerful elites often do take an inflexible 
view of their interests… In extreme cases, there may be only one solution that will 
maintain the social position of the group… Compromises that may lead down the 
slippery slope to social extinction or irrelevance have little appeal to such groups” 
(Mansfield et al 2001: 122-123). The group would therefore use whatever means 
it can to sermon the masses to its cause (Kabemba 2008; Mansfield et al 2001). 
That African elites can so easily manipulate the masses bespeaks a much larger 
problem: the existence of weak parties. Instead, in most of the countries, ruling 
parties usually deploy: 
Principles of divide-and-rule, exclusion, xenophobia, outright 
discrimination, and the victimization of those who share different 
ideological understandings, especially those with the potential to win 
elections that are democratically organized. [Indeed, although nominally 
multi-party states, in most of the countries] when it comes to the 
management of the economy, the characteristics of a one-party state 
remain entrenched. Most ruling parties have access to government 
coffers. (Kabemba 2008: 40-41) 
Even more alarming to reformists, once ensconced in power Moi appeared to 
revert to his old authoritarian ways (Mutua 2009). Following the elections and 
cognizant of the narrow nature of his victory, and so feeling politically exposed, 
“the president and his colleagues attempted to persuade members of the 
opposition to defect to KANU” (Barkan 1993: 98). In addition, state-instigated 
                                            
85 One expert implicates donors in the violence, on the ground that their pressure combined with those of 
domestic forces, forced governments that had mobilized groups along ethnic lines to privatize violence, as a 
way to escape international responsibility. See Ruessler (2005: 207-227). 
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violence as well as official corruption appeared to assume a fulsome turn (Branch 
et al 2008). 
Faced with an intransigent president, a number of groups quickly undertook a re-
evaluation of this situation. They quickly came to the conclusion that they had 
made a grievous error by equating democratization with the mere re-legalization 
of parties, while leaving the rest of the institutional infrastructure of the one party 
state intact (Grosh et al 1996/97). The groups therefore increasingly focused on 
the constitution86 as the main obstacle to genuine change (Kagwanja 2009). They, 
not surprisingly, immediately issued calls for a new constitution; the President 
initially rejected the calls outright (Mutua 2009). To stanch the mounting tide for 
constitutional reform, Moi shocked both ally and foe alike when on New Year’s Eve 
in 1995 he made constitutional reform the main thrust of his address to the nation. 
Acknowledging the inadequacy of the constitution to Kenya’s changed needs the 
president gave an undertaking to oversee needed changes. 
However, while welcoming the gesture, reformists simultaneously denounced the 
president’s proposal to entrust the exercise with foreign experts, viewing it as a 
recondite manoeuvre to sabotage meaningful change. Reformists therefore 
increasingly ogled a “National Convention Assembly (NCA),” insisting that Kenya 
had to undertake a set of reforms before the 1997 general elections; if not, the 
opposition boycott those elections, a stance rejected by opposition politicians as 
too radical87. 
In addition, the government insisted that there was no time to undertake such 
reforms; ironically, while all this was happening the opposition had been secretly 
negotiating with the government for the enactment of minimum reforms. The talks 
would lead to what became known as the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group—
leading to an agreement to initiate some minimal reforms before the 1997 general 
elections. However, Moi moved with dispatch following the passage of the reform 
                                            
86 Actually, the focus on the constitution had begun in the early 1980s and then gathered momentum in the 
1990s as part of the agitation for political pluralism; this would see the pro-reform group, operating 
clandestinely, issue a draft constitution―entitled Proposals for a model constitution. 
87 For the role of the specific political environment on the nature of opposition politics, see Lusk-Okar (2004). 
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agenda to prorogue parliament and call the1997 elections—stymying, in effect, 
implementation of the agreed minimum reforms (Brown 2001). 
 
4.3 Renewed momentum for constitutional reform, 1997-2002 
 
Agitation for a new constitution did continue apace after the elections, however. 
IPPG had put in place the Constitution of Kenya Review Act. However, KANU 
continued in its determination to control the process, with Moi maintaining that only 
MPs had the people’s mandate to preside over such a process. Thus feeling 
abandoned, and also cognizant of previous betrayals, “On December 15, 1999, 
the Ufungamano Initiative, a clergy-led constitutional review process that included 
all the key stakeholders except KANU and the NDP” (Mutua 2009: 112)88 
commenced, establishing in the process “the NGO People’s Commission of Kenya 
(PCK) to write the constitution” (idem). Interestingly, though, the president’s camp 
had launched its own constitution writing process on the same day that the pro-
reform groups launched theirs, through the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Constitutional Review (PSC).  
McAdam et al (2001: 225) identify what they call ‘brokerage of coalitions across 
unequal categories or distinct trust networks’ as a major agent of democratization. 
In the specific Kenya case, the two groups would finally agree to a merger following 
extensive negotiations and the signing of a merger bill. The development led to the 
formation of Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, chaired by the 
internationally renowned legal scholar Yash Pal Ghai. The CKRC would then 
embark on collecting and then collating views from the public on the type of 
constitutional dispensation Kenyans wanted; this would see it produce “a draft bill 
to amend the constitution of Kenya on September 18, 2000, in effect a draft 
constitution” (135). 
Again, Moi moved with alacrity to prorogue parliament for the 2002 general 
elections just as the national constitutional conference which was to vote on the 
                                            
88 On the role of Ufungamano in these activities, see, for instance Mati (2012: 71-84). 
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new document, known as the Bomas constitutional Conference—Bomas being the 
national cultural site of the conference—was set to commence. Moi, from the very 
onset, saw the agitation for a new constitution as a ploy to remove him, and by 
extension KANU, from power. The president’s gamble flopped, however: KANU 
suffered discomfiture in the ensuing polls by Kibaki and his National Alliance 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an alliance of opposition parties.  
 
  
4.4. EU Political Aid and the push for political pluralism: The Moi 
Administration 
 
EU political aid to “Kenya has provided one of the clearest cases in Africa of donor 
political conditionality forcing multiparty elections” (Barkan 1993: 58). Foreign aid 
giving during the cold war issued from geo-strategic calculations (Brown 2005). 
One analyst explains the situation that then obtained with respect to Africa: 
“paradoxically, Western democracies regularly and purposively undermined 
democratic reformers, lest they threaten the hold on power of an autocratic ally” 
(Siegle 2009: 404). It is instructive, as intimated in the introduction, that EU-
Kenya—and by extension EU-ACP—relations commenced at precisely this time; 
specifically, in 1976, a time when most newly independent countries were busy 
dismantling democracy and erecting one-party dictatorships! Indeed, from the 
1970s up to the early 1990s, Kenya stood as the darling of the West in Africa; ogled 
as a rare economic and political success story in an otherwise hopeless 
neighbourhood (Khadiagala 2009). These cold war-related calculations as well as 
stellar economic performance helped the new government avoid unnecessary 
scrutiny (Gibbon 1995).  
However, the easing and then the end of the Cold War radically changed the 
governance terrain in the developing world. Liberal theory posits that democratic 
societies show greater respect for their citizens’ rights than do their autocratic/non-
democratic counterparts. By so doing, postulates the theory, democratic societies 
allow their citizens to exploit their full potential. The theory contrasts this situation 
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with that that purportedly exists in non-democracies. There, argue the theorists, 
governments “lose tough with the needs of their peoples, and shut themselves off 
from information that might prevent egregious missteps” (Russett 1994: 105).  
Liberal theorists do therefore aver that developed countries can use aid to buttress 
the human rights agenda in the developing world (Call 2001). The shift in thinking 
resulted in a change in the discourse. Key players in the international arena made 
adherence to democracy the lodestar of international action (Leonard et al 2003). 
The hitherto cosy relationship between Kenya and donors began to fray as the 
Kenya government became increasingly repressive, first during the waning years 
of the Kenyatta Presidency, and then the Daniel Arap Moi Presidency.  The demise 
of the cold war further eroded Kenya’s status as a valued strategic ally. A midst 
growing domestic opposition to the Moi government, the EU and other major 
donors increasingly decried ‘mounting corruption’ and increased political 
repression. The Moi-donor relations took a turn for the worse at the donors’ 
Consultative Group Meeting (CGM) in Paris in 1991: appropriating the view that 
“broad-based economic growth and development require reforms,” the EU and 
other donors “made no further commitments of aid, stating that they would review 
progress in these areas ‘in 6 months’ time” (Barkan 1993: 91). This mounting 
pressure would see Moi move with alacrity to legalize political pluralism later that 
year (Okuku 2003).  
However, increasingly one brand of critical scholarship has decried the fact that 
liberal theory equates democracy with "competitive elections" (Pinkney 1999: 1). 
In the specific Kenyan case, once the EU and others had reinforced internal 
demands and forced Moi to legalize pluralism, they then shifted with alacrity on 
holding elections as the measure of democracy. This posture left the rest of the 
institutional infrastructure of the one-party repressive state intact. A midst mounting 
instances of official abuse in the run-up to the first multiparty elections in 1992, 
donors kept quiet, only making feeble representations to Moi to change course. 
Indeed, according to the literature, scholars have sought to question the motives 
and effectiveness of such assistance. They posit the strategy as a self-serving 
posture by sender countries (Bosin 2012). Those who question the motives and 
effectiveness of democracy support cast that effort as selective at best and outright 
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manipulative at worst. They observe that when the strategic interests of democracy 
promoters are at stake, those countries are likely to sacrifice democracy. Very 
seldom do values such as democracy matter (Olsen 1998). Indeed, other scholars 
writing in this vein have assailed democracy promotion as propaganda designed 
to gloss over historical domination (Ake 1996).  
Critics of liberal theory caution, moreover, that inter-party competition may make 
for appeals to religious and ethnic loyalties (Pinkney 1999: 2). For example, to 
deflect growing agitation for political pluralism President Moi and his KANU 
lieutenants had repeatedly warned that taking that route would lead to ethnic 
atavism.  Consistent with the President’s warnings “bands of armed Kalenjins 
attacked Luo, Luyha, Kisii, and Kikuyu farmers within or just beyond the border of 
the Rift Valley between December 1991 and March 1992” (Chege 1994).  The 
government sought, by way of this tactic, to demonstrate to the migrant 
communities the futility of supporting the opposition (Barkan 1994). President Moi 
hailed from the Rift Valley. Even more alarming to reformists, once ensconced in 
power following the 1992 elections Moi appeared to revert to his old authoritarian 
ways (Mutua 2009).  For example, state-instigated violence appeared to assume 
a fulsome turn (Branch et al 2008). Interestingly, the EU and other aid providers 
never took serious action against the regime. The EU has, paradoxically, sought 
to cast itself as a normative power in international affairs. 
 
4.5. Electoral Assistance 
 
Monitoring regimes, of which election monitoring is an instance, have an important 
role in ensuring adherence to international norms and commitments (Simpson et 
al 2012). In particular, election observation has emerged as a key strategy for 
democracy preservation and, hence, conflict prevention during the third wave of 
democracy. By so doing, election monitoring can in turn play an important role in 
institution building; for such external presence “can foster trust among rival parties 
by providing guarantees, clearing up misperceptions, relaying information back 
and forth and resolving key issues” (Chakand 1998: 169). Such institutions, once 
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established, could “help counterbalance state power, provide a context for 
developing civic skills, encourage norms of reciprocity and trust, articulate societal 
interests and create peaceful channels for the resolution of conflicts that might 
otherwise result in violence” (Chakand 1998: 169). However, election monitoring 
by outsiders can frequently become a target of suspicion and outside hostility as 
neo-colonial, its advantages notwithstanding (Chakand 1998:168).  
Still, with its increased use governments that seek to cheat have developed other 
strategies. These include the staffing of strategic institutions such as the judiciary 
with cronies “practices that have far more damaging consequences on governance 
in the long run” (Simpson et al 2012: 501).  
In addition, election monitoring usually relies on hastily assembled data, thus 
precluding the rendering of a comprehensive verdict. What emanate from such 
data are superficial recommendations. Furthermore, in theory, international 
election observers should not take their marching orders from the sending agency. 
This, however, is not always the case. More often than not, other considerations 
come into play (Teshome 2013).  
 
4.5.1. EU and election observation under the Moi Administration, 1992-2002 
Election observation undertaken by both local and international monitors, aims to 
guarantee the integrity of the electoral process by communicating the international 
community’s expectations (Teshome 2013: 1003). As Short-Term Observers 
(STOs), their larger numbers place election monitors “in an excellent position to 
render a comprehensive and accurate picture of the entire election, including 
potential patterns of discrimination” (Binder 2007: 231). However, election 
monitoring by outsiders can frequently become a target of suspicion and outside 
hostility as neo-colonial, its advantages notwithstanding (Chakand 1998:168).   
Indeed, the impact of foreign aid on sovereignty has emerged as a major theme in 
the democratisation literature.  Specifically, the legitimacy of foreign intervention to 
promote human rights, democracy and good governance versus the need to 
protect state sovereignty. Supporters of the shift point to a growing 
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acknowledgement of the responsibility to protect those under oppression by their 
own governments (Bishop 1994).  
The KANU government greatly circumscribed the activities of election observers 
during the 1992 elections. President Moi denounced the strategy as an 
infringement of Kenya’s sovereignty. He posited Kenyans as capable of making 
their own democratic decisions free of external influence (Chege 1994). As a result, 
most potential observer groups deployed skeletal teams. Most of these focused on 
the operations of the electoral body in Nairobi.    
The literature argues that monitoring regimes, of which election monitoring is an 
instance, have an important role in ensuring adherence to international norms and 
commitments (Simpson et al 2012). The literature posits election observation as a 
key strategy for democracy preservation and, hence, conflict prevention during the 
third wave of democracy. By so doing, election monitoring can in turn play an 
important role in institution building. External presence “can foster trust among rival 
parties by providing guarantees, clearing up misperceptions, relaying information 
back and forth and resolving key issues” (Chakand 1998: 169).  
According to the literature, the EU has increasingly sought to present itself as a 
normative power in international affairs. That is, a global player whose power 
derives not from military might but rather from moral values that inform both 
political and economic life. Deriving allegedly from universal norms, the EU's 
normative power is “founded on and has as its foreign and development policy 
objectives the consolidation of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms” (Manners 2002: 241, qtd., in Storey 2006: 331).  
Analysts adjudged the ensuing polls as not free and fair –thereby putting Kenya’s 
aid providers in a quandary. However, by 1993 the EU and others claimed to detect 
some reforms underway in Kenya. This would see the EU support various 
development initiatives, with priority given “to road rehabilitation; it also provided 
support to various NGO initiatives” (Olsen 2002: 143).  The EU did move to focus 
on democracy in Kenya anew with new elections on the horizon in 1997. This 
would see the bloc suspend aid pending “meaningful” reforms”.  The EU’s new 
posture vis-à-vis the Moi government unfolded in the context of growing domestic 
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agitations against increased repression coupled with abundant evidence of no 
serious reforms.  
As Short-Term Observers (STOs), their larger numbers place election observers 
“in an excellent position to render a comprehensive and accurate picture of the 
entire election, including potential patterns of discrimination” (Binder 2007: 231). 
Take Kenya’s 2002 elections also.  The European Union Observer Mission 
(UEOM) was in Kenya from mid-November 2002 to mid-January 2003. The 
EUEOM had over 160 observers. In its Final Report, the EUEOM notes the 
elections as free and fair, adding, “the conduct of the elections constituted an 
example for other countries in the region—also because the electoral process 
resulted in the first transfer of power from one political group to another since 
independence” (EUEOM Final Report, 2002 elections 4).  
The literature argues that mmonitoring regimes, of which election monitoring is an 
instance, have an important role in ensuring adherence to international norms and 
commitments (Simpson et al 2012). In particular, the literature posits election 
observation as a key strategy for democracy preservation and, hence, conflict 
prevention during the third wave of democracy. By so doing, election monitoring 
can in turn play an important role in institution building; for such external presence 
“can foster trust among rival parties by providing guarantees, clearing up 
misperceptions, relaying information back and forth and resolving key issues” 
(Chakand 1998: 169). Such institutions, once established, could “help 
counterbalance state power, provide a context for developing civic skills, 
encourage norms of reciprocity and trust, articulate societal interests and create 
peaceful channels for the resolution of conflicts that might otherwise result in 
violence” (Chakand 1998: 169).  
The main objective of the observer mission was "to give an informed and balanced 
assessment of the electoral process and, by its mere presence, to help reduce 
tension and minimize any electoral malpractice—thus contributing to a peaceful 
and transparent election” (55). The mission’s members and the Chief Observer 
held regular parleys with ECK and government, political parties, civil society, and 
foreign players. The mission cooperated in these endeavours with other 
international observers through Kenya-Donor Information Centre (K-DICE). It is 
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worth noting in this respect that the 2002 elections were important because of their 
potential demonstration effect regionally, given Kenya’s regional status, with the 
country having served as host on the “negotiations on Sudan and Somalia. Kenya 
is home to many refugees from Uganda, Sudan, and Somalia” (Barkan 2009: 78).  
Still, with its increased use, governments that seek to cheat have developed other 
strategies that have far more damaging consequences on governance in the long 
run (Simpson et al 2012: 501). Moi appeared to embrace reforms—including IPPG 
ones--in the face of renewed pressure for political reforms a head of the 1997 
elections. However, Moi moved with dispatch following the passage of the reform 
agenda to prorogue parliament and call for the 1997 elections— stymying, in effect, 
implementation of the agreed minimum reforms. Interestingly, the donors still 
pressurized the opposition not to boycott the elections even after Moi had gone 
ahead and reneged on the IPPG reforms (Brown 2001: 733).  
Furthermore, in theory international election observers should not take their 
marching orders from the sending agency. This, however, is not always the case. 
More often than not, other considerations come into play, thus distorting the 
ensuing evaluation of the process (Teshome 2013). Take Kenya’s 1992 elections 
referenced previously. when evidence did emerge of massive rigging, especially 
in a number of constituencies, some donors moved to suppress this, although 
others, “such as the EU… issued more critical statements” (Brown 2001: 733).  
 
4.5.2  Liberal Theory and its Critics: EU aid and the Moi Administration 
Liberal theory considers elections—and by extension the electoral process-- the 
sine qua none of democracy. This has served as the rationale for champions of 
liberal theory in their calls for aid towards free and fair elections as well as support 
of the entire electoral process. In the literature, liberalism has, however, 
increasingly come under attack for attempting to equate democracy with elections 
(Mitchell et al 2008: 162). Some of these critiques seem to comport with the events 
that unfolded in Kenya. 
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 Once the EU and others had reinforced internal demands and forced Moi to 
legalize pluralism, they then shifted with alacrity to holding elections as the 
measure of democracy. This posture left the rest of the institutional infrastructure 
of the one-party repressive state intact.  A midst mounting instances of official 
abuse in the run-up to the first multiparty elections in 1992, donors kept quiet, only 
making feeble representations to Moi to change course. Donors took this position 
because they “had spent a total of about $2.1 million on the… elections and were 
determined to see them take place, even under grossly suboptimal conditions” 
(Brown 2007: 732). Analysts adjudged the ensuing polls as not free and fair –
thereby putting Kenya’s aid providers in a quandary.  
However, by 1993 the EU and others claimed to detect some reforms underway in 
Kenya; this would see donors jettison their hitherto focus on democracy, and shift 
to a posture of business-as-usual with Moi. Donors now shifted their glare to 
economic development and political stability; donors replayed this dance during 
the 1997 elections (Brown 2001: 732). This development would see the two sides 
sign a “memorandum of understanding” that “recognized the success of economic 
reforms.” 
This would see the EU support various development initiatives, with priority given 
“to road rehabilitation; it also provided support to various NGO initiatives” (Olsen 
2002: 143). However, with new elections on the horizon in 1997 and amidst 
growing domestic agitations against Moi’s increased repression and with abundant 
evidence of no serious reforms, the EU did again move to focus on democracy in 
Kenya anew, including the suspension of aid pending meaningful reforms. 
However, once Moi pretended to embrace reforms—including IPPG ones—the EU 
and other donors again quickly relented. However, Moi moved with dispatch 
following the passage of the reform agenda to prorogue parliament and call for the 
1997 elections— stymying, in effect, implementation of the agreed minimum 
reforms. Interestingly, the donors still pressurized the opposition not to boycott the 
elections even after Moi had gone ahead and reneged on the IPPG reforms (Brown 
2001: 733). 
. 
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4.6. EU Political Aid and Institutional Reform:  Civil Service Reform 
The issue of foreign aid as a conduit for capacity building has come to the fore in 
international development in the post-Cold War era. Foreign aid as a source of 
capacity development is a response to extant thinking in international development 
that lack of capacity represents the biggest obstacle to development, especially in 
Africa (Bossnyt et al 1992). Capacity development rests on a belief that institutional 
weaknesses constitute the main obstacles to structural change.  
A critique of earlier economistic theories of development that neglected the impact 
of context as well as the role of ownership by local players on development, and 
alert to the charge that “centralized urban and professional power, knowledge and 
values have frowned out over and often failed to recognize the knowledge of rural 
people themselves,” (Chambers 1993: 82) the new approach seeks to incorporate 
participation in development. As part of this bottom-up approach to development, 
the new focus aims to transcend the earlier fixation on economics, by involving all 
societal sectors. Available literature indicates general principles under girding CD: 
local participation and locally driven agenda; building on local capacities; 
ownership and respect of local values; long-term vision; and targeting sustainable 
results. 
In Kenya civil service reform commenced in the early 1990s with the appointment 
of the ‘Dream Team’; that is, the appointment of super-technocrats, under Dr 
Richard Leakey, to revamp the bureaucracy. A view had developed over time that 
lack of domestic institutional capacity obstructed development in Africa; hence, the 
need to focus on institution building (Bossnyt et al 1992: 1). 
In analysing the concept capacity and capacity building and what role they play in 
public service management, the two terms become important when it is understood 
that a successful, efficient civil service requires competent people who can perform 
the tasks commensurate with their specific ranks (Mentz 1997: 1). He traces the 
problem to the way public administration developed under colonialism, especially 
its preclusion of the development of neutral competence, with bureaucracy serving 
merely as an instrument of control vis-à-vis the ‘natives’. At independence most of 
the new regimes retained the status quo (Mentz 1997: 2). 
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Kenya’s civil service, like its counterparts in the third world, traces its origin to 
colonial rule, a system that supplanted pre-existing institution (Bennett et al 1961). 
What developed in Kenya under colonialism was an administrative/bureaucratic 
state in so far as the “roles of administrator and politician were usually 
amalgamate” (Turner et al 1997: 86). However, by the time of the launch of plural 
politics in the early 1990s, the Kenyan civil service had turned into a pale shadow 
of its former self; its performance was at an all-time low (Nyong 2009). 
By the mid-1990s Kenya’s leading donors, the EU key among them, began to 
agitate for civil service reform, with a focus on achieving good governance, 
conceptualized as the effective and transparent pursuit of public policy by 
government, while also respecting human rights and democratic principles (Bekoe 
2006). The shift in emphasis unfolded in the context of the emergence of the good 
governance discourse—a call for fundamental change in politics and 
administration as essential to development—a stance pushed particularly 
vigorously by IFIs and northern governments beginning in 1989 as part of so-called 
New Public Management agenda (Turner et al 1997)89.  
According to Nzioka, “the Civil Service Reform Programme and Action Plan was 
developed and adopted in March 1992. The long-term objective is to improve 
efficiency and productivity of the Civil Service” (1994: 1). To do so, the government 
created a “Steering Committees on the CSRP at the national, provincial and district 
levels, as well as in each ministry with a national secretariat as its operational arm” 
(Sawe 1997: 1). 
Out of these efforts, a number of policy issues/themes did come to the fore: the 
issue of staffing; the need to re-orient civil service structure from traditional 
administration to management-based; the need for training and capacity building; 
the need to shift towards performance-based management; the need to reform 
financial management; and the issue of pay and benefits. In this respect, reform of 
organisation structures aims to achieve better defined “hierarchy of authority and 
                                            
89 NPM is a response to critiques of traditional bureaucracy; it focuses on strategic management—a situation 
whereby public managers, through a deployment of the various components of strategic management, are 
able to reshape public sector enterprises in ways that enhance their organizations’ worth to the public, both 
in the short and long run, by reconfiguring their organizations to adequately respond to the opportunities 
and challenges posed by their environments. See, for instance Moore (1995). 
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span of control and more accurate job descriptions among other initiatives” (Nzioka 
1994: 1). 
The reforms unfolded in an environment framed by mounting fiscal constraints; 
thus, the aim was to move from orthodox bureaucratic administration—seen as the 
incubator of inefficiency—and towards public management—with a focus on 
results—and is in line with NPM. The reforms were framed by a number of issues: 
merit appointments; remuneration concerns, time, and so on. In Kenya, the history 
shows that after independence, the civil service expanded rapidly up to the 1980s 
so that over time fears emerged that the public wage bill was becoming 
unsustainable, with most of the resources going towards salaries and nothing 
being directed towards capital investment; this then opened the way for the launch 
of SAPs, under Kenya’s 6th Development Plan, 1989-1993 (Kiragu 1988). 
The attempt had only minimal success, mainly a major shrinkage in the labour 
force from about 300000 to around 200000 civil servants—although the wage bill 
did continue to grow in percentage terms in comparison with other regional 
countries—as well as the establishment of Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) 
(Public Sector Reform and Institutional Capacity Building: Joint Statement by 
Development Partners at the Kenya Consultative Group Meeting, 24th-25th 
November 2003). A number of other challenges also lingered: key among them 
lack of institutional capacity, a consequence, largely, of the programme’s rushed 
nature; as well as the need for ownership of the reform agenda by those directly 
affected. In addition, corruption remained endemic (Nzioka 1994: 1). 
The Dream Team’s failure stemmed in large part from the fact that president Moi 
was not totally committed to the reforms (Nyong 2009). This implied, contrary to 
the nostra of NPM, that without focusing on the political environment, even a highly 
qualified team could not achieve much (Chandler 2006: 2).   
Indeed, a critical set of literatures has focused on what it views as a furtive attempt 
to reduce development to a managerial undertaking. The literature posits that 
issues of programme design are political and not technical, given their bearing on 
state capacity and legitimacy (Brynen 2008; McGovern 2008). Viewing 
development as multifaceted, the literatures caution that formulating and 
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“organising policy for global development is thus far from being a mechanistic or 
technocratic exercise” (Grimm et al 2012: 4).  
The literatures call for a focus on both managerial and political aspects of 
development. Yet under the extant managerialist strategy, continue the critics, 
issues of participation receive short-shrift. As a result, issues of political 
development in the Third World “that need mediating—are then quickly 
criminalized to be punished” (Chandler 2006: 6). Instead to suffice, maintain 
proponents of this stance, foreign aid policies should facilitate: 
[T]he building of legal infrastructure and participatory mechanisms, and 
that they take into account local perceptions, realities and responses. At 
the very least, donors must discontinue support of non-inclusive ‘private’ 
organizations and reform by decree. Rather, donors should broaden the 
base of recipients and support structures to include all relevant parties. 
Indeed … th[e] evidence . . . shows that aid projects that implicate 
sensitive political processes are very difficult to administer effectively 
without engendering negative consequences for recipients and/or 
donors. (Wedel 2001: 202) 
 
4.7. Conclusion: EU political aid and the Moi Administration, 1990-2002 
What, then, is the overall perception of EU political aid towards Kenya during the 
Moi-era, 1992-2002? On the one hand, the EU gets high marks for its role in 
Kenya’s political development during the 1990s, by first helping incubate civil 
society. This civil society would then in turn work with external players such as the 
EU in pressurizing Moi to repeal section 2 (a) of the constitution, thereby ushering 
in political pluralism. With the legalisation of political pluralism and the emergence 
of opposition voices both in and outside parliament, and in spite of attempts by 
then-president Moi to sabotage Kenya’s nascent democracy, the country did 
become more open politically; for example, the government could no longer 
imprison regime opponents without trial. 
Still, human rights abuses, especially by the police and state-sponsored groups, 
remained endemic during the Moi regime. In addition, and also as already 
discussed, save for the agitation for multi-party politics, once this was achieved, 
donors did not seek any other meaningful reforms.  
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What explains donor, including EU, behaviour, that is, the apparent leap-service to 
the electoral process, in Kenya in the 1990s?  Strategic calculations help explain 
donor behaviour. A major player on the donor side—former U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen would explain in later years 
the rationale for his country’s posture in this particular instance: 
For us in the Bureau of African Affairs, it was not the onset of democracy 
that was important. It was our ability to resume full-scale economic and 
military cooperation. But we had to get over the democracy huddle first, 
indicating how important that issue had become in our Africa policy in 
such a short time. (Cohen 2011: 232) 
 
Cumulatively, however, EU efforts during the 1990s, coupled with those from other 
external actors as well as domestic actors helped lay the proscenium for the pivotal 
elections that took place in the country in 2002. The elections led to the first transfer 
of power from one political party—KANU—to another—NARC—since 
independence, the topic for the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: The NARC/Kibaki Administration, 2003-2008 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter five on the Kibaki/NARC administration, 2003-2007, seeks to explicate 
political processes in Kenya during the country’s pivotal transition from the Moi—
and by extension KANU—rule and the role of EU political aid in that process. Given 
that NARC’s was the first post-dictatorship government in Kenya, this chapter 
provides an opportunity to assess how the EU interacted with this new, apparently, 
reformist government. The chapter aims to gauge the instruments the EU deployed 
in its engagement with NARC.  
The chapter opens with a discussion of the euphoria that attended the NARC 
victory, and the palpable hope that many Kenyans and their foreign supporters 
had. Initially the NARC administration appeared to keep its promises, especially 
when it came to economic renewal, and some social policies, such as free primary 
school education. In addition, the country appeared to enjoy unprecedented levels 
of political freedom. 
However, the chapter shows, with time, elite fragmentations, especially the failure 
by Kibaki and his wing of NARC to honour their pre-election Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with Odinga’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) began to sap 
reform momentum. The divisions would take a particularly dangerous turn on the 
issue of constitutional reform.  The two political camps vied to get a constitution 
that would best serve their personal and partisan interests, disregarding, in the 
process, the wishes of Kenyans. These elite divisions would undergird the 2007 
elections. Odinga and his camp viewed the elections as the best avenue for 
dislodging what they increasingly denounced as a corrupt, and ethnic-oriented 
Kibaki-led administration. Kibaki and his wing of NARC were, for their part, 
determined not to loss state power. They feared that a defeat would spell doom 
not just for themselves but for members of their ethnic community also. 
This polarized atmosphere would help trigger post-election violence, with Odinga 
and his supporters livid at what they saw as blatant electoral fraud perpetrated by 
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Kibaki, working in concert with the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). The 
chapter concludes with an examination of the role that the EU played in Kenya 
during this period, including its activities during the post-election violence.    
In 2002, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an alliance of two major 
opposition parties: Kibaki’s National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) and Odinga’s Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) (Khadiagala 2009), finally dislodged KANU, the party in 
power since independence. In the most basic terms, Kenyans saw Kibaki as their 
equivalent of Nelson Mandela: a man heralding the dawn of an incandescent era. 
Yet no sooner had Kibaki assumed power than he and associates promptly 
showed their true colours (Mutua 2009). 
In its push to power in 2002 NARC had made a number of promises, key among 
them the revival of the economy and concomitant creation of jobs, constitutional 
reform to decentralize power and decision-making away from an imperious 
presidency (Kagwanja 2009). To its credit, on acceding to power, the new 
government did register a number of successes.  On the economic front, for 
example, it presided over impressive economic revival and with this a reduction in 
poverty levels. Socially, it introduced free primary school education (Klopp 2009: 
144).  
The vignette was, however, different on the political front. Whereas NARC came 
to “power in 2002 asserting a civic nationalism and riding on the crest of a multi-
ethnic coalition,” (Kagwanja 2009: 373), once Kibaki took charge of Kenya’s 
imperial presidency, however, he quickly took decisions that would over time 
precipitate the disintegration of the coalition (Klopp et al 2007: 18). In the mould of 
“predecessors Jomo Kenyatta and Moi, Kibaki sought to inherit the existing power 
and seemed to have no intention of replacing it, despite much rhetoric to the 
contrary" (Akech 2010: 12). 
In the count-down to the 2002 general elections, then-President Moi had refused 
to allow for an open contest to pick KANU’s flag bearer. He, instead, unilaterally 
nominated Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta—Moi’s predecessor- as the 
party’s presidential candidate. Moi’s choice of Uhuru precipitated the defection 
from KANU of key figures such as Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka, among others. 
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The leaders would then take over LDP and commence negotiations with NAK; 
these would lead to the creation of NARC. NARC would go on to discomfit  
NARC would go on to discomfit Kenyatta in the ensuing elections, “capturing 125 
seats in parliament to KANU’s 64… Kibaki won 62 per cent of the presidential vote 
to Kenyatta’s 31.3 per cent” (Steeves 2009: 499). McAdam et al (2001: 265), 
identify coalition formation between segments of ruling classes that are currently 
excluded from power as a major agent of democratization.   
 
5.2 NARC in power: Elite fragmentation, and other unfulfilled pre-election 
promises 
As part of the negotiations leading to the formation of NARC, Kibaki and his team 
had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the LDP, promising to 
create the post of Prime-Minister for the leader90 of LDP if elected, and to share 
other government posts equally. They also pledged to adopt “consensus-based 
decision-making as the basis of NARC’s interethnic coalition” (Kagwanja et al 
2009: 261). The MoU was informed by provisions of the Bomas Draft Constitution 
(see the discussion below). However, no sooner had the coalition romped to power 
than a major power tussle ensued between the erstwhile allies. Kibaki’s inner circle 
was determined to tame Odinga. The group insisted that not only did Kenya’s then 
existing constitution not allow for such terms as contained in the MoU; “power-
sharing would divide the country along ethnic lines” (Kagwanja 2009: 372). 
Once in power Kibaki did not honour his other pre-election commitments either.  
Take the issue of corruption, for instance. Contrary to a previous pledge to tackle 
corruption, the vice appeared to take a fulsome turn. Some of the president’s 
closest allies were accused of involvement in the so-called Anglo-Leasing scandal 
(Kagwanja et al 2009: 264). With its genesis in the Moi era, Anglo-leasing involved 
a drive to “purchase security-related equipment and services from abroad under 
‘lease financing’ Contracts with certain companies” (Nyong’o 2009: 171)—
including the fictitious Anglo-Leasing Company purportedly registered in the UK. 
                                            
90 This was understood to mean that wing’s leader, Raila Odinga; as stated previously, once in power, and 
probably because of this issue, the Kibaki-wing of the coalition reneged on the MOU. 
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On taking power, despite clear evidence to the contrary, the new President’s close 
associates decide to push through the project “with the aim of stealing public 
money” (Kagwanja et al 2009: 267). One commentator captures the decay of the 
NARC regime on the corruption score: 
Within a short span, Moi era wheeler-dealers had crawled their way from 
the woodwork and penetrated the Kibaki administration, working in 
cahoots with certain cabinet ministers… Meanwhile, senior people in 
government were busy feeding the public with the lies that Kenya was 
getting the best of the deals by partnering with the East and not the West 
as had been the tradition—not necessarily a bad thing in itself except 
the thievery and gluttony that accompanied the transition. 91 (Ngotho, 
Daily Nation, 11th June 2017: 24) 
Take the pre-election promise to enact a new constitution within the first hundred 
days, also. Once in power, the Kibaki-wing92 of NARC reneged on this “thereby 
alienating the Kenyan public and civil society” (Kagwanja et al 2009: 269). Indeed, 
they only gave way—and grudgingly so, in the face of intense public pressure. This 
paved the way for the reconvening of the Bomas constitutional conference (Branch 
et al 2008). 
Yet those who had thought that by this action Kibaki and associates had finally 
signed onto this important national exercise would soon receive a rude shock. 
Once the Conference resumed, it immediately became clear that Kibaki and his 
team had only conceded to the reconvention for tactical purposes. Namely, to 
stanch mounting public opprobrium against the government, while not giving into 
the substantive agenda (Steeves 2007). From the onset of the meeting, the Kibaki-
wing of NARC did everything to obstruct the work of the Conference. Initially key 
figures associated with this group, for example Kiraitu Murungi (then Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Development), sought on a number of occasions to 
induce the then-Chairman of the constitutional process, Professor Ghai to alter the 
proceedings to suit the group’s agenda. 
                                            
91 For Kenya’s Eastward policy shift, but especially towards China, see, for instance, Ochami (2008). 
92 This was NAK –and even here it was really the DP wing of the triumvirate—that was determined to retain 
the status quo; matters were made worse by the untimely death of Vice-President Wamalwa just a few 
months after NARC‘s accession to power; Wamalwa had acted as a moderating voice between DP—and 
therefore Kibaki’s—conservatism, on the one hand—and LDP—and therefore Odinga’s—radicalism. 
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This goal became patently clear the moment the constitution drafting Convention 
issued “a new constitution which de-clawed the ‘imperial presidency’” (Steeves 
2009: 500). Despite coming under intense pressure, Ghai valiantly rebuffed the 
group’s nefarious overtures, however. With this route foreclosed and sensing 
imminent defeat, the group then walked out of Bomas en masse. However, 
undeterred and guided by conference rules, the delegates proceeded to 
overwhelmingly endorse the draft constitution, which provided for a parliamentary 
system of government by creating the post of executive prime minister and also 
introduced a four-tiered system of government (Mutua 2009). 
Following the discomfiture at Bomas, the camp then sought to hijack the 
constitution review process by altering the role of parliament in the review process. 
Heretofore parliament could only either endorse or reject the entire draft.  Under 
altered rules it could now “amend the Bomas Draft” (Steeves 2009: 500). The 
group, in a subsequent manoeuver, would push through parliament The 
Constitution of Kenya Review (Amendment Act).  The change gave the group the 
authority to amend the Bomas Draft Constitution before submitting the document 
to a referendum. The draft that eventually emerged out of the ensuing drama 
represented a total evisceration of the Bomas document. 
The ‘Wako Draft’ would not only see the enhancement of presidential power. More 
surprisingly, it sought to eliminate the proposed devolved system of government 
while retaining a highly centralised state. Instead of devolution the Kibaki-camp 
ogled de-concentration, with technical efficiency and thus greater effectiveness—
as the main criteria. The Kibaki camp saw the Bomas draft, especially devolution—
which proponents posit as the only true form of decentralization in that it has in-
built mechanisms to curb centripetal pressures (Turner et al 1997)—as the 
beachhead of a recondite manoeuvre for the ethnic balkanization93 of the country. 
In particular, whereas those not occupying the presidency agitated for reduction of 
presidential power, “a Kikuyu ethnic cabal, the group from which president Mwai 
Kibaki came, was determined to stall the constitution-making process , unless it 
                                            
93 This belief did, paradoxically, become a self-fulfilling prophecy: as discussed elsewhere in this study, ethnic 
balkanization became the hallmark of the 2007-2008 political crisis. 
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retained executive authority in his person” (Mutua 2009, 22-3)94. The Bomas Draft, 
as previously explained, had sought to curtail presidential power while also 
establishing a four-tiered system of devolved government. 
Having manipulated the constitution-making process, the Kibaki camp would then 
present the document to the public for a referendum. This would see the 
emergence of two contending camps, the Banana camp favouring the Wako Draft 
versus the Orange camp. The latter camp, composed of LDP-allied ministers, led 
by Odinga, working in collaboration with opposition leader Uhuru Kenyatta, was 
determined to defeat the draft. In the ensuing contest, Kenyan voters decisively 
rejected the Wako Draft by “58.5% for the ‘no’ side to . . . 41.5 %” (Steeves 2009: 
500-501). Because he had invested so much of his own political capital in the 
referendum campaign, in the wake of the ‘no’ camp’s victory, Kibaki, feeling 
personally rebuffed, came under immense pressure from his inner circle to dismiss 
LDP-allied ministers from his cabinet (The Waki Commission Report 2009: 30). 
This would see the president first dismiss “his entire cabinet and, to avoid the 
possible embarrassment of a no-confidence vote, he prorogued parliament until 
March 2006” (Steeves 2009: 5001). 
When he finally reconstituted his government he dismissed all the LDP-allied 
ministers, while co-opting some opposition MPs in order to buttress his weakened 
government. However, some appointees rejected the offer, viewing Kibaki’s as an 
illegitimate government. As for Odinga and his group, in the wake of their victory 
they would transmogrify into the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), having 
adopted the name of the victorious camp’s symbol in the referendum. The NARC 
rump would, for its part, become NARC-Kenya. However, in the run-up to the 2007 
elections ODM would split into two: a Raila Odinga-led ODM Party, on the one 
hand, and a Kalonzo Musyoka-led ODM-Kenya, on the other. The split purportedly 
hinged on the mode to deploy in the selection of the party’s presidential candidate 
                                            
94 One school of thought views the ogling of presidentialism as rooted in an authoritarian, hierarchical and 
personalistic political culture. For this interesting take on the issue, see, for instance Laumonnier (1990: 193) 
and Rappard (1936). 
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(Namunene et al 2007: 4). Meanwhile, internal struggles within the NARC rump 
would force Kibaki to found the Party of National Unity, PNU95. 
In the meantime, there had also emerged a split in KANU. One faction led by Uhuru 
Kenyatta joined Kibaki to create the Party of National Unity in 2007, while William 
Ruto led the other side into ODM. The National Executive Committee (NEC) of the 
Kenyatta-led wing of KANU rationalised its decision to support Kibaki. According 
to the NEC, the party’s “priority was to be part of the next government and he 
[Kibaki] was the candidate ‘likely to win’ the presidential election” (Warigi 2007: 
13). 
 
5.3 The 2007 elections 
The 2007 elections were the most competitive since the launch of plural politics in 
the early 1990s. With the 2005 Constitutional referendum as the context, 
“transparency and accountability” became the main campaign issues in the 
elections” (Klopp 2009: 146). Given the salience of ethnicity in Kenyan elections, 
especially in rural areas, the elections were also characterised by “ethnic 
mobilization strategies” (Kagwanja 2009: 373). Kikuyus were characterized as 
economic and political parasites, on the one hand.  PNU activists, for their part, 
sought to ignite anti-Odinga sentiment in a bid to create a lager mentality among 
the Mt. Kenya peoples (ibid). 
ODM sought to exploit what it perceived as widespread anti-Kikuyu sentiment in 
the country. To this end, Odinga “campaigned on a reformist, populist anti-
corruption platform that promised radical change… although the unofficial ODM 
rhetoric was tinged with a heavy dose of anti-Kikuyu sentiment.” She continues: 
out to exploit historical grievances, whether real or imaginary, against the Kikuyu, 
ODM’s “overarching idea was to unite all of Kenya’s minority ethnic communities 
against its largest ethnic community, the Kikuyu” (Klopp 2009: 145-146). Odinga’s 
populist tone aroused great apprehension among Kikuyus, especially the call for 
devolution (Branch et al 2009: 17).   
                                            
95 See, for instance Sunday Nation Team (2007: 1 and 13). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
119 
 
Kibaki campaigned principally on his socio-economic record. However, his party 
PNU “sought to question Odinga’s relationship with Kenya’s Muslim community.  
The ODM chief had signed “a MoU with that community, and also promised to 
review Kenya’s position in the War on Terror if he won the presidential race” 
(Kagwanja 2009: 377). Many PNU leaders “used hate speech in their rallies and 
reinforced the notion that Kikuyu should vote as a bloc and not let the state slip 
from what they claimed was their communal grasp” (Klopp 2009: 146). Given the 
ensuing fear among Kikuyus Kibaki was determined to retain power at any cost.  
Kibaki’s stance rested on the rather misleading belief borrowed from Kenya’s 
recent history “that the coercive apparatus of the state was sufficient to cope with 
protests in the aftermath” (Branch et al 2009: 17). 
The elections themselves were, however, grossly mismanaged. Both domestic 
monitors and international observers reported “many anomalies: unusually high 
voter turnout… Most important… the ECK showed clear signs of manipulating the 
vote count with bias towards government” (Klopp et al 2007/8: 1). Kibaki’s re-
election was, for instance, “questioned by international monitors, the EU, and 
eventually the United States and other major powers” (Stevenson 2008: 11). 
Nevertheless, the ECK went ahead to declare him the winner.  The actual voting 
itself went well, with the 2002 elections in which Kenyans had finally rejected KANU 
serving as the backdrop. Indeed, Election Day reports talked of huge but peaceful 
queues, with Kenyans, but especially the youth, eager to exercise their democratic 
right. 
When the vote count commenced, initial results showed Odinga a head with a 
healthy lead. However, most of these initial results came from his strongholds. As 
the results continued to trickle in and with only a few constituency results 
remaining, the ECK first delayed to announce the results and then at night after 
three days waiting for who would be the president, that is, on 30th December 2007, 
the chairman of the Electoral Commission was whisked to the State House, leaving 
the opposition at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre. The ECK then 
controversially declared Kibaki the winner; he was subsequently sworn-in for his 
final term at around 7:00 PM (Kagwanja et al 2009). 
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Interestingly, however, even after controversially declaring Kibaki the winner, the 
ECK chief, Samuel Kivuitu, and a number of his commissioners maintained that 
the vote tallying itself was flawed and so they could not state unequivocally whether 
Kibaki had actually won! Indeed, “Five ECK commissioners distanced themselves 
from the announced results” (Klopp et al 2007/8: 1). Although the final tally showed 
Kibaki the winner “with 4,584,721 votes against Odinga’s 4,352,993 votes, 
followed by Kalonzo Musyoka’s 879,903 votes” (Kabukuru 2008: 8), in the 
concurrent parliamentary poll, “ODM won 100 parliamentary seats in six provinces 
that had a voter registration of 9.5 million (of the total 14.2 million registered 
voters)” (Ouko 2008: 23). 
 
5.4 ECK’s controversial decision and the eruption of post-election violence  
Kenya has witnessed repeated episodes of violence since it launched plural 
politics in the early 1990s (Brown 2010; Chege 1994). However, the violence that 
shook Kenya after the 2007 general elections was unprecedented. It left about 
1500 lives lost and almost 650,000 people internally displaced (Branch et al 2008; 
The Waki Commission Report 2009). Of course, those sympathetic to President—
now former President—Kibaki would take strong exception to the notion that the 
2007 violence stemmed from the “derailment of the people’s right to vote” (Okia 
2009: 259); specifically, a rigged presidential election (Brown 2010). Rather, the 
President’s sympathizers argue that although difficult to abortion blame between 
the contending poles, “the spread and coordinated nature of the early attacks 
strongly suggests that it was not spontaneous” (Branch et al 2008: 20). They, 
therefore, posit the violence as a recondite scheme to extirpate members of one 
lager. Yet a third possibility does in fact exist as to the origin of the violence. 
Both interpretations could be correct simultaneously; historically, the country’s elite 
has exploited violence, secure that it was immune to prosecution. The post-
election violence was “both pre-planned and spontaneous” (Okia 2009: 267), given 
this history. 
Read alone, though, the competing accounts do not provide complete vignettes as 
to how Kenya came to rendezvous with disaster. Read them in conjunction with a 
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series of policy miscalculations over the years, however, it quickly becomes clear 
that the elections served merely as the proximate cause. Instead, with an 
understanding of “the contradictions embedded in the country’s political economy” 
(Kagwanja et al 2009: 261); in particular the personalization of presidential power 
and weakening of public institutions (The Waki Commission Report 2009: viii), as 
well as “a deeply ingrained legacy of instrumentalisation of ethnicity and 
informalisation of violence in the intra-elite struggle for state power in multi-party 
Kenya” (Kagwanja 2009: 366), coupled with “[i]nequalities and economic 
marginalization, often viewed in ethno-geographic terms” (The Waki Commission 
Report 2009: viii), it becomes clear that the root causes to the conflict were 
“complex, multiple and interrelated” (Kagwanja et al 2009: 263).  
Those opposed to Kibaki interpreted his being declared winner the ultimate 
foreclosure of democratic avenues for changing what ia mounted to an illegitimate 
and odious regime. Make no mistake about it: to those opposed to Kibaki, what the 
ECK did amounted to nothing short of a civilian coup!! In thinking about this, and 
although the specifics differ somewhat, we can draw some parallels with events 
from Nigeria. Junior Eastern military officers staged a coup against the Northern-
led federal government in early 1966. However, the armed forces chief, Major-
General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, an Easterner himself, intervened to restore law and 
order. 
Once in power, however, Ironsi quickly issued so-called decree no. 34 of 24 May 
1966—in effect a call for the abolition of the federal state, in favour of a unitary 
one. However, rather than have the intended unifying force, decree no. 34 was 
instead “rapidly followed by two violent week ends of riots in various parts of the 
Northern Regions” (Rivkin 1969: 108). Why the outbreaks of violence? According 
to Rivkin, and of particular relevance here, because decree no. 34 “fed their worst 
suspicions and fears” (110, emphasis added). Indeed, another scholar traces 
election—related violence to on-going fears that: 
One group wants to control government for the sole intention of 
protecting its own against domination by other ethnic groups. In 
protecting an ethic group from domination, by others, a reverse 
domination is established whereby the ethnic group in power imposes 
itself and dominates over others. (Kabemba 2008: 35) 
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With specific reference to Kenya: 
Most significantly, the events of late 2007 and early 2008 closely 
resembled the nightmare scenario outlined by one of sequencing’s 
better known supporters, Amy Chua. In her World on Fire, Chua 
identifies the presence of market-dominant minorities as being the 
critical variable that pulls democratizing states into the maelstrom of 
ethnic violence. According to Chua, democratization results in violence 
as a result of two factors, sometimes working in tandem: first, a market-
dominant minority resorts to extra-legal action to protect its privileged 
position; or, second, a marginalized majority resorts to violence in order 
to dislodge the minority from its entrenched position. Kenya’s dominant 
Kikuyu and the other Mt. Kenya peoples fit Chua’s taxonomy of a 
market-dominant minority. In an effort to protect the economic interests 
of Kikuyu elite threatened by the prospect of a Kibaki defeat, the state 
and its non-state partners undertook a backlash against democracy by 
forces favourable to the market-dominant minority. (Branch et al 2009: 
23) 
 
5.5 The road to the National Accord 
Historically, intrastate conflicts did not present themselves as amenable to 
compromise. Now, however, “combatants seem more willing to work out 
negotiated settlements involving compromises, some of which seem to work… and 
some of which do not… Both internal and external factors seem to be contributing 
to this trend” (Lacklider 2001: 698). At the external level, with the Cold War over, 
“international pressure has pushed parties to negotiate when they otherwise might 
not have done so.” He continues: “Once the process has begun, outsiders have 
transmitted information, acted as mediators, and offered incentives to reach 
settlements” (Lacklider 2001: 700). 
It is true that such influences could go either way.  For example, “[o]stensibly 
internal violence is often promoted or made possible by outside assistance of 
various sorts, such as that provided by the United States in Afghanistan and by 
South Africa in Mozambique” (ibid). With particular reference to African conflicts, 
foreign interventions have issued out of many different calculi; furtherance of 
specific geo-strategic and political interests, for example. 
Amidst intensifying violence both domestic and international opinion, began to pile 
pressure on Kenyan leaders to pull the country from the abyss. The pressure 
rested on “a clear view that the strategic position held by Kenya both in the region 
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and in the continent could not be allowed to drown” (Kriegler and Waki Reports, 
Summarized Version, Revised Edition 2009: 1).,Spear-headed by prominent 
individuals such as retired South African Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, then 
United Nations’ Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, among others, these efforts  
eventually coalesced around the African Union’s96 Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities under the Chairmanship of [Ban’s immediate predecessor as UN 
Secretary-General] Mr Kofi Annan” (Progress Report, South Consulting April 2010: 
8). After almost forty days of marathon, and contentious, negotiations the team 
facilitated the signing of the National Peace Accord between the two principals: 
Kibaki and Odinga in March 2008. 
The principals agreed to end the violence97; address the humanitarian situation98; 
Resolve the political crisis99, through a National Accord and Reconciliation 
(hereafter the National Accord). To buttress the National Accord, the parties 
agreed to examine long-standing sources of grievances100 and establish: an 
Independent Commission to Review the Constitution; a Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission; an independent Review Commission to examine the 
electoral process; and a Commission of Inquiry on post-election violence; the latter 
two being “non-judicial bodies mandated to investigate and report on different 
aspects of the problematic issues of the crisis” (Kriegler and Waki Reports, 
Summarized Version, Revised Edition 2009: viii). 
 
5.6 The EU and the NARC/Kibaki Administration: 2002-2007 
The EU presents itself as a major player in Kenya’s socio-economic 
transformation. The bloc also casts itself as a major partner in the country’s 
integration into the global marketplace. Kenya’s development strategy as 
                                            
96 On the role of regional organisations, see, for instance Peck (2005: 561-583). However, for the case against 
regional involvement as tantamount to a usurpation of the UN’s role, see, for instance Malan (1999). 
97 Ending the violence and restoring fundamental rights constituted Agenda Number 1 items of the National 
Accord. 
98 Agenda Number 2 items centred on ending the humanitarian crisis and achieving recovery. 
99 This was Agenda Item Number 3, the basis for the formation of a grand coalition government between 
Kibaki’s and Odinga’s factions. 
100 These are agenda items number 4. 
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enunciated in documents such as Vision 2030 has four legs: increased economic 
growth, development of the physical infrastructure, attaining improved governance, 
and increased human capital. Therefore consistent with this posture, and as 
outlined in the then-new Narc government’s  Economic Recovery Strategy for 
Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC) Paper  “Public Sector Reform and 
Institutional Capacity Building”, according to the Commission, the main thrust of 
Kenya-EU cooperation is designed to complement the Kenyan government’s 
efforts to eradicate poverty and improve the living standards of the population 
(Joint Statement by Development Partners at the Kenya Consultative Group 
Meeting, 24th-25th November 2003). 
 
5.6.1 The EU and Civil Service Reform, 2003-2007 
Technical Assistance involves foreign experts working with their domestic 
counterparts, from both government and the NGOs, in support of the entire 
electoral cycle from pre-election preparations to post election capacity building by 
supporting the establishment and reform of EMBs (Mitchell et al 2008: 161-162); 
this is usually seen as an entry point for other desired reforms, such as good 
governance, as well as the building of relationships and thus identification of other 
government entities that need assistance (Schroeder 2013: 220). However, this is 
not merely a technocratic issue; technical assistance has clear political 
implications; specifically, it is focused on strengthening institution in order to 
promote participatory and effective electoral institutions. Seen so, technical 
assistance, as opposed to election monitoring, is focused on long-term institution 
building as well as promoting the participations of hitherto excluded groups such 
as women and social and ethnic minorities “in the political process,”—consistent 
with a number of international instruments concerning non-discrimination and 
participation” of such groups (Binder 2007: 225), with such obstacles as 
majoritarian electoral systems, being some of the key barriers to  such 
empowerment.  
The EU claims to have provided funding and training as part of institutional reform 
more generally over the years. The EU has undertaken these activities consistent 
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with extant thinking in international development that lack of capacity represents 
the biggest obstacle to development, especially in Africa (Bossnyt et al 1992). 
Foreign aid has therefore “prioritized the institutional development of government, 
thereby attempting to meet the need to build the capacity of the state to govern” 
(Hearn 2000: 824).  
The EU insists that it aims through its assistance to help the country create a lithe 
public service. In Kenya civil service reform commenced in the early 1990s with 
the appointment of what then came to be known as the ‘Dream Team’. All the 
same, with the coming to power of the NARC government in 2003, the reforms 
began to receive serious attention, especially in the wake of the party’s 
commitment to economic reconstruction. NARC made civil service efficiency a 
centrepiece of its reformist agenda. In particular, in “the articulation of [a] bold 
comprehensive approach … to public sector reform as a means to economic 
recovery” (Public Sector Reform and Institutional Capacity Building, Joint 
Statement by Development Partners at the Kenya Consultative Group Meeting, 
24th-25th November 2003: 3), the new NARC government identified the civil 
service as “both large and relatively inefficient” (1).  Indeed prior to the eruption of 
post-election violence, the civil service had begun to regain its once vaunted status 
as an efficient machine, as denoted by, among others, much faster rates of 
economic growth, mostly attributable to efficient policy implementation by the civil 
service— although corruption remained endemic.  
The Multiple Donors Basket Fund (MDBF) mechanism, to which several European 
donors contributed in support of the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector 
(GJLOS) reform, and which ended in 2009, stands as the clearest example (Bello 
2011: 5). Focused on facilitating good governance, respect for human rights, equal 
access to justice and respect for the rule of law, GJLOS reforms commenced after 
NARC’s victory in 2003. 
GJLOS unfolded in the context of Kenya’s overall development strategy 
(ERSWEC), and involved 30 institutions. GJLOS are Kenya’s first SWAPs. The 
shift to SWAPs in international development aims to improve aid effectiveness by 
taking an entire sector approach as opposed to focusing on an individual project. 
ERSWEC had identified governance as the spearhead of economic growth. This 
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led to a MOU between Kenya and donors, thus leading to the erection of the 
Multiple Donor Basket Fund for the GJLOS. The programme collapsed in 2009, 
however, amidst recriminations on both sides (Akech 2005: 47). 
The findings with respect to civil service reform more generally and then GLOs in 
particular seem to vindicate the relevant literature in this area. The literature 
cautions that for political aid to have any of its intended impact, the political context 
is crucial. The literature emphasizes the role of political commitment in particular. 
Otherwise such efforts are likely to eventuate in superficial technocratic reforms. 
This calls for “a balanced approach …, which simultaneously develops societal as 
well as governmental institutions” (Diamond 1995: 44); hence, the media and 
NGOs have a crucial role in this process by way of generating public support for 
such reforms. 
 
5.6.2 EU political aid towards Kenya’s EMB 
5.6.2.1 Election monitoring and observation 
 
Monitoring regimes, of which election monitoring is an instance, have an important 
role in ensuring adherence to international norms and commitments (Simpson et 
al 2012). In particular, election observation has emerged as a key strategy for 
democracy preservation and, hence, conflict prevention during the third wave of 
democracy. 
By so doing, election monitoring can in turn play an important role in institution 
building; for such external presence “can foster trust among rival parties by 
providing guarantees, clearing up misperceptions, relaying information back and 
forth and resolving key issues” (Chakand 1998: 169). Such institutions, once 
established, could “help counterbalance state power, provide a context for 
developing civic skills, encourage norms of reciprocity and trust, articulate societal 
interests and create peaceful channels for the resolution of conflicts that might 
otherwise result in violence” (Chakand 1998: 169). However, election monitoring 
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by outsiders can frequently become a target of suspicion and outside hostility as 
neo-colonial, its advantages notwithstanding (Chakand 1998:168).  
Still, with its increased use governments that seek to cheat have developed other 
strategies. These include the staffing of strategic institutions such as the judiciary 
with cronies “practices that have far more damaging consequences on governance 
in the long run” (Simpson et al 2012: 501).  
In addition, election monitoring usually relies on hastily assembled data, thus 
precluding the rendering of a comprehensive verdict. Furthermore, in theory, 
international election observers should not take their marching orders from the 
sending agency. This, however, is not always the case. More often than not, other 
considerations come into play (Teshome 2013). 
 
5.6.2.2 EU and election observation under the NARC/Kibaki Administration, 
2003-2007 
In the run-up to the elections in 2007 the EU deployed an EOM headed by 
Alexander Graf Lambsdorff from “14th November 2007 with the mandate to 
monitor the pre-election campaign and environment”. In its ensuing Report, the EU 
EOM noted: “the 2007 General Elections have fallen short of key international and 
regional standards for democratic elections". In this regard, the EU EOM offered 
that “[b]y raising doubts over the credibility of the elections process and results in 
its preliminary statement at an early stage, the mission set a clear and neutral 
position which helped to rally the international community and to give the EU a 
strong and respected image in the eyes of many Kenyans” (EU Election 
Observation Preliminary Report 2008). The bloc went on to caution that without a 
legitimate solution to the crisis, it would not be business as usual.  
Still, with its increased use, governments that seek to cheat have developed other 
strategies, such as staffing strategic institutions such as the judiciary with cronies 
that have far more damaging consequences on governance in the long run 
(Simpson et al 2012: 501). Ominous signs were already abroad even prior to the 
voting in 2007. For example, based on the 1997 IPPG agreement, the appointment 
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of ECK commissioners by the president required consultations with the opposition. 
However, Kibaki violated this requirement in the run-up to the 2007 elections by 
staffing the body with his cronies without consulting the opposition (Klopp 2009: 
146). 
 Interestingly, the EU and other donors remained mum even as Kibaki employed 
such manipulative tactics (Wrong 2008: 5). Ironically` the EU has increasingly cast 
itself as a normative power in international affairs (Manners 2002: 241, qtd., in 
Storey 2006: 331).  
 
In theory, election observers should not take their marching orders from the 
sending agency; this, however, is not always the case. More often than not, other 
considerations come into play, thus distorting the ensuing evaluation of the 
process (Teshome 2013).  
Mounting evidence of electoral fraud in the 2007 presidential elections put donors 
in a difficult situation especially given Kenya’s pivotal position in the region, ogled 
by some as a key ally in the “War on Terrorism” (Wrong 2008: 5). Nevertheless, 
once the ECK declared Kibaki the winner amidst growing suspicions of fraud, the 
EU’s election observer team refused to endorse the result. The EU’s chief 
observer, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, stated that, “because of irregularities, doubt 
remains as to the accuracy of the result of the presidential election announced 
today” (Guardian, 31 December 2007, Qtd in Brown 2009: 392). In its preliminary 
report, the EU EOM noted: “the 2007 General Elections have fallen short of key 
international and regional standards for democratic elections” (Brown 2009: 389). 
In addition, while donor response to the crisis once it erupted denoted some 
marked improvement, still “they failed to learn some important lessons from the 
past and to take a more proactive role in preventing violence” (Brown 2009: 390). 
Indeed, by “focusing on ending violence as quickly as possible,” thereby eliding 
the need for “justice and democracy” in favour of “peace”, this in effect had 
negative consequences for “the political reform agenda” (ibid). In the end, though, 
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the EU and others played an instrumental role in ending the crisis, as well as 
pushing the various reform initiatives agreed under the NARA. 
Election monitoring can in turn play an important role in institution building; for such 
external presence “can foster trust among rival parties by providing guarantees, 
clearing up misperceptions, relaying information back and forth and resolving key 
issues” (Chakand 1998: 169). Such institutions, once established, could “help 
counterbalance state power, provide a context for developing civic skills, 
encourage norms of reciprocity and trust, articulate societal interests and create 
peaceful channels for the resolution of conflicts that might otherwise result in 
violence” (Chakand 1998: 169).  
The EU and other players supported various initiatives keyed to addressing both 
the conflict and its aftermath. It is true that violence has characterized Kenya since 
the advent of political pluralism in the early 1990s. However, during these earlier 
periods, the donors “never acknowledged this publicly” (Brown 2009: 391), but 
instead “continuing to channel relief funds through the same government that was 
allowing the attacks to continue, often even sponsoring them” (ibid). However, 
once the post-election crisis erupted, the EU and other donors acted with cohesion, 
thereby playing an instrumental role in the Annan-led talks, “using targeted 
sanctions (mainly bans on senior government and opposition figures) and threats 
of lower aid flows” (Brown 2009: 393). Then following the signing of the National 
Accord the EU also helped monitor its implementation; it also supported the 
enactment of a new constitution and other required institutional reforms as well 
(EU Election Observation Preliminary Report). 
 
5.6.2.3 Technical Assistance: EU Political Aid and the NARC/Kibaki 
Administration, 2003-07  
Technical Assistance involves foreign experts working with their domestic 
counterparts. The effort focuses on supporting the entire electoral cycle from pre-
election preparations to post election capacity building (Mitchell et al 2008). 
Viewed as an entry point for other desired reforms—such as good governance, 
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among others—the strategy can also help in the identification of other government 
entities that need assistance (Schroeder 2013: 220). 
However, this is not merely a technocratic issue.  Technical assistance has clear 
political implications. It is specifically focused on strengthening institution in order 
to promote participatory and effective electoral institutions. Seen so, technical 
assistance, as opposed to election monitoring, is focused on long-term institution 
building as well as promoting the participation of hitherto excluded groups such as 
women and social and ethnic minorities “in the political process,”—consistent with 
a number of international instruments concerning non-discrimination and 
participation of such groups (Binder 2007: 225). 
On the electoral front, technical assistance might involve training candidates; civic 
education, budgeting procedures, “computerizing voter lists… amending electoral 
regulations… and training electoral officials on new voting procedures “(Schroeder 
2013: 209-10); these activities are usually focused on creating credible electoral 
institutions and procedures, in the process increasing voter confidence in these 
institutions and processes (Binder 2007; Schroeder 2013). In addition, technical 
teams normally have the chance to discuss with ‘authorities’ emerging issues, as 
well as providing protection for otherwise exposed local observer teams. 
Understood in this manner, technical training groups can immensely “strengthen 
and support local initiatives and civil society organisation” (Binder 2007: 231). 
Technical and financial support usually unfold within the armpit of targeted 
cooperation programmes; these activities can take anyone of many forms: election 
support teams; these are teams that can analyse key aspects of previous elections 
and make recommendations for future improvements; leadership training and 
networking for women, especially in rural areas.  
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
131 
 
5.6.2.3.1 Supporting civic education: EU and the NARC Administration, 2003-2007  
Donors, the EU included, supported voter education101 in preparation for the 2007 
elections, through the election support office under UNDP-Kenya. Inspired by 
previous democratic successes, such as the 2002 elections and the 2005 
referendum more specifically, the donors increasingly came to believe that a 
successfully run election in Kenya would have a demonstration effect regionally, 
especially given the country’s regional status.  
Donors provided funding to the elections through Joint Election Support Program, 
under UNDP-K called the 2007 Kenya Election Assistance Program. 
This saw the donors establish an Election Support Donor Group led by USAID—
with ECK and UNDP as key players, with a budget of over $12 million. Key areas 
of support included: EMB capacity building. 
 
5.7 EU aid and the Development of Kenya’s Political Institutions, 2003-07 
The EU and other providers of political aid did not help Kenya develop its political 
institutions. Take the issue of comprehensive constitutional reform prior to the 
post-election crisis of 2007-08, for instance. 
NARC, as explained elsewhere in this chapter, had in its push to power, made a 
number of promises, key among them economic and political renewal (Kagwanja 
2009). Whereas the new government performed admirably in the economic 
sphere, its political record told a completely different story, however. Rather than 
undertake constitutional reforms within the first one-hundred days of the new 
government as promised during the campaigns, the Kibaki-wing of the coalition 
sought to maintain the status quo (Akech 2010: 12). To that end, having failed to 
get their way at Bomas, the pro-Kibaki forces then sought to manipulate the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on the constitution to change key aspects of the 
Act on the role of parliament in the constitution reform process. 
                                            
101 On the role of education in political development more generally, see, for example Kim et al (1968: 407-
420) and Duncan (1968: 187-210). 
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Developing Political Institutions is usually seen as the most important and 
proximate challenge of democratic consolidation. According to the literature, the 
development of political institutions has its glare on liberalizing and eventually 
democratizing otherwise weak, autocratic national, and local level institutions. 
When making their submissions to the CRCK, Kenyans had clearly indicated that 
they wanted a system of governance that fostered both participation and 
accountability (Final Report on Devolved Government in Kenya 2010). Thus, at the 
Centre the draft sought to foster participation and accountability through: the 
creation of a constitutionally constrained presidency alongside the office of prime 
minister, a two-chamber legislature—a Senate and a National Assembly; it then 
made special provision, through special electoral procedures, numerical 
requirements, and so on, for the participation at all levels of government of groups, 
such as women, ethnic minorities, among others, hitherto excluded from power. 
Finally, on the judicial front, the draft limned a plethora of judicial institutions, with 
the Supreme Court at the apex of that architecture. 
At the sub-unit level, moreover, the draft sought to use devolution to foster 
participation and accountability, through the creation of a four-tiered system of 
government: National, Provincial, County and sub-county—with Provincial 
governments more skeletal in nature. 
But defenders of the status quo immediately took umbrage at the Chapters on the 
Executive and devolution in particular. On the executive, for example, critics 
inveighed against what they posited as a furtive move to transfer power from a 
popularly elected president to a non-elected PM (Mutua 2009). It is true that the 
draft constitution had recommended the creation of the office of Prime Minister 
alongside that of the president. However, under that arrangement, the occupant of 
the former position would have had to come from the majority party in parliament. 
In any case, contrary to the claims, the document actually still envisioned a 
relatively robust presidency endowed with important powers, key among them: the 
nomination of key state officials, the Chairmanship of the National Security 
Council, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 
Also, the presidency would have had influence on the legislative agenda. Whereas 
available evidence does appear to vindicate the utility of parliamentary systems in 
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nurturing democracy, especially in deeply divided societies such as Kenya, 
“powerful opposition from groups with vested interests in the existing system” 
(Haggard et al 1994: 14) would blunt any such attempt at systemic transmutation. 
Constitution- making102 did once again find its way onto the national agenda in the 
wake of the 2007-2008 post-election violence, as discussed previously. 
Equally, the EU and others did not vigorously press the NARC government on 
corruption. It was under the NARC government, for example, that the country 
witnessed some of the most debilitating corruption scandals in its post-
independence history, capped by the so-called Anglo-leasing scandal. Although 
the president initially relented under intense public pressure and suspended a 
number of senior ministers and other close associates implicated in the scheme, 
most were quickly exonerated by the various anti-corruption institutions following 
what the majority of the public viewed as sham investigations; Kibaki then 
reinstated them to their positions. 
Donors’ quietude in this regard stemmed from their changed relationship with the 
Kenya government. Donors supported civil society in Kenya in the early 1990s as 
a major component in the struggle against the oppressive Moi regime. However, 
with the ouster of the KANU regime in 2002 and NARC’s ascendancy to power, 
donors decided to engage with the Kenyan state more directly—consistent with 
changed donor strategies more broadly—with a focus on aligning their aid with 
priorities and objectives of aid-recipient governments, as well as to better 
coordinate and harmonize bilateral aid by channelling greater support through 
government-owned programmes (Lind et al 2010: 339-340). 
With the onset of the War On Terror, donor priorities shifted from good governance, 
democracy and human rights to security-related agendas. To this end, “[s]ince 
2002, diplomatic missions in Nairobi representing leading western donors have 
pressed the Kenyan government to adopt controversial new counter-terrorism 
legislation” (343): 
In particular, amidst on-going threats of terrorist activity in East Africa, 
Kenya has come under intense pressure to join the war on terrorism, 
                                            
102 A number of scholars have argued that the adoption of new, comprehensive constitutions would go a long 
way towards achieving a much needed sustainable peace, see Harbeson (1986: 7-17). 
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thus demonstrating ―the strategic use of aid in achieving the political 
objectives of the War On Terror… Generally, the leverage of aid has 
shifted away from previous priorities on good governance and human 
rights, although these issues acquired new prominence as part of 
political reform and national reconciliation following the disputed results 
of the December 2007 election and its aftermath. (Lind et al 2010: 336) 
Indeed, the link between foreign aid, security, and democracy has emerged as a 
major theme in the literature.  In particular, since the demise of the cold war, some 
have sought to emphasis what they perceive as a close nexus between security 
and development; this assumed added urgency in the wake of the 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the US (Ganzle 2012: 116). However, some question the alleged nexus. 
They argue that establishing a strong state attuned to the dictates of fighting 
terrorism may not necessarily advance the democratic agenda. Indeed, some 
critics have faulted the strategy as connoting furtive imperialism (Cox 2008), 
specifically a ploy designed to create new post-cold war client states (Bowles et al 
2008). 
 
5.8 Conclusion: EU political aid and the NARC/Kibaki Administration, 2003-
2007 
It is true that in the Kenyan context, in the early 1990s donors worked closely with 
civil society groups to challenge entrenched KANU rule. However, once NARC 
took over in 2003, the EU and other donors shifted to working with the government 
more directly—consistent with changed donor strategies more broadly—focused 
on aligning their aid with priorities and objectives of aid-recipient governments, as 
well as to better coordinate and harmonize bilateral aid by channeling greater 
support through government-owned programmes. 
This produced desired results in some instances, it did not do so in other areas. 
On the plus side, as a result of the government’s collaboration with foreign 
partners, the country witnessed higher levels of economic growth and with it a 
reduction in poverty. On the social side, moreover, and as a spin-off from the higher 
economic growth, Kenyans also witnessed improved social service provision by 
the government. For example, working with the donors, the NARC government 
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was able to launch Free Primary School Education, thereby raising primary school 
attendance appreciably.  
On the downside, however, in most instances, the post-Moi government either 
abated corruption outright or shielded those implicated in it from the full force of 
the law. Interestingly, a side from empty proclamations, the EU never took any 
concrete action against those implicated in graft. In addition, Kenya’s EMB—the 
ECK—which had previously received high praise and support from the EU and 
others—proved unequal to the challenge during the 2007; this led to the post-
election political crisis that roiled the country in late 2007 to early 2008. But in the 
wake of the crisis, the EU, consistent with CPA provision for regular political 
dialogue, played a major role in supporting efforts to resolve the 2007-08 post-
election crisis, as well as ongoing reform of the electoral process. 
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CHAPTER 6: The Grand Coalition Government, 2008-2013 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to highlight what role, if any, EU political aid played at a critical 
juncture in Kenya’s democratisation process. Kenya witnessed unprecedented 
levels of violence in late 2007 and early 2008 due to a disputed presidential 
election. Indeed, it was only after concerted national, regional and global efforts 
that the country was pulled back from the abyss. As part of the negotiations that 
ended the violence, the warring sides agreed to form a grand coalition government. 
The chapter seeks therefore to also analyze the role of EU political aid in the reform 
process. 
The National Accord had as its immediate goal the facilitation of an elite power-
sharing arrangement (Kagwanja et al 2009). Specifically, the establishment of a 
Grand Coalition Government103 between the formations led by Kibaki and Odinga 
respectively.  The two leaders and their respective parties were, as indicated 
previously, the main players in the 2007 elections. Previously allies in the NARC 
Coalition. Odinga and Kibaki had acrimoniously parted ways over the unfulfilled 
terms of a MoU that the two, and their respective parties at the time LDP and NAK, 
had signed thus paving the way for the creation of NARC. The NARA deal also led 
to the creation of the posts of Prime Minister (PM), and two Deputies (D-PM). 
Power sharing104 has increasingly drawn widespread acclaim105 as part of the 
larger strategy of conflict prevention (Steiner 1989). In particular, theorists of 
consociational democracy ogle such arrangements--- along with other devices 
such as mutual vetoes, segmental autonomy, among others-- on the ground that, 
“although not necessarily democratic” (Lacklider 2001: 707), they bring “all major 
                                            
103 For a critique of the coalition government, though, see, among others “Kenya in the fog of Peace” (3), 
with the government being characterized as over-bloated and composed of tainted individuals from previous 
corrupt regimes. 
104 For the trend towards power-sharing in Africa and its associated problems, see Norma (2012: 11-26), but 
especially the author’s focus on informalisation of politics that is, for those at the centre of power to form 
informal channels of power, and thereby vitiate such arrangements. 
105 See, for example McRae (1989: 93-106). 
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parties together to enable hard-decision making and promotion of the national 
good” (Progress Report, South Consulting April 2010: 27). 
Scholars increasingly have argued that an astute approach to this process should 
begin with constructing an interim government. They counsel that such an 
arrangement “may take the form of a coalition among national forces pursuant to 
an agreement or a monitored government consisting of previous incumbents.” He 
continues: “The main purpose of the transitional government is to preside over a 
process that establishes a legitimate legal framework for political contestation and 
rule (generally, a constitution) and to administer the first stage of the 
implementation of this framework” (Rubin 2008: 36). As part of this process, 
political reinvigoration should strive to erect various Consultative Mechanisms 
among political elites, the aim being to foster wider and broader elite interactions 
so as “to settle outstanding issues and bring non-signatories into the process, thus 
expanding political participation beyond the narrow group of elites who sign peace 
agreements” (Papagiani 2008: 61). 
While important, however, if prematurely executed, they warn, the strategy may 
actually open the door to elite and “nationalist manipulation and extremist rhetoric” 
(Papagiani 2008: 66). In most instances, though, such political processes tend to 
unfold at a frenetic pace, “which is often due to the deadlines imposed by the 
international community” (Rubin 2008: 58). Yet such a “frame is too short to record 
sufficient progress on even the reforms prescribed by the peace accords” (Ball 
2001: 2). 
Dissenters do, however, retort that while such arrangements sound noble in 
theory; if executed along ethnic lines they may paradoxically, in practice actually 
buttress106 the very divisions they seek to heal (Bieber et al 2009; Oberschall 
2007)!  They observe, in addition, that because justice and peace are mutually 
exclusive that, therefore, in prioritizing peace over justice the approach thereby 
vitiates certain norms.  In particular, power sharing “may actually encourage 
incumbent regimes to rely on coercion to resist the will of the people and the 
                                            
106 Others reject consociationalism as a recipe for chaos, offering instead what they call an incentives based 
model (Horowitz 1989: 115-130). Others do worry, though, about the essentialism inherent to ethnic 
thinking. See, for instance Deng (1989: 343-362). 
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transfer of power to electoral winners” (Southall 2009: 445)107. They do however 
concede that power sharing and transitional justice can be reconciled, especially 
when the former focuses on addressing broader societal issues such as the need 
for institutional reforms (Vandeginste et al 2011: 492)108. As part of this effort, 
however, society must undergo reconstruction as well, including the restructuring 
of power structures from the grassroots up (Zartman 1995). 
In the specific Kenya case, the power-sharing arrangement issued out of Agenda 
number 3 items of the National Accord. Agenda number 3 items focused on how 
to overcome the political crisis—that is, “the political and humanitarian catastrophe 
that engulfed the country after the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was 
controversially declared… the winner of the country’s closely contested election” 
(Kagwanja et al 2009). Power-sharing was informed by the understanding that the 
“crisis revolves, in large measure, around the issues of power and the functioning 
of state institution” (Review Report, South Consulting, October 2012: 1). The 
meeting that facilitated the NARA resolved that the “Parties will negotiate and 
agree on a solution towards resolving the crisis… as well as the ensuing violence” 
(Review Report, South Consulting, October 2012: 2). 
Cognizant therefore of extant feelings “of marginalization from power,” (1), and 
also aware that in the then existing environment “neither side can realistically 
govern the country without the other” the parties agreed to form a coalition 
government based on “real power sharing” (ibid). It was this understanding that 
saw the parties agree to enact the National Accord and Reconciliation Act. The Act 
called for the creation of the office of PM, “to serve as coordinator as well as 
supervisor of government affairs” (1). As the Public Statement of the Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation, mediated by H.E Kofi Annan and the Panel 
of Eminent African Personalities, Feb 4, 2008, states in its preamble, “[t]he final 
goal of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation is to achieve sustainable peace, 
                                            
107 Conflict managers focus on proximate causes—with the aim of an immediate end to the violence; 
democratizers have their glare on longer-term solutions that address the root causes of the conflict; 
specifically enduring democratic stability. Thus whereas the former see peace as a precondition for 
democracy; the latter see democracy as a precondition for peace. See, for example Baker (2005: 753-764). 
108 Indeed, critics worry that elite pacts may in fact stymie institutional development. For this line, see, for 
example Leiken (1990: 26-38). 
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stability and justice in Kenya through the rule of law and respect for human rights” 
(KNDR 2008: 1)109. 
The Grand Coalition Government had as its fundamental mandate in this regard 
the pursuit “of comprehensive reforms including those that would address the 
fundamental causes of the conflict” (Progress Report, South Consulting April 2010: 
22). Agenda Number Four focused on the following themes: Constitutional, Legal 
and Institutional reforms; Land Reforms; Poverty, Inequality and Regional 
Development Imbalances; Unemployment, especially among the youth; 
Consolidation of national Unity and Cohesion; and, Addressing Transparency, 
Accountability and Impunity “to address the root causes of recurrent conflict and 
create a better, more secure and prosperous nation” (38)110.   
Most of the measures would form the core of The Constitution of Kenya Review 
Act, No. 9 of 2008 (CKR). This was assented to “on December 2008 and then 
come into force later that month” (Review Report, South Consulting, October 2009: 
16). Not only have these institutions repeatedly received low ratings among 
Kenyans. Equally, various commissions have repeatedly called for their overhaul. 
Numerous reports have, for example, consistently catalogued “police brutality and 
extra-judicial killings” (Review Report, South Consulting, August 2010: 21). The 
Waki Commission of Inquiry implicated the police in the violence, finding that in 
most instances police officers had served as partisan agents for Mr Kibaki’s party 
(The Waki Commission Report 2009: ix). However, promotion of good governance, 
lasting peace and development depends, to a large extent, “on breaking this 
history of police bias, intimidation and brutality” (Celador 2006: 58). Indeed, the 
inability to forge an elite compromise during the violence until external intervention 
and signing of the National Accord suggested: 
[A]widespread lack of trust in the ability of Kenyan democratic 
institutions, such as courts… to deliver fair political outcomes. That lack 
of faith suggests that the longevity of the Kenyan crisis was rooted in the 
prior failure to carry out a genuine process of constitutional review. 
(Branch et al 2008: 126)  
                                            
109 The National Accord seems to draw on both consociational and incentive-based models, thereby 
suggesting that the two are better seen as complementary, rather than opposites. For a formulation that 
seems to recognize the two models as complementary, see, for instance Stubb (1989: 279-307). 
110 See, for instance Skowronek (1982). 
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On 19th March 2008 Kenya’s parliament voted and amended the constitution as 
required by the National Accord to create the posts of Prime Minister and two 
Deputy-Prime Ministers, and also to enact the National Accord into law. The NARA 
led to the creation of a bloated grand coalition government—Government of 
National Unity—involving, as intimated previously, the formations led by Kibaki and 
Odinga. Kenyan leaders increasingly voiced their commitment to national renewal 
following the signing of the NARA and then the launch of the grand coalition 
government, with, for example, Kibaki outlining his vision of a new and prosperous 
Kenya, one devoid of crime, corruption and impunity (Opiyo, Daily Nation 21st 
October 2009).        
Still, because both sides “include[d] people guilty of corruption and violence,” the 
grand coalition, like its counterparts elsewhere, “creates a common interest in 
perpetuating impunity and opposing the forces of accountability and 
transformation” (Klopp 2009: 143). Given the specific Kenyan context at the time, 
perhaps such a trade-off between peace, on the one hand, and justice on the other, 
was inevitable. Thus once in office, a number of issues and problems quickly came 
to the fore. 
 
6.2 Elite fragmentation, 2008-2013 
The Grand Coalition Government was wracked by both inter and intra-party 
wrangling.  Intra-party discord emerged within ODM immediately following the 
formation of the grand coalition government in early 2008. Ruto cited as the main 
bone of contention “Raila’s disown[ing] hundreds of youths who heeded ODM party 
call for mass action [in the wake of the allegedly rigged 2007 presidential polls]” 
(By Standard Team 2010, 15th February: 6). However, others claimed that Ruto, 
a member of ODM’s then so-called Pentagon and the party’s chief strategist in the 
Rift Valley during the 2007 elections felt that his region had not received its fair 
share of government positions from the ODM-wing of the. Ruto denied the 
accusation. 
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Also, the two leaders differed over the eviction of squatters from the Mau Forest, 
a major water catchment facility. The Grand Coalition Government, in one of its 
major policy initiatives, sought to reclaim the Mau water tower by evicting those 
who had encroached on it (Njoroge, The Standard, 15th November 2009). A 
campaign spearheaded by the Prime Minister, according to the Government’s 
eviction plan, those without title deeds—mostly small landholders—could not 
receive any compensation. However, because most of the squatters were 
Kalenjins, “Ruto portrayed the Prime Minister as betraying the Kalenjin; the 
community had widely supported Mr Odinga during the 2007 General Election” (By 
Standard Team 2010, 15th February: 6). 
In addition, the two camps differed over the party’s approach to the post-election 
violence issue, with Ruto feeling “that Kenyans fought because Kibaki stole 
elections and Raila should accordingly drop The Hague or local tribunal affair” 
(Obonyo, The Standard 5th July 2009: 1). Hence, while Mr Odinga advocated for 
the formation of such a local tribunal, Mr Ruto preferred the―International Criminal 
Court [ICC] (Barasa et al, Sunday Nation 28th June 2009: 16), with his supporters 
worried that “in addition to damaging the Agriculture Minister's political future, a 
local tribunal would damage the Kalenjin” (Kisiangani, The Standard 5th July 2009: 
23). 
These intra-party developments would see Ruto increasingly voice his intention to 
vie for the Presidency in 2013 (Bartoo et al, The Standard, 15th November 2009).  
Nevertheless, there was widespread concern, both locally and internationally, that 
the infighting within the Grand Coalition government was endangering the 
country’s essential reform agenda (Rugene, Daily Nation, 16th February 2010). For 
example, in the face of intensified assaults on the Prime Minister by his estrange 
ally William Ruto and his Rift Valley lieutenants those within the Prime Minister’s 
camp sought to change priorities. They sought to focus on environmental 
conservation instead. This would see the PM jettison his previous eviction policy 
mantra in favour of “rehabilitation”; specifically tree planting. 
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6.3 Constitutional and institutional reforms: The GCG and the new 
Constitution 
NARC had, as explained elsewhere in this study, made a number of promises in 
its push to power in 2002, economic and political renewal key among them 
(Kagwanja 2009). Whereas the new government performed admirably in the 
economic sphere, its political record told a completely different story, however. 
Rather than undertake constitutional reforms within the first one-hundred days of 
the new government as promised during the campaigns, the Kibaki-wing of the 
coalition sought to maintain the status quo (Akech 2010: 12). 
Constitution-making did once again find its way onto the national agenda in the 
wake of the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Agenda number 4 reforms had 
called for, among others, “comprehensive constitutional and institutional reforms 
to address the root causes of recurrent conflict and create a better, more secure 
and prosperous nation” (Progress Report, South Consulting April 2010: 38). 
According to the schedule of Agenda Number Four Items, constitutional review 
was designed to commence in August 2008; consequently, “Parliament passed 
the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill, 2008, and the Constitutional Review Bill in 
December 2008. Both received Presidential assent the same month (Review 
Report, South Consulting January 2010: 44). Nonetheless, the process did then 
stall after these initial promising steps. Indeed, “[i]t was not until 23 February 2009 
that the government gazetted the Committee of Experts (CoE); the CoE then 
commenced work in March 2009” (ibid.,). 
 
6.4 EU Political Aid and the Development of Political Institutions, 2008-2013 
Liberalism accentuates the need for institutions (Goodin 1992: 14). In particular, 
liberalism contends that Developing Political Institutions is the most important and 
proximate challenge of democratic consolidation. Developing Political Institutions 
focuses on liberalizing and eventually democratizing otherwise weak, autocratic 
national, and local level institutions. The focus on developing institutions is 
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animated by the realization that, contrary to behaviourist valorzation of agency 
over structure, even individual choices are both constrained and enabled by 
institutions (Goodin 1992: 14). Events in the global arena provide the context for 
the rediscovery of institutions. Following the demise of the Cold War, there 
emerged "a flurry of political scientific interest in the sorts of Constitutions one 
might wrirte, and the institutions one might try to impose in a world in which the 
mediating institutions of civil society and the internal checks of the civic virtue have 
so systematically been destroyed" (Goodin 1992: 15).  
The Grand Coalition Government had as its fundamental mandate in this regard 
pursuit “of comprehensive reforms including those that would address the 
fundamental causes of the conflict” (Progress Report, South Consulting April 2010: 
22). Agenda Number Four focused on the following themes: Constitutional, Legal 
and Institutional reforms; Land Reforms; Poverty, Inequality and Regional 
Development Imbalances; Unemployment, especially among the youth; 
Consolidation of national Unity and Cohesion; and, Addressing Transparency, 
Accountability and Impunity “to address the root causes of recurrent conflict and 
create a better, more secure and prosperous nation” (38).  
Liberals posit a number of factors as crucial to institutional design. They argue in 
particular that such a development presupposes the thorough discrediting of pre-
existing institutions. They must have failed to perform their routine functions as 
well (Offe 1992: 210). With respect to Kenya, the 2007-08 "crisis was largely due 
to weaknesses in key institutions of governance, including the Constitutional 
framework, Judiciary, Police, Executive, the electoral system, and Parliament" 
(Devolved Government Report 2010: 10).  
Indeed, not only have these institutions repeatedly received low ratings among 
Kenyans. Various commissions have repeatedly called for their overhaul. 
Numerous reports have, for example, consistently catalogued “police brutality and 
extra-judicial killings” (Review Report, South Consulting, August 2010: 21). The 
Waki Commission of Inquiry implicated the police in the violence, finding that in 
most instances police officers had served as partisan agents for Mr Kibaki’s party 
(The Waki Commission Report 2009: ix). However, promotion of good governance, 
lasting peace and development depends, to a large extent, “on breaking this 
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history of police bias, intimidation and brutality” (Celador 2006: 58). Indeed, the 
inability to forge an elite compromise during the violence until external intervention 
and signing of the National Accord suggested: 
[A]widespread lack of trust in the ability of Kenyan democratic 
institutions, such as courts… to deliver fair political outcomes. That lack 
of faith suggests that the longevity of the Kenyan crisis was rooted in the 
prior failure to carry out a genuine process of constitutional review. 
(Branch et al 2008: 126)  
 
 
Constitution-making did once again find its way onto the national agenda. A 
number of scholars have argued that the adoption of new, broad-based 
constitutions would go a long way to buttress attempts to establish a new 
democratic ethos. Those who argue in this vein insist that constitution-making can 
be “a process of national education with respect to concepts of government …and 
international norms of human rights that have been incorporated into recent 
constitutions (Kritz 2005: 814). Indeed, there is a growing acknowledgement that 
state failure provides a “fertile breeding ground not only for ethnic violence, but 
also other debilitating social and economic breakdowns” (Wright 2008: 81-2). This 
does illuminate the need not only to reinvigorate state capacity, “but also… to re-
engineer its entire architecture” (Call 2008: 380), to erect an institutional framework 
founded on inclusive, participative processes that foster trust and compromise 
(Papagiani 2008). 
Liberals argue that aspiring reformers are usually emboldened by the ready 
availability of an acceptable alternative model. Liberals argue that reformers 
usually ogle a supposedly recent glorious past in their country's history for 
inspiration (Offer 1992). They simultaneously denounce the current putrid order 
they seek to supplant. In the specific Kenya case, champions of a new constitution 
as the best antidote to PEV traced the country's governance flaws "to the re-
centralization of power in the executive through post-independence constitutional 
and legal amendments. A small political-cum-economic elite that accumulated both 
political control and economic wealth to protect the centralised system captured 
state power. Democratic advancement was stifled as the governance of the 
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country descended from constitutional rule to personal rule" (Devolved 
Government document 2010: 10). The reformers drew inspiration from the fact that 
"At independence, Kenya adopted a fairly progressive liberal Constitution. Its 
primary features were an extensive Bill of Rights; a bi-cameral parliament; 
devolved government; separation of powers between the arms of government; 
judicial independence; and a multi-party political system" (Devolved Government 
2010: 12).  
One expert conceptualises a constitution as "a Charter that delegates and marks 
the limits of power" (Berger 1979: 488). In particular, a constitution, the vital 
instrument of the state, "defines, distributes, and constrains the use of state power 
and provides a power map for the construction of the society and the running of 
the affairs of the state" (Devolved Government 2010: 15). The CoE initially issued 
a Draft constitution that sought to encapsulate Kenyans’ aspirations for 
accountability, participation and efficient utilization of public resources.  With 
respect to decentralisation, for example, the document had called for the 
establishment of robust County Governments. The draft sought to use devolution 
to address Kenyans’ desire for a governance mode that comports with the two 
requisites of modern democratic states: participation and accountability. Indeed, 
theorists of consociational democracy ogle segmental autonomy--- along with 
other devices such as mutual vetoes, constitutional courts, among others-- on the 
ground that, “although not necessarily democratic” (Lacklider 2001: 707), they 
bring “all major parties together to enable hard-decision making and promotion of 
the national good” (Progress Report, South Consulting April 2010: 27). 
But defenders of the status quo did quickly take umbrage at the Chapters on the 
Executive and devolution in particular. On devolution critics favoured de-
concentration instead—an arrangement whereby administrative structures 
delegate responsibility for functions within given territories to field-level civil 
servants—in effect a slightly modified version of the then pre-existing arrangement. 
The main difference with devolution is that although decision-making and power 
are decentralized from headquarters, and also while keyed to technical efficiency 
and greater effectiveness “the ensuing delegation of power is to an official 
appointed by and accountable to central government rather than to a 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
146 
 
representative of the local community who is accountable to that community” 
(Turner et al 1997: 160-161). In addition, once the CoE had issued the draft, the 
proposed Constitution had to contend with a determined bid by assorted groups to 
derail its enactment. The groups, fronted by the ‘no’ side, sought to achieve this by 
defeating the ‘yes’ side in a referendum slated for August 2010.  
In addition, once the CoE had issued the draft, the proposed Constitution had to 
contend with a determined bid by assorted groups to derail its enactment. The 
groups, fronted by the ‘no’ side, sought to achieve this by defeating the ‘yes’ side 
in a referendum slated for August 2010. For example, chief ‘no’ campaign lights, 
then-Higher Education Minister William Ruto and ex-President Moil launched a 
vigorous bid to derail enactment of the new document, arguing that it posed a major 
threat to land ownership/rights (Sigei et al, Daily Nation, 22nd July 2010: 1+). 
Similarly, Kenyan Catholic bishops intensified calls for changes in the draft 
constitution as the referendum approached, taking particular umbrage at articles 
on Kadhis courts, abortion, and international law, among others (By Nation 
Correspondents and KNA, 22nd July 2010: 5). Kadhis’ Courts; these are 
subordinate courts that deal entirely with matters involving111 persons that profess 
the Muslim faith; they in fact existed even under the old constitution, designed as 
a symbolic gesture to propitiate the country’s Muslim minority.  
Interestingly, the ‘no’ side insisted that the field was tilted against their side, with 
state machinery especially civil servants, increasingly being used to push the ‘yes’ 
message (Shiundu, Daily Nation, 22nd July 2010). Concerted opposition to 
enactment of a new constitution issued from the realization that the new document 
sought to challenge an entrenched, conservative status quo (Review Report, 
South Consulting, August 2010). 
Major international players deployed a plethora of tools as part of the effort to 
pressure Kenyan leaders to undertake needed reforms as envisaged under NARA. 
Indeed, there was widespread concern, both locally and internationally, that in 
fighting within the Grand Coalition government was endangering the country’s 
                                            
111 In this regard, Article 170(5) of the new constitution reads: “The jurisdiction of a Kadhi’s court shall be 
limited to questions of Muslim law… in proceedings in which all the parties profess the Muslim religion and 
submit to the jurisdiction of the Kadhi’s courts.” 
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essential reform agenda more generally (Rugene, Daily Nation, and 16 February 
2010).  Others even worried that the coalition was collapsing and warned that “the 
country could be plunged into renewed chaos” (Menya, Daily Nation, 15th 
February 2010, 9), as affected leaders retreated into their respective ethnic 
cocoons. The EU decried emergent partisan politics in enacting a new constitution 
and promised to impose sanctions on hardliners on both sides of the referendum 
divide (Standard Team, The Standard, 5th February 2011). 
Despite numerous hiccups, the country finally endorsed the New Constitution at a 
National Referendum in August 2010. Enactment of a new constitution signalled 
“the attainment of major structural reforms” (Review Report, South Consulting, 
October 2012: 18). In particular, the new constitution represents “a transition [for 
Kenya] from the old order to a new one” (Review Report, South Consulting, 
October 2011: 16). According to the literature, Developing Political Institutions 
focuses on liberalizing and eventually democratizing otherwise weak, autocratic 
national, and local level institutions.  
At independence KADU agitated for, and received, a quasi-federal constitutional 
settlement. This resulted in three tiers of government: The Centre; Regions and 
Counties. The Independence Constitution had jettisoned the oppressive provincial 
administrative system in favour of elected Regional and County governments--to 
foster accountability and participation. However, when Kenyatta and his minions 
embarked on re-establishing the colonial authoritarian, administrative state they 
quickly moved to abolish the system of elected regional and county governments. 
They simultaneously ogled the system of Provincial Commissioners (PCs), District 
Commissioners (DCs), and District Officers (DOs)—prefects so to speak—the 
president’s personal representatives in their respective domains, but without the 
administrators having any direct or indirect connection to those areas (Gertzel 
1970). Moi had then consolidated the system to create a highly oppressive state.  
This is the system that the new constitution sought to dismantle. In particular, the 
Constitution tries “to cure the problem of how power is exercised by firming up 
checks and balances on presidential powers, but has not cured the shortcomings 
of Kenya’s ‘First-Past-the-Post’ Electoral System” (ibid). Although the “politics of 
the ‘winner-take-all’ is still embedded in the electoral system and its consequences 
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are likely to radiate through the newly established institutions of governance” (ibid), 
the Constitution creates “the much-needed environment for implementing reforms 
envisaged under Agenda 4 of the National Accord” (ibid). 
 
 
6. 5 EU aid and Human Rights/ Rule of Law in Kenya: The GCG, 2008-13  
  
6.5.1 The Context: The Waki Commission Report on PEV 
The National Accord mandated the establishment of a Commission of inquiry to 
investigate the cause of the 2007-2008 post-election violence. This led to the 
formation of the Waki Commission. The Waki Commission recommended that to 
break the cycle of violence characteristic of Kenyan politics every five years, Kenya 
needed to establish a Special Tribunal to look into perpetrators of post-election 
violence. The report notes: “[s]adly, violence has been a part of Kenya’s electoral 
processes since the restoration of multi-party politics in 1991” (The Waki 
Commission Report 2009: vii). The Commission does, however, note that 
throughout all this period, no one was ever held accountable, thereby incubating 
“a culture of impunity” (26). 
Although the Commission did not publicly reveal the names of those it considered 
bore the greatest responsibility, it nevertheless “places [them] in a sealed 
envelope, together with its supporting evidence. Both will be kept in the custody of 
the Panel of Eminent African Personalities pending the establishment of a special 
tribunal to be set up in accordance with our recommendations” (16). The report 
stressed: in case of failure to establish such a local mechanism: 
Consideration will be given by the Panel to forwarding the names of the 
perpetrators to the Special Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in The Hague to conduct further investigations in accordance with 
the ICC Statutes. This is a major recommendation made by this 
Commission. (18) 
On the 16th of December 2008, in a bid to facilitate the smooth operation of the 
Special Tribunal, Kibaki and Odinga reached an agreement pledging to have 
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parliament “pass the Freedom of Information Bill and to operationalize the Witness 
Protection Act and the International Crimes Act” (Makokha’s News, Daily Nation 
31st January 2009: 16).  The idea of a local tribunal proved divisive from the outset, 
however. 
The Kenyan elite had initially scoffed at the Waki Commission Report. However, 
faced with overwhelming public and international clamour for action as 
recommended by the report, the elite now focused on the establishment of the 
proposed tribunal (Klopp 2009: 150-151). At issue were the nature and contents of 
a draft Independent Tribunal Bill (Namunene et al, Daily Nation, 21st July 2009, 
1+). Critics lamented that the proposed bill suffered myriad flaws. Citing numerous 
previous failed attempts to end impunity, they insisted that the proposed 
mechanism remained susceptible to executive manipulation (Dolan, Daily Nation 
14th Feb 2009)112. 
Supporters113 of a local mechanism focused, for their part, on, among others, the 
need for a speedy process as well as the need to protect Kenya’s sovereignty. 
Adherents of the ‘state sovereignty principle’ sought to cast ICC incursions into 
Kenya as external interference in the country’s internal affairs (Mathenge, Daily 
Nation 16th June 2009: 1). In particular, proponents of a local mechanism 
increasingly expressed concern that “President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga 
may also be exposed to prosecution” (Nation Team, 3rd July 2009: 2)114. Thus 
whereas the ICC angled for a local mechanism that comported with international 
standards, some of the elite pressed for “a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC) as the platform to address crimes against humanity” 
(Namunene et al, Daily Nation, 21st July 2009). 
In early 2009 opponents defeated the proposed local tribunal bill. MPs insisted that 
they had voted against the Special Tribunal Bill because of “a deep mistrust of the 
                                            
112 For calls to use the ICC in this case to end impunity in Kenya, see for instance Oriang (2009: 10). 
113 In fact, other MP’s pushed for what they called a ‘third option’; specifically, a UN Special Court modelled 
on those that operated in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, see Mutua (2009: 1). 
114 However, Kilonzo, the then-line minister—and a staunch ICC supporter—was said to have extensively 
referred to the Rome Statute; the International Crimes Act, and the agreement that was struck between the 
Kenyan delegation and Mr Moreno-Ocampo to justify the proposal to strip the president of his immunity 
from prosecution. See, among others Gitonga (2010: 6). 
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government and influential individuals” (Rugene, Daily Nation 2009: 5).  As an 
indication that perhaps the government indeed planned to protect the suspects 
Attorney General Amos Wako taking the line that Waki had not done a thorough 
job insisted that the suspects would not be put on trial immediately; they “would be 
investigated afresh” (The Standard 25th October 2008: 18). Opponents found fault 
with various discretionary powers that the proposed bill sought to confer upon the 
president; the notion, for example, that “the president could terminate the 
proceedings of the tribunal as he pleased” (Kisiangani, The Standard 5th July 2009: 
23). Others doubted that the two leaders and their respective parties actually 
wanted such a local mechanism in place, fearful that “any form of tribunal would 
target supporters and leaders of both parties” (Kisiangani, The Standard 5th July 
2009: 23). 
Nonetheless, available evidence indicated that some of those who had voted 
against the bill had done so at the urging of some of the suspects “believing that 
The Hague process would take years or fail altogether” (Rugene, Daily Nation 
2009: 5). Equivalently, some of those who voted for the Haque option did so 
“hoping that the Netherlands-based court would indict President Kibaki and Prime 
Minister Raila Odinga” (ibid). As an indication of the scheming involved, opponents 
had reportedly worked overtime “to block the government’s push to meet the 
deadline [for establishing a local tribunal” (Namunene, Daily Nation 31st January 
2009: 6). Indeed, opponents “challenged Kofi Annan to hand over the envelope 
containing names of politicians linked to the violence to the International Criminal 
Court” (Ojwang, The Standard 17th June 2009: 4). Hence, the cry: ‘don’t be vague; 
let’s go to The Hague!’. 
In the wake of dithering, activists and other proponents of strong action to end 
impunity agitated for the ICC option (Barasa, Daily Nation 16th September 2009: 
11). Terming parliament’s failure to enact the special tribunal bill “a major setback 
and a blow to the efforts to end the culture of impunity” (Namunene, Daily Nation 
2009: 4), Annan and his team promised therefore to explore the possibility of 
handing the names to the ICC. This would see ICC Chief Prosecutor visit Kenya 
in late 2009 to ask that the cases be transferred to The Hague. However, following 
pleas by Kenyan officials, the ICC agreed to extent by one year the deadline for 
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forming a local tribunal , a move that drew varied reactions (Mutua et al, The 
Standard 1st July 2009, 1 and 9).Whereas opponents—supporters of The Hague 
route—characterized the move “a delaying tactic against justice,” those in favour 
of an extension opined, on the other hand, that this would afford Kenya “ample  
time to consult widely before a local tribunal is set up” (The Standard 5th July 2009: 
4). 
However, in the wake of repeated failed attempts in Kenya to form the Tribunal, 
“[o]n 15th December 2010, the ICC Chief Prosecutor named six persons 
suspected to bear the greatest responsibility for crimes committed during the post-
election violence” (Review Report, South Consulting, January 2012: 50). The six 
suspects were: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Uhuru Kenyatta, 
Minister for Agriculture William Ruto, Head of the Civil Service and Secretary to 
the Cabinet Francis Muthaura, Minister for Industrialization and ODM chairman 
Henry Kosgey, former National Police Commissioner Major-General Hussein Ali 
and radio presenter Joshua Sang; these were subsequently committed to trial 
(Review Report, South Consulting January 2010: 29). 
Following the naming of six P.E.V. suspects, Kenya’s parliament voted to annul 
the country’s membership of the ICC (Namunene et al, Daily Nation, 9th February 
2011: 64). The government sought, to this end, to exploit a widespread perception 
among African political elites that the court was inherently biased against the 
continent. Indeed, in the wake of ICC’s interest in the Kenyan case, the AU had 
amplified its critique of that institution.  In tandem with Kenya’s posture, the AU 
increasingly posited the ICC as anti-Africa, citing as evidence the fact that the 
institution did not follow the appropriate channels in its excursions into Kenya: 
“either a referral from the UNSC” or one from a Rome Statute Signatory member 
state. The AU contended that in the Kenyan context, the ICC acted on its own 
initiative. Spearheaded by Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, the government’s 
shuttle diplomacy effort would in particular entail the enlistment of the powerful AU 
PS & C to support the proposal for the deferral of Kenya’s cases. 
However, this increasing anti-ICC rhetoric drew instant fire. Supporters of greater 
adherence to international norms warned that the attempt to present the ICC as 
an instrument designed to trample African sovereignty completely missed the 
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point. In the first instance, they explained that in fact it was “an outsider sent here 
by the United Nations that got these two men to sit down together to sort out our 
problems” (Odipo, The Standard 24th January 2011: 15). Thus, one, such as the 
President of States Signatory to the Roman Statute, advised “the country to 
instead negotiate for the deferral directly with the ICC” (Mutua et al, The Standard, 
24th January 2011: 1). To ICC supporters, though, the Kenya government’s 
deferral call was nothing other than a furtive attempt to subvert the cause of justice 
for the victims of PEV (Mutua, Sunday Nation, 23rd January 2011). 
The Kenya government’s shuttle diplomacy came unhinged, however, thereby 
opening the door for a ruling by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber that the 6 Kenyans 
had a case to answer (Mutua et al, The Standard, 24th January 2011: 1 and 6). 
None the less, opponents faulted the ICC for privileging justice over peace, arguing 
that peace is a precondition for justice, human rights and freedom, especially in 
fragile environments (Kagwanja, Sunday Nation 23rd January 2011). Interestingly, 
former ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno-O’Campo seems to have become an ardent 
advocate of the peace over justice stance. In a speech on the Kenyan cases he 
gave after leaving office, he lauded Uhuru and Ruto for:  
forging a successful alliance that turned the perceived rivalries of their 
communities to their advantage,” thereby “demonstrating that 
international justice is not just about judges and prosecutors. You need 
political leaders because basically what I see in Kenya is Kenyatta and 
Ruto were allegedly killing each other [but now are working as a team]. 
(Menya, Daily Nation, 8th February 2014: 1 and 6) 
 
Still, ‘opponents’ of international justice could not fail but notice that The Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s majority ruling clearing the way for ICC prosecutors to commence 
investigations came with caveats, for instance, “whether the prosecutor has 
powers to trigger the court’s jurisdiction in the absence of a referral by a State Party 
or the UNSC” (Ng’eno, Sunday Nation 23rd January 2011: 26). 
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6.5.2 The nature of EU political aid: The Special Tribunal Vs The Hague 
Debate 
Deployment of foreign aid to promote human rights, democracy and good 
governance has emerged as a major theme in the literature. Champions of this 
stance contend that an uncritical focus on sovereignty in the Post-Cold War 
environment fails to take account of how changes in a variety of issue areas pose 
a challenge to existing modes of governance (Bishop 1994: 77). Supporters of the 
shift point to a growing acknowledgement of the responsibility to protect those 
under oppression by their own states as part of humanitarian law.  
The EU took a particularly hawkish stance on the Local Tribunal vs. The Hague 
Debate. The bloc emphasized the need for Kenya to prioritize the “trial of those 
who bear the greatest responsibility for the violence which claimed more than 
1,300 lives early last year, following disputed presidential elections” (Mathenge, 
Daily Nation 5th October 2009: 1). Insisting that it would not accept a flawed 
domestic process, the EU urged the grand coalition government to either set up a 
credible mechanism that met international standards or let the ICC handle the 
case. It is as part of this strategy, for example, that the EU claims to have played 
a major role in supporting the Panel of Eminent African Personalities in 
encouraging implementation of the reform agenda agreed by the Government of 
Kenya after the 2007-2008 post-election crisis115, as well as ongoing reform of the 
electoral process. 
The theme of state sovereignty has received a lot of coverage in the 
democratization literature. Adherents of the status quo have taken umbrage at thee 
new activist human rights posture. They see it as a blank cheque for external 
intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. They counter that the 
modern, sovereign state-based system arose in direct reaction to this situation.  
Adherents of the ‘state sovereignty principle’ sought to cast ICC incursions into 
Kenya as external interference in the country’s internal affairs (Mathenge, Daily 
                                            
115 http://www.dialoguekenya.org/  
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Nation 16th June 2009: 1). In particular, proponents of a local116  mechanism 
increasingly expressed concern that “President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga 
may also be exposed to prosecution” (Nation Team, 3rd July 2009: 2)117. Thus 
whereas the ICC angled for a local mechanism that comported with international 
standards, some of the elite pressed for “a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC) as the platform to address crimes against humanity” 
(Namunene et al, Daily Nation, 21st July 2009). 
One line of critique in the literature holds that the extant conceptualisation of 
human rights has proved difficult and controversial. Critics contend that the liberal 
formulation equates human rights with political and civil rights. They opine that 
such a circumscribed definition elides social, economic and cultural rights (Pinkney 
1999). The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1945 seats 
economic, social and cultural rights alongside the more political ones (Bishop 
1994: 74). This theme also manifested itself in the Local Tribunal versus Hague 
debate. Thus whereas the ICC angled for a local mechanism that comported with 
international standards, some of the elite pressed for “a Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) as the platform to address crimes against 
humanity” (Namunene et al, Daily Nation, 21st July 2009). Those agitating for a 
TJRC mainatinde that whereas the ICC would focus narrowly on political and civil 
rights violations during the 2007-08 PEV, the former mechanism would help 
address both the proximate and the underlying causes of that crisis, including 
historical injustices. They included under the historical injustices rubric such things 
as economic marginalization, grievances related to land allocation, regional 
inequalities and inequities, among others. Supporters of a TJRC argued, in other 
words, that this approach would go beyond political issues, and address also 
economic, social and cultural human rights.  
 
                                            
116 In fact, other MP’s pushed for what they called a ‘third option’; specifically a UN Special Court modelled 
on those that operated in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia; see, for instance Mutua (2009: 1). 
117 However, Kilonzo, the then-line minister—and a staunch ICC supporter—was said to have extensively 
referred to the Rome Statute; the International Crimes Act, and the agreement that was struck between the 
Kenyan delegation and Mr Moreno-Ocampo to justify the proposal to strip the president of his immunity 
from prosecution. See, among others Gitonga (2010: 6). 
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6.6 The nature of EU political aid: Funding of elections in Kenya 
 
Technical Assistance involves foreign experts working with their domestic 
counterparts, from both government and the NGOs, in support of the entire 
electoral cycle from pre-election preparations to post election capacity building 
(Mitchell and Phillips 2008). Viewed as an entry point for other desired reforms—
such as good governance, among others—the strategy can also help in the 
identification of other government entities that need assistance (Schroeder 2013: 
220). 
However, this is not merely a technocratic issue: technical assistance has clear 
political implications; specifically, it is focused on strengthening institution in order 
to promote participatory and effective electoral institutions. Seen so, technical 
assistance, as opposed to election monitoring, is focused on long-term institution 
building as well as promoting the participation of hitherto excluded groups such as 
women and social and ethnic minorities “in the political process,”—consistent with 
a number of international instruments concerning non-discrimination and 
participation of such groups (Binder 2007: 225). 
There exists a link between the national electoral process and democratic 
consolidation (Pronizer 1977): liberal democratic theory considers free and fair 
elections the sine qua none of democracy (Sainna 2009). Given the central place 
that elections occupy in a democratic system, the need for an independent and 
impartial electoral oversight body118 needs no gainsaying, if the exercise is to 
garner legitimacy. Otherwise, such an exercise is likely to exacerbate societal 
divisions (Makulilo 2011: 264). Thus an emergent consensus holds that whereas 
African countries made some important progress towards democracy in the 1990s, 
a number of challenges linger, with the electoral system as a major contributory 
factor (Kabemba 2008: 35). Indeed, as the 2007-2008 political events in Kenya 
illustrate, poorly organized elections can become the proximate cause of electoral 
related violence. 
                                            
118 The Australian Electoral Commission stands as the epitome of such a body. For the full read, see, for 
instance Brent (2009: 405-419). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
156 
 
Electoral assistance has therefore emerged as a major theme in the post-cold war 
era. Indeed, electoral support has become the chief means of UN democracy 
assistance. UN democracy assistance is facilitated by the United Nations 
Development Programmed (UNDP) and the UN’s Electoral Assistance Division 
(EAD), nested in the Secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs (Schroeder 2013). 
Free and fair elections119 are increasingly seen as the most visible form of 
democracy assistance (Mitchell and Phillips 2008: 161-2). Election support takes 
two main forms: observation/monitoring of elections as well as technical 
assistance. The support rests on the rationale that although such activities 
enhance voter participation while curbing electoral fraud at the same time 
(Schroeder 2013: 218), preparing and running elections is an expensive 
undertaking, especially for poor developing countries. 
Donors continue to support the electoral process in Kenya by way of funding. It is 
true that government funds play a major part in these activities. Still, donor 
assistance to democracy and governance programmes is substantial and critical. 
When it comes to elections, for example, “donors have traditionally given about 10 
per cent of the total election budget” (Review Report, South Consulting, October 
2012: 41). In line with this track record of assistance, “In June 2012 donors gave 
IEBC Kenya Shillings 2.2 billion [about $26m] as part of financing towards its 
preparations for the next general elections [ones held in early 2013]” (Review 
Report, South Consulting, October 2012: 41). In addition, the EU through its 
foreign policy Chief Catherine Ashton committed $2.8 million to fund the activities 
of the IEBC in preparation for the by-then impending general elections, since held 
in March 2013.  
 
6.7 The nature of EU political aid: Supporting civic education 
Technical Assistance involves foreign experts working with their domestic 
counterparts, from both government and the NGOs, in support of the entire 
electoral cycle from pre-election preparations to post election capacity building 
                                            
119 This can at times lead to a dangerous conflation of elections and democracy, though. See, for instance 
Ake (1992: 32-36). 
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(Mitchell et al 2008). On the electoral front, technical assistance might involve 
training candidates; civic education, budgeting procedures, “computerizing voter 
lists… amending electoral regulations… and training electoral officials on new 
voting procedures “(Schroeder 2013: 209-10).  
These activities are usually focused on creating credible electoral institutions and 
procedures, in the process increasing voter confidence in these institutions and 
processes (Binder 2007; Schroeder 2013). The EU and other donors have also 
consistently supported voter education, especially after the 1997 elections. For 
example, in early 2012 the EU jointly with the United Nations Development 
Programme—Kenya under the Joint Training Facility—a working arrangement on 
democracy support between the two entities—organised a workshop for EMB 
officials from across the globe in Mombasa on the issue of ICT and elections. 
Technical and financial support usually unfold within the armpit of targeted 
cooperation programmes. These activities can take anyone of many forms: 
election support teams; these are teams that can analyse key aspects of previous 
elections and make recommendations for future improvements; leadership training 
and networking for women, especially in rural areas.    
Liberal theory holds that respect for associational life, conceptualized as the ability 
of “citizens to organize in defence of their own interests or identities without fear of 
external intervention or punishment has long been identified as a key ingredient 
for democracy” (Fox 1994: 151-152). This empowerment helps such groups 
transmute relationships of dependency, replacing them with a new order infused 
with a greater respect for citizenship rights by the state. In the end, such activities 
permit “community groups to grow in awareness, to increase their commitment to 
the common good and better to defend the needs and the rights of the excluded” 
(O’Gorman 1995: 194).  
Civil society can also play a crucial role as a facilitator of conflict mediation. Civil 
society can accomplish this, they contend, through its ability to attract people from 
different social backgrounds “on a constant and voluntary basis… thereby 
mitigating cleavages” (10). Hence, Africa’s ability to successfully navigate its 
current political development voyage will crucially hinge on “how well… 
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democratizing African governments are able to negotiate in good faith… with those 
who represent the important and influential social forces” (Owusu 1997: 148). The 
existence of strong civil societies in Africa “would provide a foundation for 
sustainable development, both participation and development” (Shaw 1990: 21). 
Donors have extended financial support to a number of national civil society 
initiatives to guarantee free and fair elections. This has been especially the case 
with regard to funding for Elections Observation Group (E-LOG). This is a 
consortium of civil society organisations and other stakeholders “established in 
2010 to provide a permanent national platform through which citizens can monitor 
general elections in Kenya and other countries in Africa” (Review Report, South 
Consulting, October 2012: 41). 
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on Kenya under the grand coalition government that came to 
power following international mediation efforts that ended the 2007-2008 political 
crisis. The chapter has examined some of the issues with which the grand coalition 
government had to grapple: The Special Tribunal versus The Hague debate, as 
well as implementation of some of the reform initiatives mandated by the NARA. 
Kenya witnessed unprecedented violence following a disputed presidential 
election in December 2007. However, combined domestic and international 
pressure was brought to bear on Kenyan leaders; this forced them to seek a 
negotiated solution to the crisis-in the form of a power-sharing arrangement 
between the formations led by Kibaki and Odinga respectively. 
The two leaders agreed to undertake institutional and structural reforms as 
mandated under agenda number four items of the NARA. In addition, the two 
leaders agreed to use the window of opportunity opened by the grand coalition 
government to address other pending issues, such as corruption. Once in power, 
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however, the Grand coalition government seemed to always make two steps 
forward, and then one back.  
Still, the elite, cognizant of both public and international concerns in the wake of 
the violence, did undertake some of the country’s major pending reform agenda 
items, constitution reform key among them. This would see the country finally 
inaugurate a new constitution in 2010, after many previous false starts. 
Implementation of the new constitution as well as the other reform items would 
devolve to the new administration, which assumed power after the 2013 general 
elections. The next chapter has the current administration, under Uhuru Kenyatta, 
as its main focus. 
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CHAPTER 7: The Kenyatta/Jubilee Administration, 2013- 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter seven discusses Kenya’s political development since 2013.The chapter 
seeks to elucidate the dynamics of political change in Kenya since 2013 and the 
role of EU political aid in the country under the Kenyatta/Jubilee administration. 
Kenya held a general election in 2013 to elect a government that would succeed 
the grand coalition administration. The new government was the one to preside 
over implementation of the reforms inaugurated in the wake of that violence. These 
were anchored in the constitution adopted under the grand coalition government. 
The National Accord had called for both institutional and constitutional reforms. 
The first section of the chapter seeks to provide the contextual setting. The first 
section limns political developments in the country as Kenya headed into this 
crucial election, especially in light of the PEV. The section opens with an 
introduction, including preparations for those elections, the elections themselves. 
Here the focus is on the main campaign issues that framed the elections, and the 
political alliances that emerged in the run-up to the elections. The section also 
examines the reaction, especially by the losing side, to Kenyatta being declared 
the winner…The next part of this section examines how some of the reformed 
institutions have performed; it will also analyze the ICC case that confronted 
Kenyatta and Rut. 
The next section—the substantive part—then shifts to a discussion of some of the 
key events—themes—that have emerged under the Kenyatta administration, and 
the role that EU political aid with respect to these issues/themes. The section will 
therefore focus on the role of EU political aid in Kenya during this period with 
respect to, among other themes: the Uhuru-Ruto presidential ticket, emergent calls 
for reform of IEBC, The ICC case that confronted Kenyatta and Ruto at the time of 
assuming office; and so on. This substantive part of the chapter aims to analyze 
the role of EU political aid in Kenya from 2013- . 
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The first conducted under the new constitution, the 2013 elections pitted two major 
political-cum ethnic alliances120 against each other:  the Jubilee Alliance (JA) 
versus the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD). Captained into the 
elections by Uhuru Kenyatta—son of Kenya’s founding President Jomo Kenyatta—
and William Ruto, as its presidential and Deputy-presidential candidates 
respectively, Jubilee was actually a coalition between two parties: Kenyatta’s The 
National Alliance (TNA), and Ruto’s the United Republican Party (URP). In 
addition, and on the ethnic front, Jubilee drew majority of its support from the Mount 
Kenya region and the Rift Valley—or from the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru (GEMA) 
group from the Mt Kenya region, and the Kalenjin and other related, and 
marginalized groups in the Rift Valley and parts of North Eastern Kenya. 
With Raila Odinga121—son of Kenya’s founding Vice-President Oginga Odinga—
and Kalonzo Musyoka as its presidential and Deputy-Presidential candidates 
respectively, Cord, similarly, was a coalition between Odinga’s ODM, Musyoka’s 
Wiper-Kenya and Moses Wetangula’s Ford-Kenya. The coalition’s base of support 
lay in Western Kenya (among the Luo and Luhyia people—collectively referred to 
during the colonial era, ‘the people of Kavirondo’), the Coastal region, Nairobi, 
parts of eastern Kenya inhabited by the Kamba people, as well as some 
marginalized groups in Northern Kenya and the Rift Valley.  
The crimes against humanity cases stemming from the 2007-2008 post-election 
violence facing a number of prominent Kenyans, key among them Kenyatta and 
Ruto, and implementation of the new constitution, were the main campaign issues. 
In the face of the ICC threat, key figures—and former nemeses—implicated in 
PEV, namely Kenyatta and Ruto, moved to cement an ethnic alliance: The 
Kalenjin-Kikuyu alliance (the K-K Alliance).  Forged out of apprehension that 
Odinga’s ascension to power would see them handed over to the ICC prosecutor 
in The Hague, the K-K alliance focused on isolating Odinga by insinuating that he 
was the mastermind of “the Ocampo list” (Obonyo, Sunday Standard, 23rd January 
2011: 1 and 6). As a key plank in its electoral grand strategy, the K-K alliance 
                                            
120 Some observers decried formation of the two alliances, viewing them as antithetical to national unity, see, 
for instance Kanjama (2011: 15). 
121 Odinga was the country’s incumbent Prime Minister, and Kenyatta one of his two deputies; Musyoka was 
the Vice President. See, for instance Lang’at (2016: 4). 
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worked assiduously to convince its supporters that the Cord team was even 
opposed to government’s effort to rally African countries against The Hague 
(Kerrow, Sunday Standard, 23rd January 2011). To this end, exploiting the ICC 
issue, Kenyatta and Ruto sought to cast the case they faced at The Hague as an 
imperialist plot designed to infringe Kenya’s sovereignty by imposing leaders on 
the populace (Chagema, The Standard, 22nd December 2016: 15). 
Odinga and Musyoka sought to make implementation of the new Constitution, as 
well as experience the thrust of their campaign. Focused especially on devolution, 
the Cord team repeatedly warned Kenyans not to entrust the task of implementing 
the Constitution with the Jubilee team, arguing that some within that camp, most 
prominently William Ruto, had led the ‘no’ team in the referendum. In addition, they 
claimed that although Kenyatta had in the end thrown his weight behind the ‘yes’ 
camp in the referendum, he had done so in a tepid manner, mostly after Kibaki and 
his camp had come under intense pressure to support the passage of the new 
document.  In this regard, Odinga and Musyoka and the rest of the Cord ensemble 
made a point of reminding Kenyans of the events that unfolded right after 
independence. 
At independence KADU agitated for, and received, a quasi-federal constitutional 
settlement; this resulted in three tiers of government: The Centre; Regions and 
Counties. The Independence Constitution had jettisoned the oppressive provincial 
administrative system in favour of elected Regional and County governments--to 
foster accountability and participation. However, when Kenyatta and his minions 
embarked on re-establishing the colonial authoritarian, administrative state they 
quickly moved to abolish the system of elected regional and county governments. 
They simultaneously ogled the system of Provincial Commissioners (PCs), District 
Commissioners (DCs), and District Officers (DOs)—prefects so to speak—the 
president’s personal representatives in their respective domains, but without the 
administrators having any direct or indirect connection to those areas (Gertzel 
1970). During the campaigns, the Kenyatta-Ruto team continued to defend the 
provincial administration. 
The 4th March 2013 General Elections proceeded peacefully, contrary to earlier 
apprehensions. Based mostly on the events of late 2007 and early 2008, the 
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apprehensions proved unwarranted, thanks, in part, to “meticulous planning and 
serious gathering of intelligence by the country’s security organs” (Ombati, The 
Standard 13th March 2013: 4). Fearful of a repeat of the 2007-2008 events, the 
government had invested huge financial resources in security.  
On 6th March, just two days after the election, the IEBC declared122 Kenyatta the 
overall123 winner of the presidential poll, having garnered 50 per cent of all the valid 
votes plus 1. Article 138(4) of the constitution, ordains that a candidate will be 
declared president if the individual receives: “(a) more than half of all the votes 
cast; and (b) at least twenty-five per cent of the votes cast in each of more than a 
half of the counties.” Kenya has 47 counties. One commentator captured the 
implication of declaration of Kenyatta by IEBC as president thus: 
The declaration of Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta as President-elect has set into 
motion seismic legal processes without precedent and into uncharted 
legalities in international, commonwealth, continental, and local arenas. 
(Bowry, The Standard 13th March 2013: 15) 
Claiming to have in their possession evidence proving manipulation of poll results 
in favour of Kenyatta, CORD exuded confidence of legal victory in a suit the party 
planned to file at the Supreme Court124 (Mosoku, The Standard 13th March 2013: 
1 and 4). Cord picked Odinga’s chief campaigner Eliud Owallo to file125 the petition 
against Kenyatta’s purported first round overall victory, a victory which would, if 
allowed to stand, negate the need for a run-off (Thuku et al, The Standard 13th 
March 2013: 4). 
The decision to let Owallo, and not Odinga, file the petition represented a clever 
strategy by Cord to turn the glare away from Odinga. Cord planned to rely “on a 
full audit of the presidential election” as “the basis of their case” (ibid). 
                                            
122 Article 138(10) of the new Constitution of Kenya enacted in 2010 demands that within seven days after 
the presidential election, the IEBC chairperson shall: “(a) declare result of the election; (b) deliver a written 
notification of the result to the Chief Justice and the incumbent president.” 
123 Article 138(4) of the constitution, ordains that a candidate will be declared president if the individual 
receives: “(a) more than half of all the votes cast; and (b) at least twenty-five per cent of the votes cast in 
each of more than a half of the counties.” Kenya has 47 counties. 
124 Article 163(3) (a) of the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with “exclusive original jurisdiction to hear 
and determine disputes relating to the election to the office of president”. 
125 Article 140(1) of the Constitution states thus: “A person may file a petition in the Supreme Court to 
challenge the election of the president-elect within seven days after the day of the declaration of the result 
of the presidential election.” 
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 Out to prove that the entire electoral process was inherently flawed, the party 
wanted IEBC to provide them with key electoral documents such as “all form 34, 
35, and 36 from the more than 33,000 polling stations and constituencies, serial 
numbers of electronic devices used as well as provisional and final registers of all 
registered voters” (ibid). Form 34 is a declaration of presidential election results 
signed by the presiding officer and election agents; form 35 details results from 5 
other elective seats. Cord planned to use these documents to demonstrate that 
the presidential election was a sham, a sham it attributed to the manipulation of 
electronic tallying126. 
Odinga’s—and by extension Cord’s—decision to seek legal redress elicited mixed 
reviews. Kenyatta supporters denounced the move as a waste of time and 
resources. However, Odinga backers lauded the decision as “a major boost for 
democratisation of our country and helps sustain respect and upholding of the rule 
of law” (Mosoku, The Standard 13th March 2013: 1 and 4), they simultaneously 
castigated opponents as being engaged “in an abuse of the constitution… [an] 
abuse of the constitution because electoral disputes are part [and parcel] of an 
electoral process in a democratic society” (ibid). 
The Court, in a controversial ruling, unanimously upheld127 Kenyatta’s victory, 
thereby clearing the way for his swearing-in as Kenya’s fourth president. The 
Supreme Court’s decision received mixed reviews. Whereas pro-Kenyatta groups 
hailed the ruling as apposite for democracy, those allied to Odinga denounced it 
as both lacking in legal reasoning and empirical evidence. In particular, critics 
argued that the Court appeared not interested in the evidence adduced before it, 
but rather in merely endorsing Kenyatta’s purported victory. One acerbic critic of 
the court’s verdict put it thus many years later: 
A number of us have spent the last four years criticizing the Supreme 
Court over that decision and demonstrating the profound harm that it 
caused the judiciary. Our criticism has relied on the text of the judgment, 
whose reasoning we have discredited, and also on the observable 
procedures that the court employed which we have also questioned. 
(Kegoro, Sunday Nation, 16th July 2017) 
                                            
126 Article 138(3) (c) of the Constitution declares: “after casting the votes in the polling stations, the IEBC shall 
tally and verify the count and declare the result”. 
127 Article 140(2) of the Constitution mandates that: “Within fourteen days after the filing of a petition under 
clause (1), the Supreme Court shall hear and determine the petition and its decision shall be final”. 
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Indeed, one percipient legal expert had made what would prove a prescient 
prediction. He had wondered if in case of a legal dispute over the announced 
presidential results, the new judicial architecture was perhaps too nascent to 
handle such a situation, thereby raising a big question mark as to whether “Will the 
justice meted out suffice?” (Bowry, The Standard 13th March 2013: 15).  In the 
event, Odinga and his Cord team having pledged to respect the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, accepted, albeit reluctantly, the Court’s final affirmation of Kenyatta and 
Ruto as the winners of the 2013 contest. 
In the wake of their victory, the Kenyatta-Ruto duo went on to construct a 
government that appeared to cast them as the builders128 of a new, modern 
Kenyan state. In particular, cognisant of the new, stringent constitutional 
requirements that they faced in naming their cabinet, the two leaders not only 
named mostly technocrats—with only two politicians included. They also honoured 
the gender requirement in the constitution. Indeed, when they named the cabinet, 
most of the plum posts—foreign affairs, defence, devolution and planning, energy, 
among others, went to women. 
Once they got down to the business of governing the country, moreover, the duo 
continued with or, in some instances, even intensified some of the developmental 
policies launched by the two predecessor administrations, NARC and the Grand 
Coalition. On the economic front, for example, the new administration intensified 
the country’s investment in infrastructural projects, epitomized by commencement 
in 2013 of construction of the first phase of a Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) line 
from the port of Mombasa to Nairobi. The next two phases would extend the facility 
to the western part of the country, to link Kenya with Uganda and Rwanda and 
possibly other countries in Central Africa. (By Sunday Nation Team, Sunday 
Nation, 7th May 2017: 4). Funded and undertaken by the Chinese, and intended to 
replace the pre-existing facility constructed at the beginning of the colonial era, the 
first phase is already operational, commissioned by the president at the end of May 
2017. The next phase of the project—intended to extend the facility from Nairobi 
to Naivasha—the Western phase—is already underway (ibid). 
                                            
128 For statebuilding in historical perspective, See, for instance Skowronek (1982). 
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The administration has continued and intensified efforts in other area as well. Take 
the attempt to extend social services to a majority of Kenyans. With respect to 
access to electricity, for example, when Jubilee took over, approximately thirty per 
cent (30 %) of Kenya’s households had access to this vital service—itself a vast 
improvement over the state of affairs that existed in this domain under the previous 
KANU administration (By Sunday Nation Team, Sunday Nation, 7th May 2017: 4).  
Then less than five (5 %) per cent of households had access to power. Jubilee has 
increased connectivity to electricity appreciably, thanks to massive investment in 
the sector in the last five years; as a result, now more than fifty per cent (50 %) of 
all households in the country have access to electricity.  In addition, the 
administration has had the vast majority of, if not all, primary schools in the country 
connected to power, an unheard of development previously. Similarly, to cushion 
more of the country’s senior citizens from the ravages of poverty, the administration 
intensified a programme that begun under the grand coalition government of 
monthly cash transfers to the most indigent senior citizens; the administration has 
increased the progamme’s reach appreciably (ibid). 
Still, corruption continued to blight Kenya even under the Jubilee administration. 
For example, critics contend that after the administration floated the country’s first 
ever Eurobond rather than use the proceeds to finance various so-called flagship 
projects under vision 2030 as initially promised, most of the cash was actually 
squandered through corrupt arrangements (Leftie, Daily Nation 28th October 2015: 
1). Similarly, the EACC, in an investigation launched at the invitation of the National 
Assembly Speaker, discovered that MPs are employing all manner of tricks to filch 
public coffers (Otieno, Daily Nation 5th December 2015: 1). In one such scam, “an 
MP claimed mileage allowance for visiting his constituency when he had [in fact] 
travelled to Australia on parliamentary expense for six days” (ibid)129.  
Kenyatta first used his State of the Nation Address in March 2015 to address the 
corruption issue. Kenyatta used the occasion to present to parliament a list of 
senior government officials, both elected and appointed, at both the County and 
                                            
129 No wonder, then, given this context, that the country’s youth would inform Pope Francis during his maiden 
visit to Kenya in 2016, that “the biggest challenges the youth and the country are facing are tribalism and 
corruption,” with one of the youth leaders alerting the pontiff: “sometimes one has to pay extra cash and in 
kind to access services” (Ngirachu 2015: 17). 
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National levels, reportedly implicated in graft by the country’s anti-graft agency, the 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC). The president reinforced his 
speech with the suspension of a number of senior government officials. However, 
critics accused State House of doctoring the list unveiled in parliament by Kenyatta 
to excise names of key government figures (Kegoro, Daily Nation, 5th November 
2016: 5). 
The foregoing governance challenges would see Kenyatta ogle politicians in a mini 
reshuffle of his administration so that he could have a “Cabinet that can also offer 
political advice in times of crisis,” a move assailed by critics as inconsequential, on 
the grounds that the president “moved people who have failed in one docket into 
another” (Wanga, Daily Nation, 15th June 2016: 4). The next part of this section will 
therefore limn some of the issues, especially the way some of the reformed 
institutions have performed, analyze the ICC case that confronted Kenyatta and 
Ruto at the time of assuming office as well as trace Kenya’s role in the war on 
terror. This examination should then provide the context for analyzing the role of 
EU political aid during the Kenyatta/Jubilee administration, again, with a focus on 
the institutions and issues identified in the first section. 
 
7.2 The showdown over IEBC 
CORD begun to agitate for a ‘national dialogue’ starting sometime in 2014 in the 
wake of what it characterized as major national crises, corruption key among them. 
However, Jubilee and the clergy rejected Cord’s call for dialogue as an 
unnecessary waste of time (Kegoro, Daily Nation, 12th June 2016: 37). Although 
the team continued to make intermittent calls for national dialogue, it shifted gears 
and launched a new campaign aimed at ‘reform’ of the IEBC130. 
On the 31st of May 2016, just a day before Madaraka Day—celebrated on 1st June 
to mark the day when the country received internal self-rule from Britain in 1963—
Cord leaders Raila Odinga and Moses Wetangula announced a break-through. 
They claimed that following their meeting with the president and his team at State 
                                            
130 The IEBC, as discussed previously, is one of the new governance institutions established under the new 
Constitution. 
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House the two sides had reached an understanding to open talks on the IEBC 
(Ongiri, Daily Nation, 2nd June 2016: 5). State House, through Deputy President 
Ruto, subsequently rubbished the claim. In the subsequent State House rejoinder, 
Ruto claimed that although the Cord leaders had made a proposal to this effect, 
because of time constraints, no “deal was struck between the two sides with 
specific timelines given to resolve the matter” (By Standard team, The Standard, 
5th June 2016: 12). The statement, in addition, stated that no such agreement had 
been struck as it would vitiate the president’s position that anything touching on 
constitutional institutions, such as the IEBC, unfold within the armpit of the law.  
The statement went on to intimate that because the relevant parliamentary 
committee had already signaled its desire to tackle the issue, that therefore that 
was the appropriate venue to address any concerns about the IEBC. 
The government’s position would see Cord vow to intensify its public 
demonstrations—already underway— “to push electoral commissioners out of 
office” (Jubat et al, The Standard, 5th June 2016: 13). The opposition’s call for 
intensified civil action drew a sharp response from the police. The police 
characterized such action as illegal and thus subject to the full force of the law. 
However, Cord rejected this interpretation. Cord maintained that the court ruling 
on which the police claimed to base their position had “only barred the storming of 
IEBC offices and the destruction of the Commission’s property” (Ongiri, Daily 
Nation, 6th June 2016: 4). 
The leaders also moved to reject the government’s claim that the anti-IEBC 
demonstrations enjoyed the tacit support of some neighbouring countries (read: 
Tanzania).  Cord and allied groups counselled that while they, too, respected the 
Constitution, they still believed it “possible to get a solution outside the 
Constitution” (By Standard Team, The Standard, 5th June 2016: 12). Kenyatta 
moved to recapture the initiative. Calling for the need to always prioritise national 
interests over personal gain, the president announced that “he had offered to 
dialogue with the opposition to save the country from constant wrangles” (Sunday 
Nation Team and PSCU, Daily Nation, 12th June 2016: 10)131. 
                                            
131 See, also Barasa (2016: 6). 
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The clamour by the opposition for IEBC’s reform stemmed from a number of 
considerations. First, the opposition had developed antipathy towards the IEBC 
ever since the electoral body declared Kenyatta the overall winner of the 2013 
presidential race. Cord and its supporters maintained that while they agreed that 
Kenyatta had won the first round, available evidence showed that he had not 
secured 50 per cent of the votes cast plus 1 to negate the need for a run-off 
(Kegoro, Sunday Nation, 16th July 2017). 
To buttress allegations of fraud, Cord offered, for example, that there was a major 
discrepancy between the total number of people who cast votes for the other five 
elective offices being contested, on the one hand, and those that cast ballots for 
presidential candidates, on the other. They claimed that available evidence 
showed that 2 million extra people had cast votes in the presidential elections vis-
à-vis those who did so in the other races. Cord and supporters wondered how the 
IEBC could account for this discrepancy, other than the fact that it indicated 
manipulation of the presidential vote in favour of Kenyatta (Kegoro, Daily Nation, 
12th June 2016: 37). Cord’s animus towards the IEBC gained further momentum 
as a result of a number of post-election controversies that engulfed the electoral 
body. 
 
7.2.1 The so-called ‘Chickengate’ scandal 
 
The first major post-election crisis to engulf the IEBC centred on the so-called 
chickengate scandal. The scandal stemmed from revelations that a British firm had 
bribed top IIEC officials to win the tender for the supply of electoral material for use 
in the referendum and the Bamachoge by-election in 2010. The information came 
to light following investigations by British anti-corruption agencies. It emerged that 
IIEC officials had actually actively advised the firm to inflate the price of the items 
in question; the two sides would then share the difference. UK prosecutors alleged 
that as part of this scheme, IIEC officials were “paid a sum of British Pounds 
349,057.39 (shs 46m at current rates). The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) alleged 
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that the electoral body & S & O officials accommodated bribes in pricing by inflating 
the prices by up to 38 per cent” (Menya, Sunday Nation 24th July 2016: 9). 
The British government proceeded to prosecute the firm’s officials. However, when 
it came to the Kenyan side of the story, save for the forced resignation of IEBC’s 
then-chief executive officer James Oswago, no one else on the commission was 
ever prosecuted. Finally, in 2016 the EACC summoned IEBC chief Isaak Hassan 
for interrogation over his role in the scandal. Hassan was a senior official with IIEC 
at the time of the scandal; he was also among those adversely implicated in the 
event. 
 
7.2.2 Allegations of biased voter registration 
 
In addition, as new voter registration got underway in readiness for the 2017 
elections, Odinga and other Cord leaders increasingly accused the electoral body 
of bias. The leaders decried in particular “the inadequate number of BVR kits 
[allocated to Cord’s strongholds] and called on IEBC to extent the registration 
period,” suggesting, “each polling station should have one clerk and one BVR 
machine daily. The period should be extended and if possible be done 
continuously” (Onyango, The Standard, 22nd February 2016: 1) 132. 
 
7.2.3 The “Okoa Kenya” initiative fiasco 
Cord had sought starting sometime in 2015 to use a popular initiative to begin the 
process of amending133 the Constitution. Cord collected what it claimed were well 
over one million signatures, as required by the constitution. Cord then submitted 
these to IEBC for verification. 
                                            
132 ODM did some introspection, increasingly coming to the conclusion that rigging allegations a side, it had 
not done a good job of marketing itself, see, especially Kiplang’at (2014: 1 and 8). 
133 Article 257, (1) and (4) states that a popular initiative to amend the constitution needs at least one million 
signatures; these are then to be presented to the IEBC for verification. Subsection (5) further states that if 
“IEBC is satisfied with the signatures it is then to submit these to County Assemblies for consideration; this is 
to happen within three months of IEBC’s receipt of a draft bill vouching for the proposed amendment”. 
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However, the electoral body declared the initiative to have failed. IEBC’s action 
came just two days after the deadline and following complaints by Cord leaders 
that the electoral body took too long to verify the signatures. Cord had wanted 
Kenyans “to vote on whether they wanted funding to counties to increase from 15 
per cent to 45 per cent of the total audited and approved national revenue; security 
to be devolved to counties and the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) 
entrenched in the constitution among other issues” (Shimoli, Daily Nation, 23rd 
March 2016: 5). 
IEBC claimed that after perusing the signatures it had found that “741,979 of the 
1,633,577 submitted had failed to meet the threshold, leaving only 891,598 of the 
signatures to be valid” (ibid). Cord denounced the decision as the clearest 
evidence yet that IEBC was working with government to undermine democracy 
(Mubatuk, The Standard, 5th June 2016: 9). In this regard, others cautioned that 
the focus on IEBC not obscure the larger point that Cord and others were making, 
albeit clumsily.  Namely, the need for genuine reforms before the 2017 elections 
(Kegoro, Daily Nation, 12th June 2016: 37). 
The two sides did therefore abandon their respective positions and launch 
preparatory inter-party talks over IEBC reform. Both sides would then name their 
respective representatives—from the National Assembly and the Senate134. 
Interestingly, though, and consistent with the president’s Team’s posture that the 
talks unfold via a parliamentary mechanism, the National Assembly’s Justice and 
Legal Affairs Committee had been busy, also holding public hearings on whether 
IEBC Commissioners should be forced out of office. This followed a petition135 to 
the committee by a citizen, alleging that IEBC officials had committed a number of 
egregious transgressions inimical to the tenets and spirit of the constitution. 
The parallel sittings by the parliamentary committee did, however, draw a lot of 
criticism. Critics cast them as a diabolical plot hatched solely to divert attention 
from the need for essential reforms. Cord and other ‘pro-IEBC reform’ groups did 
                                            
134 Article 124(2) of the Constitution states: “Parliament may establish joint committees consisting of 
members of both Houses and may jointly regulate the procedure of those committees”. 
135 Article 119(1) of the Constitution declares: “Every person has a right to petition parliament to consider 
any matter within its authority, including enacting, amending or repealing any legislation”. 
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therefore call for the immediate abandonment of the parliamentary effort; if not, 
they would resume public demonstrations. This would see the parliamentary 
committee terminate its ‘investigation’, having found, perhaps in a face saving 
gesture, that the allegations lacked merit. This development shifted the focus back 
to the joint parliamentary initiative. 
After some posturing, the team brokered a deal that allowed IEBC commissioners 
to vacate office before the expiry of their terms. This was in return for payment136 
of the balance of their dues up to when they would have left office in 2017 (Mukinda 
and Ngirachu, Daily Nation 24th June 2016: 4). The join committee remained 
deadlocked on other aspects, such as whether the next team of IEBC 
commissioners would serve on a fulltime or part time basis, for instance. New IEBC 
commissioners have since taken office and the country is already in election mode 
for the August 2017 elections, again pitting the Uhuru-Ruto team against the 
Odinga-Musyoka ticket. 
 
7.3 The ICC issue 
 
With the demise of the cold war and the onset of intra-state conflicts, the previously 
reactive approach to peace maintenance began to find strong theoretical anchors, 
first captured in then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda 
for Peace (Ryan 2000). Because of this enhanced understanding, now conflict has 
increasingly come to be seen as progressing through different phases; these 
require distinct resolution tools (Lederach 2007). In the immediate after-math of 
the Cold War this new understanding called for conflict prevention and 
management under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Ryan 2000). 
However, when faced with ever escalating crises, the international community 
sought to recalibrate its approach and tactics. The shift led to major changes in 
international legal norms (Schabas 2001: 604). This shift entailed a new focus on 
                                            
136 Most Kenyans expressed relief at the resolution of the IEBC issue had finally been resolved; others viewed 
the part about payment of outstanding dues askance, equating it with rewarding wrongdoing. 
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curbing wanton violations of humanitarian law and rights. This meant, in practice, 
a de-emphasis of state sovereignty concerns in international affairs. The shift now 
had a new conception of state sovereignty as a responsibility; that is, state 
sovereignty as conditional upon a state’s treatment of its own citizens. This led to 
the enunciation of a new principle: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P); the notion 
that working collectively the international community had the right to intervene in 
the internal affairs of sovereign states in order to protect victims of state 
oppression. 
This initially led to the creation of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, such as 
those created to deal with crimes against humanity committed in the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, among other post-cold war global hotspots. However, with 
ever escalating conflicts and rights violations in the post-Cold War era, human 
rights campaigners and others increasingly called for a more robust response. 
These efforts would culminate in the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in 1998.The Rome statutes of the ICC state that the prosecutor can 
decline to proceed with a case when submitted by a state party or the UNSC, 
“when [t]aking into account the gravity of the crimes and the interests of the victims, 
there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would 
not serve the interests of justice” (602). Equally, the statutes allow the court itself 
to decline jurisdiction in matters that are “not of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action” (ibid). 
As previously intimated, the ICC became a key campaign issue in the 2013 
elections, with the Kenyatta-Ruto team and supporters positing the case as a neo-
colonial attempt to impose leaders on Kenyans. 
Following his electoral victory, Kenyatta’s first agenda item on the ICC issue was 
to try and have the cases referred back to the Pre-Trial Chamber for 
reconsideration. Kenyatta insisted, contrary to the Prosecutor’s stated 
determination to proceed with the case to trial, that confirmation of the case against 
him by the Pre-Trial Chamber was a mistake. He in particular took issue with the 
fact that the prosecution had failed to take note of an acknowledgement by a 
number of its key witnesses that they had provided false testimony. The Kenyatta 
defense team explained, for example, that the ICC Prosecutor had “recently 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
174 
 
admitted that witness number 4, who linked Uhuru and Muthaura to the infamous 
State House meeting lied,” even if she, the Prosecutor, maintained that the case 
proceed (Olick, The Standard 13th March 2015: 13). However, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber rebuffed the request; it then ordered the duo to appear in person before 
the Court to enter a plea. 
Both the Kenyatta administration and the AU responded with uncharacteristic fury.  
They launched a determined bid to scuttle the ICC process. This would see them 
threaten a mass withdrawal by African states from the ICC as well as attempt to 
enlist the support of two of the five permanent members of the UNSC, China and 
Russia. The AU even requested for an opportunity for continental institutions to 
handle the case, insisting that this stance comported perfectly with ICC’s founding 
statutes. Those statutes envision the Court as complementary to local/domestic/ 
mechanisms, and not as a substitute. 
The pleas fell on deaf ears, however, with critics casting the overture as 
disingenuous, merely a clever ploy to defeat the ends of justice. This would see 
Ruto and Kenyatta become the first incumbent leaders to appear before the court 
in person. The Court then issued tough conditions, such as non-interference with 
potential witnesses that the duo would have to meet to remain free; any deviation 
from these would lead to automatic arrest and detention in The Hague. 
However, once the cases commenced the prosecution was forced to progressively 
withdraw charges against suspects citing lack of sufficient evidence. The 
prosecution first withdrew its case against Muthaura and Major-General Ali; it then 
followed with that of Henry Kosgey. These developments left only three of the six 
suspects, Kenyatta, Ruto and Sang, with cases pending.  
Sensing a shift in momentum, Kenyatta and the AU intensified their campaign for 
the dismissal of the case against the president. Incidentally, the strategy proved a 
success: the ICC prosecutor eventually terminated the case against Kenyatta. The 
prosecution accused Kenyatta of interfering with key witnesses, citing bribery and 
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intimidation as the tactics that Kenyatta had deployed to defeat137 the ends of 
justice. The prosecution claimed that as a result of this development, it lacked 
sufficient evidence to sustain the case against Kenyatta. This development left only 
two of the suspects, Ruto and Sang, with cases pending (Menya, Daily Nation 13th 
September 2015: 10). 
The Court committed138 Ruto and Sang to trial to face charges related to crimes 
against humanity issuing from the 2007-2008 post-election violence. The court 
permitted the prosecution to use “prior recorded testimony of five witnesses who 
ha[d] since recanted their written statements and transcripts of their interviews with 
prosecutors” (Muthoni, Daily Nation 11th September 2015: 1). ICC trial judges 
stated: “‘Trial Chamber V (A) grants the prosecution’s request to use into evidence 
the prior recorded testimony of a number of witnesses pursuant to Rule 68(2) (c) 
& (d) of the Rules of Procedure & Evidence, without prejudice to the weight, if any, 
which will be attached to them in the Chamber’s weighing of the evidence’” (Musau, 
The Standard 20th August 2015: 2). 
However, emboldened by Kenyatta’s acquittal, the Jubilee administration sought 
to pressure the ICC to drop the charges pending against Ruto and Sang. This 
would see the government actively champion what became known as “Prayer 
Meetings”—but actually political mobilization intended to pressure the ICC—for the 
acquittal of Ruto and Sang (Tanui, 11th September 2015: 13). Held across the 
country and denounced both locally and internationally as a blatant attempt to 
blackmail the ICC, the ‘prayer meetings’ did, however, have President Kenyatta’s 
full support. The president offered: 
As Kenyans, we should continue praying for Ruto. A judge cannot tell 
us that we cannot pray. As Kenyans, we should not accept to be divided 
or made to fight. We understand the value of our unity. We are the only 
ones who can resolve our issues. (Jamnah, The Standard, 21st October 
2015: 1 and 4) 
                                            
137 Kenyatta maintained—contrary to the prosecution’s claim—that he and Ruto had in fact co-operated with 
the ICC, citing as proof their submission to the ICC process, consult, among others By Standard Reporter and 
PSCU, The Standard (2015: 4). 
138 The Trial Chamber used the occasion to issue arrest warrants targeting mostly close allies of Ruto’s and 
Sang’s, seen as engaged in witnessing tampering, Consult, for instance, Kajilwa (2015: 2). 
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In early 2015 ICC judges granted Ruto the chance to appeal against use of 
previously recorded testimony of witnesses who had since recanted139. In addition, 
the defence questioned, “the amendment to Rule 68 of the rules of Procedure and 
Evidence that allowed use of prior recorded testimony” (Muthoni, Daily Nation 11th 
September 2015: 2), arguing that applying the rule would amount to a retroactive 
application of the law. Kenya and the AU also vigorously contested the Trial 
Chamber’s ruling, insisting that applying amended rule 68 violated an earlier 
pledge by the ICC to the Assembly of State Parties in 2015, when amending the 
Rule against its retroactive application in the Kenyan cases (Makana, The 
Standard 21st October 2015: 10). The AU maintained that use of Rule 68 would 
negate the purposes for Amended Rule 68—namely, to speed up some trials in 
some instances. 
These concerns would see the African Union Commission (AUC) move to be 
enjoined in the case as an amicus curae (a friend of the court). The AUC contended 
that when the bearers of the testimony in question appeared before the court, 
consistent with jurisprudential principles of orality and cross-examination, the 
prosecution was not satisfied with the ensuing encounter; hence, the attempt to 
use recanted evidence. Kenya, for is part, continued its bid to have the cases 
referred back to Kenyan institutions. The government planned, as part of this effort, 
to win the support of ICC delegates at the Assembly of State Parties at The Hague 
in 2015 (Nyamori, The Standard 22nd November 2015: 9). Kenya had successfully 
lobbied “during the 12 session of ASP held in 2013, for the change in Rule 34” to 
allow Kenyatta and Ruto be tried in absentia at The Hague. The push to have Rule 
68 suspended saw a major division emerge among African states, with those from 
the West, supported by civil society and opposition forces, against the bid, “arguing 
that the government was not in pursuit of justice but to protect the Deputy 
President” (ibid). 
After concerted efforts by both the Kenya government and civil society to influence 
ASP on the use of recanted evidence, in late 2015 the ASP—the legislative arm of 
ICC--issued a statement to the effect that “ASP reaffirms its understanding that the 
amended Rule 68 shall not apply retroactively” (Wanzala, Daily Nation 28th 
                                            
139 On witnesses who had recanted their prior evidence against Ruto, see, among others Munuhe (2014). 
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November 2015: 19). The ASP statement received varied reviews. The Kenya 
government hailed the announcement as a victory for its stance, with one key 
government figure enthusing, “after a protracted 10-day legal, political and 
diplomatic struggle by Kenya, the 14th ASP of the ICC has adopted our agenda” 
(Musau 2015: 19). 
However, civil society and associated groups, begged to disagree, offering “[t]he 
fact is that the ASP declined Kenya’s request. Only judges can interpret Rule 68” 
(ibid).  
On the 13 of February 2016, ICC Appeals judges, in a unanimous decision “ruled 
that the Trial Chamber had erred in allowing Ms Bensouda to rely on out-of-court 
statements of witnesses who either recanted them or refused to take the stand to 
testify” (Menya, Daily Nation, 14th February 2016: 4). In its ruling, the Appeals 
Chamber found that Rule 68 had been applied retroactively in the Ruto /Sang case, 
offering that this had “resulted in additional exceptions to the principle that 
evidence shall be given orally and was a restriction on the right to cross-examine 
those witnesses” (Kegoro, Daily Nation, 14th February 2016: 5). The Appeals 
Chamber observed that the retroactive application of amended Rule 68 had led to 
the admission of evidence, not previously admissible in that forum under former 
rule 68 of the Rules of article 69 (2) and (4) of the statute which could be used 
“against the accused in an Article 74 decision” (Menya, Daily Nation, 14th February 
2016: 4). The judges cautioned that such an approach ran counter to some of the 
major requirements of the Rome Statute, “such as the requirement for open case 
hearing in court” (Kegoro, Daily Nation, 14th February 2016: 5). 
Following the Appeal Chamber’s ruling, Ruto’s defence team moved to file a 
motion for termination of the case against their client. In his submission to ICC 
judges for acquittal in 2015, Ruto maintained that the prosecution had failed to 
prove its case against him, and “instead blamed the ‘Mt Kenya mafia’ for the 
2007/2008 post-election violence” (Namunene, The Daily Nation, 28th October 
2015: 9). Thus, to the prosecution’s claim that Ruto and allies had orchestrated the 
violence, Ruto’s defence team retorted that "the violence was ‘spontaneous’ and 
in ‘isolated’ attacks following a perception by many Kenyans that the election 
results were rigged in favour of President Mwai Kibaki of PNU” (ibid). Thus, 
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contrary to prosecution attempts to place Ruto at the centre of the violence, the 
defence maintained that “it was the combination of several factors unconnected to 
Mr Ruto, which raised tensions about rigging and contributed to the outbreak of 
violence” (ibid), citing both domestic and foreign election monitors and observers 
who adjudged the elections flawed and thus the spring well of post-election 
violence. 
On 5th April 2016 the ICC Court declared a mistrial and acquitted Ruto and Sang. 
With the other four suspects already acquitted for lack of evidence, the acquittal of 
the two brought to an end Kenya’s post-election violence cases at The Hague 
(Opanga, Daily Nation 10th April 2016: 34). That the Kenyan cases collapsed 
should not have come as a surprise. From the outset, supporters of a local judicial 
mechanism had repeatedly cautioned against putting too much stock in the ICC 
process (Chiloba, The Standard 8th February 2009). 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Judicial reforms 
 
7.4.1 Introduction 
Societal revitalization; specifically, the establishment of a functioning and impartial 
law enforcement and criminal justice system, has emerged as one of the major 
elements in the democratization literature. For example, scholars posit that in such 
volatile environments it is imperative to have an independent legal system, to serve 
as a forum for the resolution of a number of issues that could otherwise turn into 
major sites for on-going instability. However, the pre-existing law enforcement 
agencies are, for one reason or another, likely to be discredited. Alive to this reality, 
the “training and cleansing of the law enforcement and criminal justice systems 
need to begin promptly” (Kritz 2005: 806).  Specifically, to restore trust in these 
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vital organs, it becomes essential to quickly launch a judicial system that is above 
“corruption and intimidation by criminal elements, police forces need to be 
supported and individual officers must be held accountable for violations of the rule 
of law” (Kritz 2005: 801). 
The foregoing provides the context for comprehending inclusion of judicial reforms 
in Agenda number four. Cognisant of the need to address the permissive factors 
that propelled the conflict, and thus lay the proscenium for long term stability and 
prosperity, Agenda Number Four Reforms on the judicial front sought to achieve: 
financial independence; a transparent and merit-based appointive system; 
discipline and removal of judges; respect for human rights and gender equity; 
formation of an impartial and inclusive JSC; the enactment of a Judicial service 
Act—calling for peer review mechanisms; performance contracts; streamlining the 
functioning of judicial and legal institutions (Review Report, Annex 3, South 
Consulting, 2012).  
On the Judicial reforms front, consistent with new constitutional dictates, the 
Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board (JMVB)—one of the institutions created 
following the enactment of the new constitution—vetted all sitting judges, offering 
the public the opportunity to provide evidence that would help the board in its 
vetting process; the process led to removal from office of a number of sitting 
judges. However the affected judges had the right of appeal140, initially to the same 
board for a review of its decision. However, when they appealed to the board and 
then lost, some of them proceeded to challenge the board’s decision in court141. 
Once the dust had settled, the reinvigorated judiciary then got down to work. 
Generally, the courts now operated with a high level of independence. The High 
Court took a particularly tough stance against the government on several 
                                            
140 The board initially contended that Article 262 of the Constitution, on transitional and consequential 
provisions, the Sixth Schedule, Article 23(1) which mandates parliament to create systems “for vetting… the 
suitability of all judges and magistrates [already in office] to continue to serve”; and subsection (2), which 
reads: any decision to remove someone from office based on the operation of “subsection (1) shall not be 
subject to question in, or review by, any court”, immunized its operations against such legal action. 
141 The High Court citing Article 165(6), which gives it supervisory authority “over subordinate courts and 
over any person, body or authority exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function,” ruled that JMVB’s actions 
were subject to judicial review. The ruling would see a number of aggrieved judges seek legal redress; while 
most failed in the ensuing legal drama; quite a few managed to get their jobs back. 
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occasions. That court has in particular repeatedly struck down as unconstitutional 
a number of pieces of legislation designed to recreate the imperial presidency that 
the new constitution sough to tame. It struck down as unconstitutional in early 2016 
a law that would have compelled the JSC, in naming candidates for appointment 
to the bench, to submit three names to the president. The president would have 
then had to select one person from the list, and then forward the name onto the 
legislature for either approval or rejection (Wanga, Sunday Nation, 22nd May 2016: 
18). 
That law ran counter to the provisions of the New Constitution on the selection of 
judges. Those provisions vest such power solely with the JSC142. What this means 
in practice is that once the JSC has conducted public interviews/hearings for a 
judicial opening, it is then to select one individual and forward his or her name to 
the President for appointment. The President has no power, in this process, to 
reject the JSC’s selection; rather, he formally forwards the name to the legislature 
which can then either approve or reject the selection. If the legislature approves 
the nominee, then the president moves to formally appoint him or her to the 
respective position. If, however, the legislature rejects the nominee, then the 
process commences a fresh, with the JSC re-advertising the position in question. 
These stringent requirements aimed to restore the independence of the judiciary, 
compromised over the years. Those manipulations had, as previously discussed, 
reduced the JSC to an empty shell, with the president now solely in charge of 
appointing, and in the late 1980s removal, of judicial officers. In any event, 
cognizant of the attempt by the executive to resume its historic control of the 
judiciary, concerned groups moved to court, and Judge Isaac Leonala143 of the 
High Court issued an injunction stopping implementation of the new rule. 
The High Court subsequently declared the change unconstitutional (ibid). Given 
the country’s recent history, judge Leonala—and the High Court in general—rightly 
viewed any attempt to give the president any substantive say in the selection of 
                                            
142 Article 172(a) of the constitution states: the JSC shall “recommend to the President persons for 
appointment as judges”. 
143 He has since moved to the Supreme Court; he won one of three seats that became vacant on the Supreme 
Court—as discussed below. In fact, he is touted as a future CJ. 
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judges as a furtive attempt to subvert the judiciary‘s new found independence144 
by yet again making it a mere arm of the executive branch. Indeed, it is precisely 
because of this newly found “independence of the judiciary that today the political 
class tries to care about the legality of their actions and decisions” (Mungai, Daily 
Nation, 16th June 2016: 9). 
Still, Kenya’s refurbished judiciary has had its fair share of scandals and 
controversies. In early 2016, there surfaced bribery allegations against Supreme 
Court Justice Philip Tunoi. Justice Tunoi was accused of having received a kshs 
200 million bribe145 to rule in favour of Nairobi City County Governor Evans Kidero 
in an election petition filed by his challenger—and loser—in the 2013 elections, Mr 
Ferdinand Waititu. The governor sought to rubbish the claims, insisting that they 
originated with Senior Counsel Ahmednasir Abdulahi, who he accused of a 
vendetta stemming from Kidero’s refusal to hire him as his counsel in the case 
(Ogemba, Daily Nation 3rd February 2016: 6). Pleading his innocence, Justice 
Tunoi, on his part, claimed that the same forces at play had worked assiduously to 
defeat his nomination to the Supreme Court (Menya, Daily Nation, 16th June 2016: 
9). 
The JSC, bowing to immense public pressure, moved to appoint a 6-member 
committee to investigate the allegations levelled against Justice Tunoi. The 
ensuing investigation prompted the team to recommend146 to the President to 
suspend Justice Tunoi, to pave way for investigations by a tribunal appointed by 
the president. Although the president initially hesitated, he nevertheless came 
under immense pressure to act as required by JSC; he subsequently suspended 
justice Tunoi and appointed a tribunal to investigate the allegations. 
Established in late February (Karanja, Daily Nation 28th June 2016: 8), the tribunal 
concluded its work in June 2016 without giving a verdict on the accusations against 
                                            
144 On the independence of the Judiciary, Article 160(1) of the Constitution clearly proclaims: “The exercise 
of judicial authority… shall be subject only to this Constitution and the law and shall not be subject to the 
control or direction of any person or authority.” 
145 Others trace these corruption scandals to the larger Kenyan national culture, a culture which they contend 
tends to glorify rather than vilify corruption. See, for instance Abdullahi (2016: 6). 
146 Article 168(5)(b)(i) of the Constitution states that after receiving a recommendation from the JSC for the 
suspension of a judge “The President shall, within fourteen days… suspend the judge from office” pending 
an investigation by a tribunal. 
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Tunoi. This followed a decision by the majority of the five eligible Supreme Court 
justices—I discuss this presently—not to review an earlier ruling by the Court of 
Appeal—upholding an earlier ruling by the High Court—that 70 years was the 
retirement age for judges. The ruling was, incidentally, in a case filed by Deputy 
Chief Justice Kalpana Rawal and Justice Tunoi contesting the 70-year retirement 
requirement. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the team appointed to 
investigate Justice Tunoi came to the conclusion that “there was no legal mandate 
for the tribunal to investigate a retired judge” (ibid). 
Kenyans witnessed a major national spectacle in 2016. This stemmed from a case 
whereby two Supreme Court justices, Deputy Chief Justice Kalpana Rawal and 
colleague Philip Tunoi, sought to contest their retirement age after attaining the 
constitutionally-mandated 70 years. The duo contended that as judges originally 
appointed under the old constitution—the document had 74 years as the retirement 
age for judges—the 70 year rule did not apply to them147. Pleading a breach of 
their fundamental148 rights as enshrined in the Bill of Rights, the two subsequently 
petitioned the High Court for a constitutional interpretation149. 
Pursuant to this mandate, “on December 11, 2015… a five-bench panel of the High 
Court determined that the retirement age of judges was 70 as set out in the 
Constitution [and not 74 as claimed by some of its members]” (Imanyara, Daily 
Nation, 8th July 2016: 10). The High Court observed in its ruling that the issue of 
the old constitution had become a moot point once the country adopted a new 
document in 2010 and then the two judges took a new oath of office under it.  
Not satisfied with the High Court’s ruling, however, the two then lodged an appeal 
with the Court of Appeal150. The Court of Appeal in its preliminary ruling granted 
the two justices stay orders pending determination of their case. In a unanimous 
                                            
147 Four Supreme Court justices first made their anti-70 -year retirement sentiment public in an unrelated 
matter in late 2015. See, for instance Ndurya (2015: 8). 
148 Article 22(1) of the Constitution states: “[E]very person has the right to institute court proceedings 
claiming a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated or infringed, or is 
threatened,” 
149 Article 165 of the Constitution vests the High Court with original jurisdiction with regard to the 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
150 Article 164(3) (a) of the Constitution states: “The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear appeals from 
the High Court”. 
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ruling by a seven bench-judge, on 27th May 2016 The Court of Appeal upheld the 
High Court’s ruling. Still unconvinced, the two sought to take their case151 to the 
highest court in the land—the Supreme Court, the very institution in which they 
served152.  
No sooner had the Court of Appeal rendered its unanimous decision affirming the 
High Court’s finding than the two moved and had one of their colleagues, Justice 
Njoki Ndung’u—grant a stay of the Court of Appeal’s ruling—pending hearing by 
the Supreme Court. Justice Ndung’u then went ahead and fixed the date for the 
hearing for a later date—a time when the chief Justice Willy Mutunga was to have 
left the court. He retired almost a week later. One of the litigants, Justice Rawal, 
as the deputy CJ, would have become the CJ, albeit in an acting capacity. 
However, using his administrative power over the judiciary, the CJ moved with 
haste to reverse Justice Ndung’us ruling, and reschedule the hearing before the 
Supreme Court to occur just two days before his retirement.  
In the subsequent ruling, “a majority verdict of three Supreme Court judges out of 
five, on Tuesday [14th June 2016] declined to hear their appeals, arguing that they 
did not want to be perceived to be biased having made public their positions 
regarding the retirement age”153 (Ochieng et al, Daily Nation, 16th June 2016: 70). 
Interestingly, the other two members of the court, Justices Ndung’u and Ojwang, 
perceived to be in favour of the litigants, and also suspected to have been receiving 
their marching orders on this front from the executive, boycotted the session. In 
any event, the three justices also allowed the Court of Appeal’s verdict to remain 
in force until “another bench is constituted to hear the appeals” (idem), although 
their other two colleagues, “Njoki Ndung’u and Jackton Ojwang’ said they were 
ready to hear the appeal” (ibid). 
                                            
151 Article 163(3) (b) (1) of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to hear and 
determine appeals from the Court of Appeal. 
152 Reportedly, when CJ Mutunga got wind of his two colleagues’ plan, he cautioned them that, given that 
they served on the Supreme Court, the public would perceive such a case being handled by this same 
institution as self-serving. They then reportedly struck a deal to the effect that the two would abide by 
whatever decision the Court of Appeal delivered. 
153 The court has seven members but because two of them were the litigants in the case, conflict of interest 
automatically disqualified them from participating. 
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Following the ruling, the two contesting judges—Rawal and Tunoi—“applied to 
suspend the Supreme Court’s judgement but the CJ directed them to appear in 
court [the following day] for direction” (Ochieng et al, Daily Nation, 16th June 2016: 
70). The majority three subsequently rejected their two beleaguered colleagues’ 
prayers—thereby ending Rawal’s and Tunoi’s careers on the bench. To most 
observers, by this action the court thereby appeared to “technically clear the way 
for the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to start the process of replacing the two 
judges who had reached the retirement age but who were kept on pending their 
appeal” (Editorial, Daily Nation, 16th June 2016: 14). The rejoicing in the wake of 
the ruling proved premature, however. When the JSC sought to publish the two 
vacancies in the Kenya gazette, the Government Printer initially refused to do so 
(Kiai, The Sunday Nation, 25th June 2016). 
The retirement controversy was really a sub-plot in a much bigger contest: the 
struggle over the future control and direction of the judiciary. That struggle over the 
future of the judiciary also had as one of its other major—the major—target the 
office of Chief Justice. Chief Justice Mutunga had elected to retire one year ahead 
of his official retirement date. The CJ argued that his decision was informed by a 
desire to afford the country ample time to have another judiciary head in place well 
ahead of the 2017 elections154.  
Pro-status quo forces both in and outside the judiciary perceived Mutunga’s 
impending departure—given his reformist track record—as a fine moment to fight 
“to ensure that the next CJ was not an activist but a conservative pro-establishment 
figure who could be trusted not to rock the boat” (Imanyara, Daily Nation, 8th July 
2016: 10)155. This is the group that was really behind the retirement controversy. 
The group planned to install a judiciary “insider” as the next Chief Justice (Sunday 
Nation Reporter, Sunday Nation 24th July 2016: 4). 
                                            
154 Article 171 of the Constitution vests the Supreme Court, of which the CJ is the President, with original 
jurisdiction in presidential election petitions. 
155 It would later emerge that before leaving office Mutunga had send a secret memo to JSC on this matter. 
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They hoped to stage what amounted to a coup156 within the judiciary (Kiai, The 
Sunday Nation, 25th June 2016). The group planned to ask Kenyatta to circumvent 
or usurp JSC’s powers and name one of their allies—Justice Ojwang—acting Chief 
Justice—just before JSC could publish the existence of any vacancy in the 
Judiciary. However, following warnings that the president did not have the authority 
to appoint a chief Justice and after being briefed, Kenyatta, who was abroad at the 
time, rejected the conservatives’ proposition, thereby opening the door for 
publication by JSC in the Kenya Gazette of vacancies in the judiciary (Imanyara, 
Daily Nation, 8th July 2016: 10). 
Why the great focus on CJ’s replacement—and by extension the Supreme Court? 
Because the stakes are so high; for, “[j]ust as the 2013 [presidential] race ended 
up in the Supreme Court after Cord candidate Raila Odinga contested… Uhuru 
Kenyatta’s victory, whoever assumes [that] office may preside over such a petition 
next year” (Wanga, Sunday Nation, 22nd May 2016: 18). 
 
7.5 The war on terrorism 
Kenya’s position in international security has historically been pro-West (Leys 
1974). Following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the United Sates, 
Washington moved with alacrity to designate Kenya “‘an anchor state in the Horn 
of Africa’, and a ‘frontline in the Global War On Terror’ GWOT” (Mogire et al 2011: 
437). Kenya has therefore emerged as a crucial player in counter-terrorism efforts 
in East Africa and the horn of Africa more generally. 
Kenya first came under terrorist threat in the late 1990s, following twin terrorist 
attacks on US embassies in Dar es Salam and Nairobi. Since then Kenya has 
remained under constant terrorist threat (Jude et al 2009: 336). In addition, events 
in neighbouring Somalia, especially the emergence of a radical Islamist regime 
there—and then the decision by both Ethiopia and the US to fight the “Islamic 
Courts Union” (ICU), which was briefly in charge of the southern part of that country 
                                            
156 Indeed, even as the conservative forces within the judiciary had been laying stratagems to subvert an 
adverse ruling by the Court of Appeal, their allies within the executive and the legislature had also remained 
busy laying plans of their own. 
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“has drawn Kenya deeper into the prosecution of the War on Terror” (ibid). 
Specifically, in light of the perceived terrorist threats, “since 2002, diplomatic 
missions in Nairobi representing leading Western donors have pressured the 
Kenyan government to adopt controversial new counter-terrorism legislation” 
(343), thereby demonstrating: 
The strategic use of aid in achieving the political objectives of the War 
On Terror… Generally, the leverage of aid has shifted away from 
previous priorities of good governance and human rights, although these 
issues acquired new prominence as part of processes of political reform 
and national reconciliation following the disputed results of the 
December 2007 election and its aftermath. (Lind et al 2010: 336) 
Kenyan officials contend that their country’s proximity to Somalia exposes it to Al 
Shabaab terrorist activity (Mogire et al 2011). This would see Kenya, with external 
assistance, create a number of security and intelligence related institutions during 
both the NARC and grand coalition administrations. In particular: 
Foreign security assistance and training aid were pivotal to the 
establishment of many post 9/11 counter-terrorism structures in Kenya. 
These feature new and greater levels of cooperation with foreign 
security and intelligence agencies, some, by way of extra-judicial 
practices and institutions. Kenya was one of only five states to receive 
special training through the US government’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
Program in the 2005 budget, which included support for establishing a 
National Security and Intelligence Services Agency (NSIS). Other 
measures have included the establishment of a joint Terrorism Task 
Force in 2003 and the National Security Advisory Committee. The US 
government has also funded the establishment in Kenya of a National 
Counter-Terrorism Centre that notionally sits within the NSIS, but is 
rumoured to be under direct operational guidance of Washington. 
Muslims continue to endure police abuses—including the involvement 
of foreign security and intelligence personnel; in particular, Kenya has 
been accused of being involved in the regional rendition of suspects as 
part of the War on Terror. (Lind et al 2009: 341) 
Kenya’s counter-terrorism strategy also focused on ‘stabilising’ Somalia. When on 
a visit to the US then president Kibaki intoned: “‘Stabilising Somalia is essential in 
sustaining the war against terrorism’” (Etats-Unis 2003: 1257 qtd in Mogire et al 
2011: 483), with his counterpart and host, then-US Chief George W. Bush 
concurring, “the establishment of an effective representative government in 
Somalia will help stabilise the region and dispel the hopelessness that feeds 
terrorism” (ibid). As part of its attempt to ‘stabilise’ Somalia, the Kenya government 
took some measures that invited global condemnation; for example: 
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In recent months, Kenya has come under criticism from the United 
Nations and human rights groups for barring additional Somali refugees. 
The government of Kenya handed over more than 40 Somalis to the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Ethiopian 
government. Human rights groups are concerned that some of these 
individuals would be tortured or killed. In addition, Kenyan Muslim 
leaders accuse the Kibaki government of handing over Kenya Muslims 
to Ethiopian and Somali security services. (Lind et al 2009: 10-11) 
Kenya capped its involvement in Somalia with military invasion of that country in 
2011—the first time Kenya has taken such a step since independence. 
Codenamed Operation Linda Nchi, the incursion into Somalia commenced in late 
2011 purportedly in pursuit of Al Shabaab terrorists who had launched a number 
of deadly attacks on Kenyan soil. The immediate trigger, though, was the seizure 
of tourists at the Coast in late 2011, by gunmen suspected to have links to terrorist 
groups. The attack on tourists coupled with other previous such incidents by 
militant groups prompted the Kenya government to deploy its troops in Somalia, 
fearful that inaction would embolden terror groups and thus pose a grave danger 
to the country’s vital interests. Kenyan forces, over 3000 strong, integrated into the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in early 2012. The Kenyatta 
administration has continued Kenya’s involvement in Somalia and the War on 
Terrorism more generally. 
Increasing voices have, however, begun to question the rationale behind the 
country’s continuing involvement in Somalia. Critics cite both the materiel and 
human costs that the war effort has exacted on the country, the fact, for example, 
that the government has had—at least prior to the integration of Kenyan forces into 
AMISOM—to divert scarce national resources into the war effort—as against the 
outcome. To add to the economic pain, contend the critics, the war has seen 
families lose young soldiers who, in most instances, served as sole breadwinners 
for their families. Domestic critics have therefore called on the Kenyatta 
administration to enunciate a clear exit strategy from Somalia. Opposition leader, 
Raila Odinga, encapsulated the critics’ position: 
We want the Government to define and limit Kenya’s military objectives 
in Somalia and to make sure that the war on terror is not fought on 
Kenya’s territory and to ensure that our engagement in Somalia is time-
bound and does not mutate into a military occupation. (Mbaka, The 
Sunday Standard, 22nd June 2014) 
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However, insisting that Kenyan troops are in Somalia as part of AMISOM, Kenyatta 
and administration supporters have maintained that the troops will not leave 
Somalia before accomplishing the mission that took them there—defeating Al 
Shabaab and the erection of a stable government. The president’s spokesperson, 
Manoah Esipisu, put it sentensiously: “we have a clear objective. That objective 
will be met. And when that objective is met, we will have that discussion of thinking 
about withdrawal” (Mbaka, The Sunday Standard, 22nd June, 2014: 8). 
These critical voices come in the wake also of a number of recent terrorist activities 
within Kenya and against Kenyan interests elsewhere. Thus on the security 
situation, the country has remained under constant terrorist pressure (Angira, Daily 
Nation, 12th July 2016: 12). First—and here I merely touch upon the major 
attacks—in 2013 terrorists launched a daring attack on Westgate Mall in the 
suburbs of Nairobi. The attack—actually the siege—lasted several days and when 
it was over it left many dead and also inflicted heavy economic losses. Al Shabaab 
claimed responsibility for the attack and said that it had done so in revenge for 
Kenya’s invasion of Somalia as well as Nairobi’s continued cooperation with the 
United States and Israel in the war on terrorism. Owned by Israelis, Westgate mall 
is usually patronized by affluent Kenyans as well expatriates—mostly west 
Europeans and Americans—resident in Nairobi and its environs. 
Similarly, in early 2015 Kenyans came face to face with yet another deadly terrorist 
attack, with Garissa University College as the main target. On 2nd April 2015, in the 
early morning hours Al Shabaab fighters and sympathizers infiltrated and killed a 
total of 148 people at Garissa University College in Northern Kenya, with 142 of 
the dead being students and the remaining 6 security officials (Muasya, Standard 
on Sunday, 3rd April 2016: 11). 
Then in January 2016 Kenyan forces157 in Somalia became the target. Although 
the government has never seen it fit to release the full details of what transpired, 
the little information that there is in the public domain shows that Al Shabaab 
fighters surrounded and then discomfited Kenyan forces at El Adde. It would 
                                            
157 This is not terrorism; under international law, Kenyan forces have become a legitimate target for attack 
by Al Shabaab, given that they are actively involved in hostilities against the group. 
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appear, based on the sketchy information available, that Kenyan forces lost an 
entire company—perhaps one-hundred and eighty to two-hundred men in this 
episode, representing the worst military defeat since Kenya attained independence 
in 1963. 
As part of the increased terrorist activity within Kenya, in mid-July 2016, for 
example, “security forces fought off Al Shabaab terrorists, who tried to storm the 
Managai Rapid Deployment Unit’s (RDU) camp in Lamu”; this was the third such 
attempt “on the camp [which houses administration police officers]” (Kaungu, Daily 
Nation, 15th July 2016: 5). 
Increased terrorist attacks on Kenyan targets have had two interesting results. As 
part of the determination to stay the course, the administration has adopted some 
of the policies that characterised its predecessor regarding suspected domestic Al 
Shabaab sympathizers158. Kenyan security forces working clandestinely with their 
foreign counterparts, but especially American and Israeli agents, continue with the 
previous administration’s policy of extra-judicial killing targeting Islamist radicals 
and anyone else who might fit the bill; this has seen a number of such 
assassinations take place across the country. 
In one such incident159, for example, police officers killed a young-man in Kwale in 
early June 2016, claiming that he was a terrorist suspect. However, rejecting this 
account, “several sources told the Standard on Sunday that the young-man was 
killed in a stationery tuk tuk at a bus stage… A police officer approached the tuk 
tuk, lifted the plastic back cover and shot him at point blank [range]” (Wesangula, 
Standard on Sunday, 5th June 2016: 8). In fact denying that her son was a terrorist, 
the victim’s mother explained that he had just recently moved to the city, having 
recently “finished secondary education in Malimuni Makueni… and later did driving 
and computer courses” (ibid). In their version, the police had claimed that “they 
were on patrol based on what has been happening in the area when they stopped 
                                            
158 The war on terrorism has at times appeared to take a particularly dangerous ethnic/regional turn. See, for 
instance Njangili (2015: 6). 
159 In another incident, and a variation on the theme, widows whose husbands had been extra-judicially killed 
on allegations of being Al Shabaab agents complained of being denied access to normal public services, such 
as national identification cards. See, Ahmed (2016: 29). 
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the tuk tuk that had three occupants with the driver who jumped out and one started 
running while shooting at the the[m]” (ibid).   
The policy has, however, invited continuing condemnation from human rights 
groups and other conscientious Kenyans. Critics argue that the government cannot 
flout the constitution in the name of fighting terrorism when in fact the document 
offers the best antidote to the problem. In this respect, they claim that it is tactics 
such as the ones being deployed by Kenya and its allies that could actually be 
worsening the security situation. They, for example, trace the rise of Al-Shabaab 
in Somalia to an impolitic move160 by the US and Ethiopia to militarily attack and 
unseat the putative Islamic Courts Union militia regime in 2006.  
Second, faced with increased attacks in Kenya the Kenyatta administration took 
the unprecedented decision to close Dadaab refugee camp. The government had 
ordered the camp’s closure161 by May 2017. Kenya has cited security as its main 
rationale for seeking to close down the refugee complex arguing that most, if not 
all, of the terrorist attacks inflicted on the country recently, including the September 
2013 Westgate Mall siege “have been planned and executed from Dadaab” 
(Kagwanja, Sunday Nation 22nd May 2016: 35). Founded in the early1990s as 
Somalis fled their then collapsing country following ouster of the Barre dictatorship 
(Kubania, Daily Nation 23rd June 2016: 9), Dadaab’s insecurity stems from its close 
proximity to Somalia: it is less than 100 kilometers away. Indeed, “there are 
whispers of Al Shabaab sleeper cells inside the camp, who lay dormant until such 
a time as they are called upon to host active fighters who have been deployed to 
wreak havoc within Kenya’s borders” (ibid). 
Why the obsession with the War on Terror, though? 
                                            
160 Even though the militia enjoyed wide spread support in Somalia because of its ability to restore law and 
order to Mogadishu—thereby opening the door for Al-Shabaab to rise and fill the power vacuum (Mogire et 
al 2011; Whitaker 2008). 
161 However, High Court Judge John Mativo issued a ruling in early 2017 nullifying the government’s decision 
to close the refugee camp, finding that the decision to repatriate refugees against their will violates the 
principle of non-refoulment as per the laws relating to status of refugees. For the full read, see, for example, 
Kakah et al (2017: 10). 
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7.5.1 Kenya’s pivotal role in the East African and Horn of Africa region 
That Kenya has emerged as a major theatre in the war on terrorism stems, in part, 
from the country’s pivotal162 role in the region. Not only is Kenya the major power 
in the region; “it has historically been pro-west, it is also the key regional economy, 
it is a key player in regional diplomacy” (Stevenson 2008: 12). In addition, “Nairobi 
is home to regional headquarters for embassies, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and the United Nations” (Burns 2009: 6). These factors make Kenya “the 
only regional power with the political capacity and moxie to step up to the 
diplomatic plate” (Stevenson 2008: 12).  
 
7.5.2 Kenya as the hinge of regional security, as well as a key player in APSA 
Kenya achieved independence in 1963 under a multiparty political system. 
Although it became a de facto one-party state shortly thereafter, it continued to 
conduct its election successfully every five years; this infused the regime with a 
modicum of legitimacy, thus creating stability in the country. This situation 
contrasted sharply with events elsewhere in the region. With the exception of 
Tanzania, most of Kenya’s neighbours endured high levels of political instability. 
Indeed, even under the calcified Moi regime, Kenya remained, at least to some, 
“the principle beacon of stability in a sea of weak states convulsed in civil wars and 
militarism” (Khadiagala 2009: 431).  
Kenya has traditionally served as the fulcrum of regional affairs (Bachmann 2012: 
130); being a key player in both the East African Community (EAC) and the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Kenya has previously served as 
a regional peacemaker in Sudan and Somalia. Acting through IGAD, for example, 
during this period Kenya oversaw negotiations between the Khartoum regime and 
the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels, then fighting for South 
Sudan’s independence. The negotiations would then lead to the signing of the 
                                            
162 As an indication of Kenya’s pivotal role in the region, the country hosted a number of major events and 
personalities in 2015, including most prominently the WTO’s Ministerial Conference, The Global Enterprise 
Summit (GES), President Obama, Italy’s Prime Minister, the Pope, among others in what one commentator 
called “a glorious year of basking in the sun” (Ngugi 2015: 35). 
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Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The agreement opened the 
door for South Sudan’s independence in 2010. 
Kenya has also historically played a major role in conflict resolution in Somalia. It 
was as part of this long term engagement, for example, that Kenya "hosted a two-
year reconciliation conference that resulted in the formation of the Somali 
Transitional Federal Government in 2004” (TFG) (ibid). It then hosted the TFG in 
Nairobi for a while, only relocating much later (Whitaker 2006: 263). A major troop 
contributor to the AMISOM in Somalia, currently Kenya has well over 3000 troops 
serving in that country. 
In addition, following the emergence of attempts by Africa to address its own 
emergent security challenges, Kenya has emerged as a key player in continental 
affairs. As part of its remit under the APSA, for example, currently Kenya serves 
as the host of “the coordination Mechanism of the Eastern Brigade (Easbricom) as 
part of the proposed African Standby Force [ASBF]”. Kenya is “home to the 
International Peace Support Training Centre [IPSTC], the regional training centre 
for peacekeeping forces in Eastern Africa” (Bachmann 2012: 130). 
 
7.5.3 Kenya as the centre of humanitarian activity in the region 
 
Kenya has historically served as the epicentre of humanitarian activity in the region 
and the Horn of Africa more generally (Bachmann 2012). In particular, at the urging 
of the international community, Kenya has traditionally hosted hundreds of 
thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries. At the beginning of refugee 
inflows to the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Kenya had a liberal policy, 
with the government itself in charge of refugee policies, especially Refugee Status 
Determination (RSD). 
However, with growing instability in the region—and then the attendant inflows of 
vast numbers of refugees into the country in the mid-1990s, the Kenya government 
moved to create two refugee camps. Dadaab—the largest refugee camp in the 
world--in North Eastern Province (NEP), bordering Somalia—for Somali 
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refugees—and another one at Kakuma, near Sudan—mostly for refugees from 
other neighbouring countries. The government did also hand over the responsibility 
for these refugees to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), so that the UNHCR and NGOs became the implementers of refugee 
policy beginning in the mid-1990s. With these changes, the Kenya government 
served merely in an advisory role. 
The Kenya government has, however, recently taken an uncompromising stance 
towards the refugees, viewing them as a potential national security risk (Burns 
2006: 5).The Kenyatta administration has, as previously mentioned, decided to 
close163 Dadaab refugee camp. The largest refugee camp in the world, Dadaab 
has a population of 348,130. The government of Kenya cites security as the main 
reason for its decision, arguing that the camp is “a fertile breeding ground for 
terrorists, the worst of whom are suspected to be responsible for the massacre at 
Garissa University College where 147 people, mostly college students, were killed” 
(Kubania, Daily Nation 23rd June 2016: 9). Founded in the early 1990s as Somalis 
fled their then collapsing state, the camp has become synonymous with insecurity 
over the years. 
The situation in Dadaab contrasts sharply with that that obtains in the Kakuma 
refugee camp. Kakuma, hosting mostly Sudanese refugees, “anyone can walk in 
and out as they please, and stay as late as they want, with no fear that they might 
end up victims of a bloodthirsty terrorist” (ibid); this despite the fact that Kakuma is 
also in close proximity to South Sudan, “which just a few months ago was in the 
midst of a bloody civil war” (ibid). 
 
7.5.4 Kenya and the commanding heights of the regional economy 
The key economy within the region, Kenya serves as a hub for trade and finance 
(Burns 2009). Kenya has, as the regional leader, played an instrumental role in the 
revival of the East African Community. A trading bloc that initially yoked Tanzania, 
Uganda and Kenya, and that has its roots in the colonial era (Hazlewood 1975; 
                                            
163 However, and to the administration’s great chagrin, the High Court nullified this decision; see footnote 
127. 
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Musila 2002), the EAC has now expanded to include Burundi, Rwanda and South 
Sudan. The EAC assumes added importance in the context of the changes 
wrought in EU-ACP relations by the CPA. 
On trade and aid, the CPA divides ACP countries into three categories, based on 
their levels of development (Lee 2000). The three categories comprise so-called 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs); so-called non-LDCs; and so-called Non-LDCs 
ACP states. Kenya, unlike its EAC partners, falls into the second category. Under 
CPA, so-called non-LDCs can negotiate Economic Partnership Arrangements 
(EPAs) with the EU, but as ACP sub-regions and not ACP as a whole, and without 
overlapping ACP membership in different EPAs. So-called non-LDCs that do not 
want EPAs with the EU, will have their status upgraded to receive GSP of the EU, 
or they can negotiate WTO-compatible trade agreements with the EU; such 
arrangements would, however, hinge on reciprocity. 
Of course, besides purely economic considerations, both political and security 
issues164 have historically had a central role in regional integration (Manzetti 1993-
94; Theret 1999). Regional integration as a search for political stability assumed a 
new meaning following the demise of the cold war (Bresslin et al 2002), with most 
integrating countries viewing this as a strategy to buttress democracy165 (Khanyile 
2001: 7). In the past, though, regionalism in East Africa was decidedly economic 
in nature (Khadiagala 2009). 
The region begun to ogle regionalism as source of stability in the 1990s in 
response to emergent conflicts, including those that roiled the Great Lakes166, with 
Kenya and Tanzania as central movers. Then with the emergence of terrorism in 
East Africa, the two countries moved to make security part of the agenda items of 
the EAC; this would lead to a MOU in 1998, itself only a harbinger of much broader 
discussion on “conflict resolution and peacebuilding institutions”. This would in 
particular lead to the formation of a “Sectoral Committee on Cooperation in 
                                            
164 The view that political stability is necessary for economic development hinges on two aspects namely, 
first, development pre-supposes long-term commitment and, two, private investors are viewed as the agents 
of investment—hence, they need stability in order to do so. See Henick et al (1983: 112). 
165 For regional integration as a guarantor of democracy, see, for instance Musila (2004). 
166 For developments in the Great Lakes region in the post-cold war era, see, for instance Nzongola-Ntalaja 
(2002: 91-115). 
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Defence (SCCD) and the Inter-State Security Committee (ISSC) to exchange 
information and harmonise policies on a host of peace and security concerns” 
(Kagwanja 2009, quoted in Khadiagala 2009: 433). However, EAC’s security 
architecture remains bucolic in nature—a fact dramatized by the failure of regional 
conflict and peacebuilding instruments, such as the EAC and IGAD; during the 
Kenyan post-election crisis, thus opening the door to continental and global 
involvement (Khadiagala 2009). 
 
 
7.6 EU political aid, the Jubilee administration, 2013-: 
7.6.1. EU Political Aid and Human Rights/ Rule of law in Kenya, 2013-
13: 
 
The use of foreign aid to promote human rights, democracy and good governance 
has emerged as a major theme in the literature. Champions of this stance contend 
that an uncritical focus on sovereignty in the Post-Cold War environment fails to 
take account of how changes in a variety of issue areas pose a challenge to 
existing modes of governance (Bishop 1994: 77). Supporters of the shift point to a 
growing acknowledgement of the responsibility to protect those under oppression 
by their own states as part of humanitarian law.  
The ICC became, as previously stated, a major campaign issue during the 2013 
presidential elections. Perhaps sensing a shift in momentum in the Jubilee team’s 
direction, “[a]head of the March 4 Presidential elections, Western states sent out 
strong signals that electing leaders who face trial at the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in The Hague would have ‘consequences’ for Kenya internationally” (Olick 
et al, The Standard 23rd January 2014: 7). The EU then went ahead and stated 
that it would limit its dealings with the Kenya government and the two leaders were 
they even to win, pending conclusion of the case at the ICC. The EU then indicated 
that until the case was concluded, it would in the interim continue its other activities 
in Kenya, but working in league with other players, such as civil society (ibid). 
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The theme of state sovereignty has received a lot of coverage in the 
democratization literature. Supporters of the status quo have taken umbrage at 
this new activist human rights posture. They see it as a blank cheque for external 
intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The theme manifested itself 
on different occasions on the ICC debate during the Kenyatta administration. First, 
the pronouncements by the EU and others drew instant protest and rebuke from 
both the Kibaki-wing of the grand coalition government and the Kenyatta-Ruto 
team.  The ICC was a major issue during the 2013 presidential campaigns, with 
the Kenyatta-Ruto team and supporters positing the case as a neo-colonial attempt 
to impose leaders on Kenyans. By issuing the warnings, the international 
community appeared to play right into the two leaders’ hands on this issue just a 
few days to the elections.  
Sensing an opportunity to exploit, Kenyatta and Ruto advised the diplomatic 
community to stick to its brief in the country and let Kenyans exercise their 
democratic right to choose their own leaders, free of external intimidation and 
interference (Bowry, The Standard 13th March 2013: 15). Instructively, in his first 
major speech on the Kenyan cases after leaving office, former ICC chief prosecutor 
Moreno-O’campo revealed that “some, diplomats, whom he didn’t want to name, 
exerted pressure on him to ensure President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy 
William Ruto were not on the ballot at the elections” (Menya, Daily Nation 8th 
February 2014: 1 and 6). The prosecutor claimed to have rebuffed the request, 
insisting that that was not the ICC’s business, but rather an issue best left to 
Kenyan institutions and the citizenry. 
State sovereignty as a theme did also come to the fore once Kenyatta assumed 
the presidency. Following his electoral victory, Kenyatta’s first agenda item on the 
ICC issue was to try and have the cases referred back to the Pre-Trial Chamber 
for reconsideration. Kenyatta insisted, contrary to the Prosecutor’s stated 
determination to proceed with the case to trial, that confirmation of the case against 
him by the Pre-Trial Chamber was a mistake. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
rebuffed the request; it then ordered the duo to appear in person before the Court 
to enter a plea. Both the Kenyatta administration and the AU responded with 
uncharacteristic fury to the order; they launched a determined bid to scuttle the 
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ICC process. This would see them threaten a mass withdrawal by African states 
from the ICC.  The AU even requested for an opportunity for continental institutions 
to handle the case, insisting that this stance comported perfectly with ICC’s 
founding statutes. Those statutes envision the Court as complementary to 
local/domestic/ mechanisms, and not as a substitute. 
The pleas fell on deaf ears, however. Critics cast the overture as disingenuous, 
merely a clever ploy to defeat the ends of justice. Supporters of greater adherence 
to international norms warned that the attempt to present the ICC as an instrument 
designed to trample African sovereignty completely missed the point (Odipo, The 
Standard 24th January 2011). This would see Ruto and Kenyatta become the first 
incumbent leaders to appear before the court in person. The Court then issued 
tough conditions, such as non-interference with potential witnesses that the duo 
would have to meet to remain free; any deviation from these would lead to 
automatic arrest and detention in The Hague. However, once the cases 
commenced the prosecution was forced to progressively withdraw charges against 
suspects citing lack of sufficient evidence.  
The EU moved with alacrity to embrace the two leaders following termination of 
the cases. In fact, the EU and other key states had begun to retreat from their 
previous tough position vis-à-vis the duo immediately following Kenyatta’s victory. 
According to Amina Mohamed, Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs, for 
example, contrary to extant belief, Kenya’s “relationship with the West was 
stable… The country’s Government had been invited to the UK by the country’s 
foreign secretary” (Olick et al, The Standard 23rd January 2014: 7).  
That the Kenyan cases collapsed should not have come as a surprise. From the 
outset, supporters of a local judicial mechanism had repeatedly cautioned against 
putting too much stock in the ICC process (Chiloba, The Standard 8th February 
2009). Champions of democratization as an endogenous matter insist that 
domestic actors must assume the lead role in this process for purposes of 
accountability and legitimacy.  Kenyatta appeared to allude to this, albeit cynically, 
when he defended the anti-ICC ‘prayer sessions’: 
As Kenyans, we should continue praying for Ruto. A judge cannot tell 
us that we cannot pray. As Kenyans, we should not accept to be divided 
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or made to fight. We understand the value of our unity. We are the only 
ones who can resolve our issues. (Jamnah, The Standard, 21st October 
2015: 1 and 4) 
 
7.6.2    The EU and institutional reforms: The IEBC ‘reforms’ debate 
There exists a link between the national electoral process and democratic 
consolidation (Pronizer 1977). Liberal theory considers free and fair elections the 
sine qua none of democracy (Sainna 2009). The need for an independent and 
impartial electoral oversight body167 needs no gainsaying, given the central place 
that elections occupy in a democratic system. Otherwise, such an exercise is likely 
to exacerbate societal divisions (Makulilo 2011: 264). Thus with regard to Africa, 
and as stated earlier, an emergent consensus holds that whereas African countries 
made some important progress towards democracy in the 1990s, a number of 
challenges linger, with the electoral system as a major contributory factor to this 
situation. (Kabemba 2008: 35). Indeed, as the 2007-2008 political events in Kenya 
illustrate, poorly organized elections can become the proximate cause of electoral 
related violence. 
Electoral assistance has therefore emerged as a major theme in the 
democratization literature. In particular, electoral support has become the chief 
means of UN democracy assistance. UN democracy assistance is facilitated by 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN’s Electoral 
Assistance Division (EAD), nested in the Secretariat’s Department of Political 
Affairs (Schroeder 2013). Free and fair elections168 are increasingly seen as the 
most visible form of democracy assistance (Mitchell et al 2008: 161-162). Election 
support takes two main forms: observation/monitoring of elections as well as 
technical assistance. The support rests on the rationale that although such 
activities enhance voter participation while curbing electoral fraud at the same time 
(Schroeder 2013: 218), preparing and running elections is an expensive 
undertaking, especially for poor developing countries. 
                                            
167 The Australian Electoral Commission stands as the epitome of such a body. For the full read, see, for 
instance Brent (2009: 405-419). 
168 This can at times lead to a dangerous conflation of elections and democracy, though. See, for instance 
Ake (1992: 32-36). 
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European and North American diplomats made concerted efforts to resolve the 
IEBC imbroglio in a bid to lower rising ethnic and regional tensions in the country 
over the issue. This involved attempts to persuade the Opposition to cancel its anti-
IBEC demonstrations, with informed sources confiding of the involvement of “an 
external and powerful hand that wants an amicable solution found. They are 
therefore keen not to be seen as failing” (Wanga et al, Daily Nation, 12th June 2016: 
4). The same sources intimated that as part of the diplomats’ tactics to get the 
parties to talk, they “used subtle threats,” including “travel bans for hardline 
politicians” (ibid). As part of this effort, “ambassadors from the European Union 
met Mr. Kenyatta at State House, a session understood to have discussed the 
economy and diplomatic impact of the growing instability” (ibid). As part of the EU's 
itinerary, then “British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond visited Kenya… and 
talked with the president and [wa]s understood to have raised issues” (ibid). 
Liberal theory holds that respect for associational life, conceptualized as the ability 
of “citizens to organize in defence of their own interests or identities without fear of 
external intervention or punishment has long been identified as a key ingredient 
for democracy” (Fox 1994: 151-152). Such activities permit “community groups to 
grow in awareness, to increase their commitment to the common good and better 
to defend the needs and the rights of the excluded” (O’Gorman 1995: 194). By so 
doing, civil society can serve “a crucial role in providing effective channels of 
interest articulation. Civil society can also play a crucial role as a facilitator of 
conflict mediation. Civil society can accomplish this, they contend, through its 
ability to attract people from different social backgrounds “on a constant and 
voluntary basis… thereby mitigating cleavages” (10).  Africa’s ability to 
successfully navigate its current political development voyage will consequently   
hinge on “how well… democratizing African governments are able to negotiate in 
good faith… with those who represent the important and influential social forces” 
(Owusu 1997: 148). To that end, then, the existence of strong civil societies in 
Africa “would provide a foundation for sustainable development, both participation 
and development” (Shaw 1990: 21). 
To pressure the politicians to the negotiating table, the diplomats had worked in 
concert with two major domestic groups: religious and private sector leaders. 
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Insisting that the country could not afford to go into the next elections under a 
discredited IEBC, the two domestic groups had persistently called for compromise 
(Editorial, Daily Nation, 2nd June 2016: 10).The private sector besought the political 
class to find a speedy solution to the issue, warning that a prolonged conflict would 
have devastating economic consequences, with previous “studies hav[ing] shown 
that Kenya’s economic fortunes always suffer a thorough beating in the run-up to 
and aftermath of hotly contested elections” (Musau, The Standard, 5th June 2016: 
9). 
 
7.7 EU Political Aid and Kenya’s Regional position 
 
Liberals have increasingly made the argument in international relations that 
democracies do not fight each other. Liberals specifically posit that “societal ideas, 
interests, institutions influence state behaviour by shaping state preferences, that 
is, the fundamental social purpose underlying the strategic calculations of 
governments’ (Allison et al 1999: 40).   
 
7.7.1. EU Political Aid and Counter-Terrorism 
 
Kenya’s position in international security has historically been pro-West (Leys 
1974). Following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the United Sates, 
Washington moved with alacrity to designate Kenya “‘an anchor state in the Horn 
of Africa’, and a ‘frontline in the Global War On Terror’ GWOT” (Mogire et al 2011: 
437). Kenya has therefore emerged as a crucial player in counter-terrorism efforts 
in East Africa and the horn of Africa more generally. 
Kenya first came under terrorist threat in the late 1990s, following twin terrorist 
attacks on US embassies in Dar es Salam and Nairobi. Since then Kenya has 
remained under constant terrorist threat (Jude et al 2009: 336). In addition, events 
in neighbouring Somalia, especially the emergence of a radical Islamist regime 
there—and then the decision by both Ethiopia and the US to fight the “Islamic 
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Courts Union” (ICU), which was briefly in charge of the southern part of that country 
“has drawn Kenya deeper into the prosecution of the War on Terror” (ibid). 
Specifically, in light of the perceived terrorist threats, “since 2002, diplomatic 
missions in Nairobi representing leading Western donors have pressured the 
Kenyan government to adopt controversial new counter-terrorism legislation” 
(Jude et al 2009: 343), thereby demonstrating: 
The strategic use of aid in achieving the political objectives of the War 
On Terror… Generally, the leverage of aid has shifted away from 
previous priorities of good governance and human rights, although these 
issues acquired new prominence as part of processes of political reform 
and national reconciliation following the disputed results of the 
December 2007 election and its aftermath. (Lind et al 2010: 336) 
 
The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (SFHA) frames overall EU security 
and development engagement at the regional level. EU-Kenya co-operation hinges 
on two areas: Development assistance and security co-operation and support. As 
part of the security co-operation strategy, Kenya and its western allies, but 
especially the EU, have mounted counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. 
Indeed, the EU was to lead international counter-piracy efforts off the coast of 
Somalia in 2014; hence “[t]he EU looks forward to working with all the stakeholders 
in the region and with the international community to bring the fight against Somali 
piracy to an end”. 
 This aim reflects the strategic framework and broader objectives set out during 
the Conference on a New Deal for Somalia in Brussels on the 6th of September 
2013. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was 
established in 2009 pursuant to UNSCR 1851 (2008), as the coordinator of 
counter-piracy strategy among the various entities involved; since its inception, at 
least the report claims, CGPCS has made tremendous gains, as denoted by 
reduction in pirate attacks. 
 
Kenyan officials contend that their country’s proximity to Somalia exposes it to Al 
Shabaab terrorist activity (Mogire et al 2011). This would see Kenya, with external 
assistance, create a number of security and intelligence related institutions during 
both the NARC and grand coalition administrations. In particular: 
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Foreign security assistance and training aid were pivotal to the 
establishment of many post 9/11 counter-terrorism structures in Kenya. 
These feature new and greater levels of cooperation with foreign 
security and intelligence agencies, some, by way of extra-judicial 
practices and institutions. Kenya was one of only five states to receive 
special training through the US government’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
Program in the 2005 budget, which included support for establishing a 
National Security and Intelligence Services Agency (NSIS). Other 
measures have included the establishment of a joint Terrorism Task 
Force in 2003 and the National Security Advisory Committee. The US 
government has also funded the establishment in Kenya of a National 
Counter-Terrorism Centre that notionally sits within the NSIS, but is 
rumoured to be under direct operational guidance of Washington. 
Muslims continue to endure police abuses—including the involvement 
of foreign security and intelligence personnel; in particular, Kenya has 
been accused of being involved in the regional rendition of suspects as 
part of the War on Terror. (Lind et al 2009: 341) 
Kenya’s counter-terrorism strategy also focused on ‘stabilizing’ Somalia. When on 
a visit to the US then president Kibaki intoned: “‘Stabilising Somalia is essential in 
sustaining the war against terrorism’” (Etats-Unis 2003: 1257 qtd in Mogire et al 
2011: 483), with his counterpart and host, then-US Chief George W. Bush 
concurring, “the establishment of an effective representative government in 
Somalia will help stabilise the region and dispel the hopelessness that feeds 
terrorism” (ibid). As part of its attempt to ‘stabilise’ Somalia, the Kenya government 
took some measures that invited global condemnation; for example: 
In recent months, Kenya has come under criticism from the United 
Nations and human rights groups for barring additional Somali refugees. 
The government of Kenya handed over more than 40 Somalis to the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Ethiopian 
government. Human rights groups are concerned that some of these 
individuals would be tortured or killed. In addition, Kenyan Muslim 
leaders accuse the Kibaki government of handing over Kenya Muslims 
to Ethiopian and Somali security services. (Lind et al 2009: 10-11) 
Kenya capped its involvement in Somalia with military invasion of that country in 
2011—the first time Kenya has taken such a step since independence. 
Codenamed Operation Linda Nchi, the incursion into Somalia commenced in late 
2011 purportedly in pursuit of Al Shabaab terrorists who had launched a number 
of deadly attacks on Kenyan soil. The immediate trigger, though, was the seizure 
of tourists at the Coast in late 2011, by gunmen suspected to have links to terrorist 
groups. The attack on tourists coupled with other previous such incidents by 
militant groups prompted the Kenya government to deploy its troops in Somalia, 
fearful that inaction would embolden terror groups and thus pose a grave danger 
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to the country’s vital interests. Kenyan forces, over 3000 strong, integrated into the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in early 2012. The Kenyatta 
administration has continued Kenya’s involvement in Somalia and the War on 
Terrorism more generally. 
Increasing voices have, however, begun to question the rationale behind the 
country’s continuing involvement in Somalia. Critics cite both the materiel and 
human costs that the war effort has exacted on the country, the fact, for example, 
that the government has had—at least prior to the integration of Kenyan forces into 
AMISOM—to divert scarce national resources into the war effort—as against the 
outcome. To add to the economic pain, contend the critics, the war has seen 
families lose young soldiers who, in most instances, served as sole breadwinners 
for their families. Domestic critics have therefore called on the Kenyatta 
administration to enunciate a clear exit strategy from Somalia. Opposition leader, 
Raila Odinga, encapsulated the critics’ position: 
We want the Government to define and limit Kenya’s military objectives 
in Somalia and to make sure that the war on terror is not fought on 
Kenya’s territory and to ensure that our engagement in Somalia is time-
bound and does not mutate into a military occupation. (Mbaka, The 
Sunday Standard, 22nd June 2014) 
However, insisting that Kenyan troops are in Somalia as part of AMISOM, Kenyatta 
and administration supporters have maintained that the troops will not leave 
Somalia before accomplishing the mission that took them there—defeating Al 
Shabaab and the erection of a stable government. The president’s spokesperson, 
Manoah Esipisu, put it sentensiously: “we have a clear objective. That objective 
will be met. And when that objective is met, we will have that discussion of thinking 
about withdrawal” (Mbaka, The Sunday Standard, 22nd June, 2014: 8). 
These critical voices come in the wake also of a number of recent terrorist activities 
within Kenya and against Kenyan interests elsewhere. Thus on the security 
situation, the country has remained under constant terrorist pressure (Angira, Daily 
Nation, 12th July 2016: 12). First—and here I merely touch upon the major 
attacks—in 2013 terrorists launched a daring attack on Westgate Mall in the 
suburbs of Nairobi. The attack—actually the siege—lasted several days and when 
it was over it left many dead and also inflicted heavy economic losses. Al Shabaab 
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claimed responsibility for the attack and said that it had done so in revenge for 
Kenya’s invasion of Somalia as well as Nairobi’s continued cooperation with the 
United States and Israel in the war on terrorism. Owned by Israelis, Westgate mall 
is usually patronized by affluent Kenyans as well expatriates—mostly west 
Europeans and Americans—resident in Nairobi and its environs. 
Similarly, in early 2015 Kenyans came face to face with yet another deadly terrorist 
attack, with Garissa University College as the main target. On 2nd April 2015, in the 
early morning hours Al Shabaab fighters and sympathizers infiltrated and killed a 
total of 148 people at Garissa University College in Northern Kenya, with 142 of 
the dead being students and the remaining 6 security officials (Muasya, Standard 
on Sunday, 3rd April 2016: 11). 
Then in January 2016 Kenyan forces169 in Somalia became the target. Although 
the government has never seen it fit to release the full details of what transpired, 
the little information that there is in the public domain shows that Al Shabaab 
fighters surrounded and then discomfited Kenyan forces at El Adde. It would 
appear, based on the sketchy information available, that Kenyan forces lost an 
entire company—perhaps one-hundred and eighty to two-hundred men in this 
episode, representing the worst military defeat since Kenya attained independence 
in 1963. 
As part of the increased terrorist activity within Kenya, in mid-July 2016, for 
example, “security forces fought off Al Shabaab terrorists, who tried to storm the 
Managai Rapid Deployment Unit’s (RDU) camp in Lamu”; this was the third such 
attempt “on the camp [which houses administration police officers]” (Kaungu, Daily 
Nation, 15th July 2016: 5). 
A major critique of the democracy-security nexus holds that establishing a strong 
state attuned to the dictates of fighting terrorism may not necessarily advance the 
democratic agenda. In particular, the obsession with order and security may mean 
that repressive regimes will enjoy much latitude in defining domestic opponents as 
security threats and deal with them harshly (Hadiz 2004: 67; Harbeson 2005: 278).  
                                            
169 This is not terrorism; under international law, Kenyan forces have become a legitimate target for attack 
by Al Shabaab, given that they are actively involved in hostilities against the group. 
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Increased terrorist attacks on Kenyan targets have had two interesting results. As 
part of the determination to stay the course, the administration has adopted some 
of the policies that characterized its predecessor regarding suspected domestic Al 
Shabaab sympathizers170. Kenyan security forces working clandestinely with their 
foreign counterparts, but especially American and Israeli agents, continue with the 
previous administration’s policy of extra-judicial killing targeting Islamist radicals 
and anyone else who might fit the bill; this has seen a number of such 
assassinations take place across the country. 
In one such incident171, for example, police officers killed a young-man in Kwale in 
early June 2016, claiming that he was a terrorist suspect. However, rejecting this 
account, “several sources told the Standard on Sunday that the young-man was 
killed in a stationery tuk tuk at a bus stage… A police officer approached the tuk 
tuk, lifted the plastic back cover and shot him at point blank [range]” (Wesangula, 
Standard on Sunday, 5th June 2016: 8). In fact denying that her son was a terrorist, 
the victim’s mother explained that he had just recently moved to the city, having 
recently “finished secondary education in Malimuni Makueni… and later did driving 
and computer courses” (ibid). The literature warns that he obsession with order 
and security may mean that repressive regimes will enjoy much latitude in defining 
domestic opponents as security threats and deal with them harshly (Hadiz 2004: 
67). In their version, the police had claimed that “they were on patrol based on 
what has been happening in the area when they stopped the tuk tuk that had three 
occupants with the driver who jumped out and one started running while shooting 
at the the[m]” (ibid).   
The policy has, however, invited continuing condemnation from human rights 
groups and other conscientious Kenyans. Critics argue that the government cannot 
flout the constitution in the name of fighting terrorism when in fact the document 
offers the best antidote to the problem. In this respect, they claim that it is tactics 
such as the ones being deployed by Kenya and its allies that could actually be 
                                            
170 The war on terrorism has at times appeared to take a particularly dangerous ethnic/regional turn. See, for 
instance Njangili (2015: 6). 
171 In another incident, and a variation on the theme, widows whose husbands had been extra-judicially killed 
on allegations of being Al Shabaab agents complained of being denied access to normal public services, such 
as national identification cards. See, Ahmed (2016: 29). 
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worsening the security situation. They, for example, trace the rise of Al-Shabaab 
in Somalia to an impolitic move172 by the US and Ethiopia to militarily attack and 
unseat the putative Islamic Courts Union militia regime in 2006.  
Second, faced with increased attacks in Kenya the Kenyatta administration took 
the unprecedented decision to close Dadaab refugee camp. The government had 
ordered the camp’s closure173 by May 2017. Kenya has cited security as its main 
rationale for seeking to close down the refugee complex, arguing that most, if not 
all, of the terrorist attacks inflicted on the country recently, including the September 
2013 Westgate Mall siege “have been planned and executed from Dadaab” 
(Kagwanja, Sunday Nation 22nd May 2016: 35). Founded in the early1990s as 
Somalis fled their then collapsing country following ouster of the Barre dictatorship 
(Kubania, Daily Nation 23rd June 2016: 9), Dadaab’s insecurity stems from its close 
proximity to Somalia: it is less than 100 kilometers away. Indeed, “there are 
whispers of Al Shabaab sleeper cells inside the camp, who lay dormant until such 
a time as they are called upon to host active fighters who have been deployed to 
wreak havoc within Kenya’s borders” (ibid). 
The administration has steadfastly rebuffed international pressure to reconsider its 
decision to close the Dadaab camp. For example, in a meeting with UNSC 
ambassadors in 2016, President Kenyatta came under pressure to reconsider the 
planned closure, with the delegation “offering instead that the UN holds further 
discussions on refugee management in the country” (Mutambo, Sunday Nation, 
22nd May 2016: 16). Kenyatta spurned the overture, however, insisting that 
security174 and not financing was the main consideration that informed his decision 
to close Dadaab. He has equally rejected accusations that his decision ran counter 
                                            
172 Even though the militia enjoyed wide spread support in Somalia because of its ability to restore law and 
order to Mogadishu—thereby opening the door for Al-Shabaab to rise and fill the power vacuum (Mogire et 
al 2011; Whitaker 2008). 
173 However, High Court Judge John Mativo issued a ruling in early 2017 nullifying the government’s decision 
to close the refugee camp, finding that the decision to repatriate refugees against their will violates the 
principle of non-refoulment as per the laws relating to status of refugees. For the full read, see, for example, 
Kakah et al (2017: 10). 
174 Indeed, following relatively peaceful presidential elections in Somalia—won by Mohamoud Abdullahi 
Mohamed—Kenyatta, decrying the “terrible” conditions in the refugee camp and security risks associated 
with the camp, maintained that it was time for the refugees to go back home, insisting that in fact a sizable 
number had already done so voluntarily. Consult, in this case PSCU (2017: 2). 
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to humanitarian law. That law forbids host countries from forcibly repatriating 
refugees. In the face of Kenya’s continuing insistence that it would close the camp 
the UN has promised to “seek funds to ensure the refugees are repatriated safely” 
(Namunene, Daily Nation 16th June 2016: 10). 
Kenya is currently one of the major troop contributors to the AMISOM mission in 
Somalia, with well over 3000 troops serving in that country. However, Kenya 
threatened and then begun to withdraw its troops from Somalia in 2016; this 
followed failure by the mission’s main financier, the EU, to remit the troops’ monthly 
stipends for five months. This development came hot on the heels of an 
announcement by the EU that it was reducing its funding to the mission by 20 per 
cent. The EU cited “a constrained budget and new security needs” (Mutambo, Daily 
Nation 28th June 2016: 6), as the reason for its reduced funding. However other 
sources, mostly notably “the BBC… reported that lack of accountability on the part 
of AMISOM was behind the funding delay” (ibid). 
The EU had hoped that troop contributing countries would plug AMISOM's funding 
gap. However, in a meeting with ambassadors of the UNSC President Kenyatta 
had threatened to withdraw Kenyan forces from the mission, insisting that Kenya 
would not shoulder any such responsibility. Indeed, Kenyatta informed the 
ambassadors that AMISOM was not receiving adequate175 international support. 
 
7.7.2. EU-Kenya engagement: Kenya and the regional economy 
 
Kant’s 1795 theory of Perpetual World Peace postulated that free market 
economies would promote international division of labour and, with that, there 
would issue greater international interdependence. Post-cold war liberalism has 
taken up this same argument (Russett 1994).  
 On trade and aid, the CPA divides ACP countries into three categories, based on 
their levels of development (Lee 2000). The first category comprises so-called 
                                            
175 New UN chief Antonio Guterres appears to agree with Kenya on the need for predictable funding to ensure 
the mission has the wherewithal to fulfil its mandate, see, for instance, Mutambo (2017: 11). 
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Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Under this arrangement, all LDCs, both ACP 
and non-ACP members alike, will continue to have free access to the EU, without 
reciprocity after 2005. The second category includes so-called non-LDCs; these 
can negotiate Economic Partnership Arrangements (EPAs) with the EU. To do so, 
however, the EU insisted that it would only negotiate such arrangements with ACP 
sub-regions and not ACP as a whole. Equally, it forbade ACP members from 
participating in more than one EPA—thereby forcing ACP States to negotiate new 
arrangements among themselves to meet this goal; in all this, EU aimed to avoid 
negotiating with one, unified ACP states. 
 Non-LDCs ACP states that do not want EPAs with the EU, will have their status 
upgraded to receive Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) of the EU. 
Otherwise they can negotiate WTO-compatible trade agreements with the EU. 
Such arrangements would, however, hinge on reciprocity.  The renegotiations to 
that end must commence no later than 2002 and be finalized no later than 2007. 
The final category includes so-called non-LDCs; they will/cannot negotiate EPAs 
with the EU (Royeen 2001).  
The non-reciprocal aspects of Lome were to lapse in 2007 under CPA. Thereafter 
ACP countries had to enter into reciprocal trade relations with the EU.  Future ACP-
EU relations would have as their goal integration of the former into the global 
economy (Mackie 2008: 144). 
In addition, in the late 1980s the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)-
-predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO)--had ruled that Lome 
violated multilateral trade rules. GATT had specifically ruled that Lome, by 
extending trade preferences to ACP countries while excluding other equally poor, 
but non-ACP developing countries, especially in Latin America, breached the 
multilateral trading system’s “MFN Principle and a 1979 enabling clause designed 
to support developing countries” (Gibb 2003: 890). To continue with Lome, the two 
sides had had to obtain a waiver with respect to these principles and issues. 
However, the EU saw the waiver as a short-term measure only. It argued that for 
the long-term, Lome needed major revisions to bring it into compliance with GATT 
rules. Hence the shift to reciprocal trade relationship, by way of the 2000 CPA.  
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The EU and the EAC have continued to negotiate the liniments of an EPA. The EU 
posits the arrangement thus: “a comprehensive trade agreement that is expected 
to deepen existing trade relations in a host of areas; simplify customs procedures 
and reduce trade barriers caused by burdensome industrial standards and food 
safety requirements, improved administrative cooperation” (EU-Kenya Relations: 
EU and Kenya on the brink of Consolidating Closer trade ties).  
The EU is Kenya’s biggest trading partner.  More than 25 per cent of the country’s 
exports, valued at over Euro 1 billion a year are destined for the bloc. Kenya 
worries that failure to sign an EPA would have devastating consequences for its 
economy, but especially horticultural and other agricultural products. The other 
EAC members are categorized as least developed. The changes inaugurated by 
CPA will have no impact on their existing relations with the EU.  They have 
therefore refused to sign the proposed EPA (Andae, Daily Nation, 5th March 2017).  
Kenya’s pleas to its partners to sign the EPA have thus far proven unsuccessful. 
In the face of this delay, to continue to export to the EU duty-free Kenya “and 
Rwanda signed the agreement last year to renew the terms, although for a short 
period” (Andae, Daily Nation, 5th March 2017: 38). In any event, Kenyan leaders 
insist that they can apply “for market access to Europe in the event that the Heads 
of State fail to reach a decision on a joint EPA” (ibid). 
Critics reject the EU's stance.  They observe instead that the end of the cold war 
necessitated a more robust foreign policy posture by the EU. The EU, in its attempt 
to play a global role perceived Africa as the best staging ground for that goal. The 
EU perceives promotion of regional integration around the world as part of its 
mission (Bechmann et al 2010: 2). Scholars writing in this mold opine that whereas 
neo-liberalism is too narrowly focused on economic growth, what is, instead, 
needed is a comprehensive strategy for development (Pinkney 1999). With respect 
to the EU'S ogling of EPAs, a critic, retorts: 
This obsession with WTO rules obviously is based on the dominant 
paradigm that the free market and the ACP countries’ full participation 
in it will create conditions necessary for the eradication of poverty. This 
is a lie for the simple reason that trade liberalization—which is an 
offshoot of globalization—is not the route to economic salvation in ACP 
States, in particular Africa. Trade liberalization is not an end; it is not 
even an effective means to global prosperity, given that an essential 
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ingredient—Social Justice—is lacking in its execution. (Udombana 
2004: 91) 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the role of EU political aid in Kenya during the current 
administration’s tenure, a critical stage in the country’s political development. What 
makes this a particularly important phase in Kenya’s political development and, 
therefore, worth examining is the fact that the current administration is actually the 
one that is to oversee the various institutional and constitutional reforms launched 
as part of Agenda Number 4 Items of the National Accord. Agenda number 4 
focused on institutional and constitutional reforms as key to Kenya’s prosperity and 
stability. The chapter has, to this end, first traced the events that characterized the 
road to the 2013 elections, including campaign issues and the attendant political 
alliances that vied for power; it has next examined some of the issues and 
institutional reforms that have come to the fore as a way to lay the proscenium for 
analyzing the role of EU political aid during this critical phase in the country’s 
democratization. 
On the events that characterized the road to the 2013 elections, the chapter has 
examined how the ICC became the defining issue in that race so much so that 
hitherto political nemeses Kenyatta and Ruto, both indicted by the Court, felt 
compelled to form an alliance to rally their respective communities to their anti-ICC 
banner. The two leaders sought to use this strategy to capture state power and, 
once in office, use their positions to fend off the legal dragnet that threatened to 
ensnare them. This, the two leaders hoped to do—and sure did! —by casting the 
ICC as an imperialist plot hatched by some foreign powers working in cohorts with 
Odinga, to lock them out—and by extension their communities—from vying for the 
presidency. The chapter has also shown how Odinga sought to counter his 
opponents by constructing an alliance of his own, albeit again with ethnicity as the 
main force of gravity. 
The chapter did then show how the international community appeared to play right 
into the two leaders’ hands by making what amounted to impolitic statements to 
the effect that the international community would take exception to Kenyans 
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electing indicted leaders. Kenyatta and his team exploited this pronouncement to 
the hilt, and it no doubt played a major role in their eventual triumph in the ensuing 
contest. Interestingly, the former ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo would 
much later appear to corroborate the two leaders’ allegation of external attempts 
to meddle in Kenya’s elections. In an interview he gave some time after leaving 
office, the former prosecutor claimed to have rebuffed suggestions from some key 
diplomats in Nairobi that he use his office to block the duo’s candidacy in 2013. 
The next section has attempted to show how the losing side reacted to IEBC’s 
decision declaring Kenyatta the overall winner of the elections in the first round, 
thus rendering the need for a run-off superfluous. In particular, the section has 
shown how Odinga and his team exuded confidence of vindication in a suit they 
planned to file at the Supreme Court, arguing, one, that they had solid evidence to 
support their claim of electoral fraud in favour of Kenyatta and, two, that they had 
confidence in the reformed judiciary to render an impartial verdict. However, and 
contrary to these assertions, the Court affirmed Kenyatta’s victory and, the losing 
side expressed dissatisfaction with that ruling, in fact questioning whether the 
judiciary had actually undergone reform! But having pledged to respect the Court’s 
verdict as final and in the face of intense domestic and international pressure not 
to do anything that would ignite another political firestorm in the country, Odinga 
accepted the Court’s ruling, however reluctantly; the decision cleared the way for 
Kenyatta to become the 4th president of Kenya. 
This introductory part of the chapter has then limned corruption, with the section 
highlighting how the phenomenon continues to dominate Kenyan life. In this 
regard, the chapter has shown how the country’s elite and weak or highly 
compromised anti-corruption institutions have remained major impediments to that 
fight, the changes inaugurated by the new constitution notwithstanding. 
The next section of the chapter—the substantive one—focused on some of the 
institutions that reportedly underwent reform such as IEBC and the judiciary; it also 
examined the ICC debate and Kenya’s involvement in counter-terrorism under the 
current administration. On both the IEBC and the ICC controversies, the chapter 
sought to limn the issues at play and the role of EU political aid in addressing them. 
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On IEBC, the chapter sought to show how the body’s woes with Cord went back 
to the 2013 elections; these were then amplified by a number of post-election 
controversies that dogged the body. Initially, it appeared as if though the 
controversies that surrounded the IEBC would tear the country apart; what with 
Cord vowing to press on with its country-wide, anti-IEBC demonstrations! 
However, following intense negotiations, mediated by both domestic actors and 
the international community, but especially the EU, the parties did abandon their 
previously entrenched positions and open dialogue; this culminated in the 
reconstitution of the IEBC. 
On the judiciary, the discussion has focused on highlighting attempts to reform this 
crucial institution, and how the institution has functioned thus far. In particular, the 
discussion has endeavored to demonstrate how the judiciary, because of its 
centrality in a democratic society, remains contested terrain in Kenya. Whereas 
pro-status quo forces have thus far tried various stratagems to recoup what they 
believe they lost in the reforms, they have had to contend with reformists out to 
erect an institution that can serve as an impartial and honest arbiter of political and 
policy differences in a democratic society. 
On ICC, the chapter has demonstrated how the EU tried to employ a calibrated 
approach to grapple with the issue. The bloc warned, on the one hand, that it would 
not engage with indicted individuals; it simultaneously maintained that it would 
continue with some of its activities in Kenya, albeit by engaging other actors in 
society, especially civil society, and not necessarily the government. It meanwhile 
insisted that it would interact with the two leaders only when absolutely necessary. 
However, the chapter has also shown how, in the wake of the duo’s victory, and 
then commencement of the cases against them, the EU, although continuing to 
insist that it would not deal with them on a business-as-usual basis, nonetheless 
took ‘a wait-and-see’ approach. Then following collapse, first of the case against 
Kenyatta, and then declaration of a mistrial in the Ruto case, the bloc finally moved 
to soften its approach towards the two leaders, arguing that it was now time to 
move on to address other pending problems, such as terrorism and instability in 
the region. 
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Finally, the chapter moved to show how in fact, the EU’s political aid to Kenya 
under the Jubilee administration has increasingly been one of ‘a hands-off 
approach’, save for the engagement over counter-terrorism. True, the EU initially 
took a hardline position vis-à-vis the Uhuru-Ruto candidacy for the 2013 
Presidential elections and then the ICC case that the two faced. As part of this 
tough stance, for example, the EU, along-side the US, made it clear to Kenyans 
that electing indicted leaders would have negative repercussions for the country’s 
international standing, including harming relationships with key partners. However, 
in the wake of the resultant backlash, especially the acerbic reactions by both the 
Uhuru-Ruto camp and the Kibaki-wing of the grand coalition government, the EU, 
and even the US, appeared to recalibrate its position, now terming the presidential 
contest an entirely domestic matter, one for Kenyans to decide. The EU and others 
were, by this position, actually vacating their previous position on this matter. 
Incidentally, the EU and others interested in ending impunity in Kenya now placed 
all their hopes in the ICC process itself. 
It is also true that once the IEBC declared Kenyatta the outright winner, having 
scored fifty per cent of the votes cast plus one, the EU played an important role in 
emphasizing to the losing side the need to address whatever grievances they 
might have through the legal process. And once the Supreme Court affirmed 
Kenyatta’s victory, the EU also played a major role in convincing Odinga to 
concede defeat.  In addition, the EU played a major role in bringing the feuding 
parties to the negotiating table during the IEBC ‘reforms’ controversy. 
These actions aside, what is, however, clear is that the EU’s other actions 
undertaken in support of democratization in Kenya under the Jubilee 
administration—and even the previously discussed ones—appear to have been 
motivated in large part by a desire to maintain stability in Kenya, rather than really 
to advance democracy. This is particularly so because the EU has always 
appeared to take a nonchalant approach to developments in the country until such 
a time that matters appeared to get out of hand; the EU would then get involved. 
This stance would appear, superficially at least, motivated by the need to let 
Kenyans themselves sort things out, especially in light of the backlash that 
attended the bloc’s pronouncements vis-à-vis the Kenyatta-Ruto presidentially 
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ticket. Perhaps the EU drew the ineluctable conclusion that overt statements and 
actions in support of democracy could do more harm than good in the long-term. 
It is also possible that the EU has had the view that what really matters in Kenya 
is stability, a stance perhaps best exemplified by the bloc’s apparently more robust 
engagement with the Jubilee administration in the area of counter-terrorism. 
Apparently, the EU has continued an emergent trend—since 2001—of elevating 
counter-terrorism concerns over other considerations, such as respect for human 
rights and democracy. I focus on some of these issues and concerns in the 
concluding chapter, to which I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 8: Findings, conclusions and recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter eight—the final one—offers the main findings issuing out of this research; 
it revisits the major theoretical arguments made for and against political aid. Also, 
the chapter re-examines some of the key concepts discussed in this study in light 
of the findings. It is hoped that the attempt to link empirical and theoretical 
arguments will help elucidate the main conclusions and recommendations issuing 
from this study, both retrospective and prospective, with the aim of improving the 
role of political aid in the support of democracy in Africa in the post-cold war era. 
This study analyzed the role played by EU political aid in political processes in 
Kenya since the onset of plural politics in the early 1990s to the 2013 elections. 
 
8.2 Findings 
The study shows that, on the one hand, the EU gets high marks for its role in 
Kenya’s political development during the 1990s, by first helping incubate civil 
society; this civil society would then in turn work with external players such as the 
EU in pressurizing Moi to repeal section 2 (a) of the constitution, thereby ushering 
in political pluralism. In particular, the chapter on the Moi administration elucidates 
how with the demise of the cold war and then the onset of the third wave of 
democracy—itself a major force in the end of the cold war—the Moi administration, 
like its authoritarian counterparts elsewhere, came under intense domestic and 
international pressure to allow political pluralism. 
Initially, however, Moi resisted these pressures, seeking, instead, to cast agitation 
for multi-party politics as inimical to economic development and political stability, 
a tactic applied astutely during the cold war. But the strategy proved ineffective: 
pressure for change continued to mount, culminating, on the external front, with 
the Group of Donors Club suspending in mid-1991 further aid to the country 
pending political reforms. The strategy worked wonders: Moi moved with alacrity 
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to repeal section 2(a) of the constitution that made the country a de jure one party 
state; as a result, the country did become more open politically; for example, the 
government could no longer imprison regime opponents without trial. 
Still, human rights abuses remained endemic during the Moi regime. In addition, 
save for the agitation for multi-party politics, donors did not seek any other 
meaningful reforms. However, this changed amidst increased instances of state 
abuse, especially in the run-up to the 1997 elections. In this atmosphere, the EU 
and other donors did ogle democracy, good governance and human rights again. 
Overall, however, the 1990s were characterized by a major disjuncture between 
rhetoric and reality: whereas the EU increasingly denounced Moi's tactics, funding 
continued to grow and also the bloc refused to decertify flawed elections in both 
1992 and 1997. In any event, continuing domestic and external pressure would 
combine and help unseat the reviled KANU regime in the 2002 general elections. 
Turning focus to the Kibaki/Narc administration and the contributions made by EU 
political aid towards Kenya’s political development during the period, the study 
shows that the EU and other donors shifted to working with the government more 
directly; this produced desired results in some instances. For example, because of 
this collaborative effort Kenya’s once anaemic economy begun to thrive again. 
However, in other instances this increasingly cozy relationship prevented the EU 
from using its political aid leverage in ways that would have advanced Kenya’s 
nascent democracy. For example, even as Kibaki reneged on some of the 
agreements that led to the formation of NARC and therefore the unseating of 
KANU from power, such as constitutional reforms as well as others such as the 
1997 IPPG deal that mandated the cross-party nomination of ECK commissioners, 
the EU never raised any questions. 
EU quietude in the face of anti-democratic stances by Kibaki issued, in part, from 
a change in Kenya-donor relationship occasioned by the onset of the WOT. With 
the onset of the War On Terror, and thus the elevation of strategic calculations in 
the bloc’s interaction with Kenya—and here Kenya meant the government—the 
EU appeared to have retreated into the cold war posture of security, as over human 
rights, good governance and democracy. This, in practice, meant that as the EU 
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focused more and more on security issues, such as the fight against piracy off the 
coast of Somalia as well as the War On Terror in East Africa, it tended to elide 
democracy and human rights. For example, the international community was 
hamstrung by internal divisions in its response to the post-election political crisis, 
with some key players predisposed to support Kibaki, viewing him as an invaluable 
ally in counter-terrorism. The various policy and political miscalculations by Kibaki 
would lead to the fragmentation of NARC and sow the seeds of the 2007-08 PEV; 
in fact, signs of violence were already extant even prior to the voting itself, but 
donors ignored all this, on the grounds that Kenya had finally embarked on a more 
promising trajectory. 
However, in fairness to the EU with mounting suspicions that the ECK had 
manipulated the vote in favour of Kibaki, not only did the bloc issue tough 
statements questioning that decision; it reinforced these by insisting that without a 
fair settlement to the crisis it would not be business as usual. It then deployed a 
number of instruments, such as threats of travel bans for key leaders to press the 
parties to reach a negotiated settlement. The EU then continued to play a major 
role in the implementation of the reforms agreed under the NARA, such as 
extending financial support towards reform of Kenya’s then discredited EMB. 
As for the grand coalition government, the study shows that the EU played a major 
role both in  facilitating the agreement that led to the formation of the grand coalition 
as well as the various reform initiatives undertaken by that government as part of 
the NARA, especially the adoption of a new constitution in 2010.The chapter 
shows that the EU played a major role during this period of political reforms in 
Kenya using both carrots and sticks: the former coming in the form of tangible 
monetary assistance, such as that extended by the bloc to Kenya’s EMB in 
readiness for the 2013 elections; and sticks, mainly in the form of threats to key 
leaders to abandon their obstructionist posture or face the consequences. 
The EU took a particularly hawkish stance on the Local Tribunal vs. The Hague 
Debate. Insisting that it would not accept a flawed domestic process, the EU and 
other international players cautioned the grand coalition government to either 
establish a credible mechanism that met international standards or let ICC handle 
the case. 
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The EU’s political aid to Kenya during the current Jubilee administration has 
increasingly been one of ‘a hands off approach’, save for the engagement over 
counter-terrorism. True, the EU initially took a hardline position vis-à-vis the Uhuru-
Ruto candidacy for the 2013 Presidential elections and then the ICC case that the 
duo faced. However, in the wake of the resultant backlash, especially the acerbic 
reactions by both the Uhuru-Ruto camp and the Kibaki-wing of the grand coalition 
government, the EU appeared to recalibrate its position, now terming the 
presidential contest an entirely domestic matter, one for Kenyans to decide. 
What is, however, clear is that the EU’s other actions undertaken in support of 
democratization in Kenya under the Jubilee administration appear motivated in 
large part by a desire to maintain stability in Kenya, rather than really to advance 
democracy. Or, perhaps the EU drew the ineluctable conclusion that overt 
statements and actions in support of democracy could do more harm than good in 
the long-term. 
A number of findings present themselves from the preceding summary. One, EU 
political aid to Kenya has been most effective when supporting the process of 
democratization—such as helping the country’s EMB improve its capabilities, or in 
the procurement of election related material. In such instances, the EU has usually 
been positively perceived by most domestic political players in Kenya; they have 
usually seen such measures as merely intended to augment otherwise scarce local 
capabilities. This was the case in the early 1990s when EU political aid helped 
augment local efforts by civil society by civil society in the fight against an obdurate 
President Moi.  
Aid seems to make the most contribution to democratization when the recipient is 
genuinely in need of such assistance; the giver can then use it as leverage to get 
desired reforms.  This was the case in 1991 when the EU and others, working 
through the Paris Donors’ Club, withheld much needed aid pending reforms; Moi 
moved with alacrity to legalize pluralism. We see the same logic at work during 
post-election violence, with the EU making it clear to Kenyan leaders, both within 
government and the opposition, that without a speedy and acceptable solution to 
the crisis, it would not be business as usual. This stance, coupled with other 
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measures would force Kenyan leaders to the negotiating table, thereby opening 
the way to the National Accord agreement. 
The point that aid is likely to make the most contribution to democratization when 
the recipient is in need warrants emphasizing. Although it sounds, at least at first 
glance, pedestrian—after-all, is it not only commonsensical that aid would be most 
effective in achieving desired reforms when the potential target is in dire need of 
such assistance, and thus susceptible to the demands of the sender? This finding 
is, however, not as simplistic as it initially appears; in fact, it seems to contradict 
some other findings. For example, other studies contend that although potential 
recipients are usually susceptible to senders’ pressure before the desired 
assistance is given, once the aid is given, however, senders have no more 
leverage; the reform effort is henceforth at the mercy of the recipients. 
 In other words, the recipient can renege on previous promises of reform and return 
to old ways of doing things. In fact, others in the same vein, taking a particularly 
hawkish stance, claim that even when given, such aid was likely to make only 
negligible contributions to reforms, or that such aid has corrosive influences—that 
it, for example, merely helps to cement neo-colonial relationships between the 
sender and the recipient. The finding being discussed here is pointing in a radically 
different direction; namely, that properly calibrated, aid can make a major 
contribution to reform, more so when the potential recipient is actually in need of 
that assistance. 
The key word here is calibration; it is designed to denote aid that is keyed to 
addressing the immediate issue at stake, say, moving towards multiparty politics, 
as was the case with the aid freeze in 1991, or ending the PEV, and so on. We 
see this phenomenon at play in 1991 when Moi, under pressure following refusal 
by donors to release further funds pending reforms, moved with alacrity to legalize 
pluralism. In this case, the aid was tied to a specific reform measure—legalization 
of pluralism. It is true that after that action, Moi tried every trick to resuscitate the 
one-party state. 
The recalcitrance on Moi’s part after the launch of plural politics does not invalidate 
the finding that political aid was likely to make the most contribution to 
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democratization when the recipient was in need of such aid. Straight to the point, 
to the extent that the 1991 aid conditionality was about the legalization of 
pluralism—which Moi actually undertook with alacrity. To the extent, then, that Moi 
sought to sabotage pluralism after his initial reform action, an astute critique would 
then be that EU failed to help sustain the reform momentum—perhaps by 
deploying other instruments to support further democratization. 
Relatedly, and in the second place, EU political aid to Kenya seems to make the 
most contribution to democratization when supporting domestic demands for 
reform. We see this dynamic at work in the early 1990s during the push for plural 
politics. The EU supported domestic forces agitating for reform, when it first helped 
incubate civil society—an entity which would then confront the Moi dictatorship 
frontally. The EU also supported pro-reform forces’ push for pluralism when, as 
previously indicated, it joined other members at the Donors' Consultative meeting 
in 1991 in denying Moi new lines of aid, pending reforms; Moi gave in a few months 
later. 
We see a similar logic at work during the disputed presidential election of 2007 and 
then the eruption of PEV. Amidst growing domestic calls for an end to the crisis, 
the EU joined the fray, insisting that without a satisfactory formula to resolve the 
crisis, it would not be business as usual with Kenya. This stance forced Kibaki and 
Odinga to relent and agree to a negotiated settlement to the crisis; the ensuing 
parleys would lay the proscenium for reaching the National Accord and, with that 
agreement, formation of the grand coalition government. The EU played a similar 
role in support of the other reforms envisaged under NARA, Constitution reform, 
for example. 
In similar fashion, following the signing of the NARA, the EU played a crucial role 
in supporting domestic calls to end impunity, as recommended by the Waki 
Commission. The EU lend its support to calls to end impunity by insisting on the 
establishment of a credible local mechanism to deal with PEV cases, as 
recommended by the commission or, failing this, to turn the cases over to the ICC, 
again as recommended by the same commission. When Kenyan leaders failed to 
establish such a local entity, the EU once again vigorously supported domestic 
forces calling for transfer of the cases to The Hague. These concerted domestic 
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and external efforts would see the cases move to The Hague as well as the 
indictment of six prominent Kenyans suspected to bear the greatest responsibility 
for the violence and attendant crimes. 
Similarly, aware that the country’s EMB had been implicated as a major culprit in 
the eruption of the chaos that attended the 2007 elections, and alive to domestic 
demands for reform of the electoral commission as recommended by IREC, the 
EU provided resources toward reform of Kenya’s EMB, now renamed IEBC, prior 
to the 2013 elections. The resources were especially geared towards the purchase 
of biometric voter registration kits (BVRs). This finding, that is, that EU political aid 
was likely to make the most contribution towards democratization in Kenya when 
supporting domestic demands for such reform is consistent with other findings. 
These other findings show that emphasis ought to rest on “the capability of national 
actors and their interactions with the populace. Although international actors have 
an important role play, their engagement is rarely the key to ensuring the 
effectiveness of states” (Call 2008: 366). 
The obverse of the argument that EU political aid was likely to make the most 
contribution to democratization in Kenya when supporting domestic forces is that 
the EU was most likely to hurt the cause of democratization in Kenya when it failed 
to act, in light of domestic calls for reform. This development issues from two 
factors: one, because on their own domestic forces were likely to lack the 
wherewithal to compel the government to undertake change, the government was 
at best most likely to ignore whatever domestic calls existed for change; at worst, 
it was likely to take a tough stance vis-à-vis those that sought such reforms. 
We see this dynamic on full display following legalization of plural politics in 1991 
and then the ensuing inaugural multiparty elections in 1992. Although evidence of 
rigging in those elections abounded, the EU and others chose to ignore this; this 
only emboldened Moi in his determination to try and resuscitate the one-party 
state. Indeed, the EU’s ensuing entanglement with Moi—under cover of supporting 
economic reforms and road rehabilitation—only served to delay; indeed, 
undermine desired reforms. We see the same behavior both in the run-up to and 
in the aftermath of the 1997 elections: although there were voluble domestic calls 
for reforms, especially the need for a new constitution, prior to the elections, the 
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EU never showed enthusiasm for the calls. Indeed, when pro-reform forces called 
on the opposition to boycott the polls—fearing that as things stood, the rules 
worked in Moi’s favour, the EU advised otherwise. 
Finally, the findings serve as cautionary note against the technical vs. political 
arguments so prominent in the democratization literature; this study suggests that 
these binaries are misleading. The two are complementary. In particular, the study 
shows that whenever the EU has tried to promote one of the two at the expense 
or neglect of the other, the effort has not succeeded. For example, the 1991 aid 
freeze focused mostly on political aspects:  expansion of the political space to 
facilitate greater citizen participation; the aid never focused on any institutional 
reforms—quintessential technical aspects.  The study shows that, although Kenya 
did become a multiparty state and citizens routinely voted, the country did not 
consolidate/institutionalize democracy. 
In similar fashion, and on the technical side, when the EU and others sought a 
technocratic approach to reform of the civil service in the early 1990s, the effort 
registered only negligible results; that effort had to await the NARC 
administration—when there existed the requisite political will to undertake 
meaningful civil service reforms. However, in the wake of the 2007-2008 political 
crisis, the EU and others have appeared to couple the need for technical and 
political reforms—or the need for legitimacy (participation) and capacity 
(technocracy), as denoted by the various reforms enunciated under Agenda 
number four of the National Accord and then enshrined in the new constitution 
enacted in 2010, such as a reformed IEBC—keyed to conducting free and fair 
elections. In other words, to manage the tensions inherent in democratization, a 
proper balance needs to be struck between the need for legitimacy, on the one 
hand—this the institutional design aspect, and the need for capacity, on the other. 
 
8.3 Going back to the future: Literature revisited 
A review of extant literatures on democratisation shows that current research on 
African democratization tends to be overly focused on the role of endogenous 
factors in this process, to the exclusion of a serious consideration of the role of 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
223 
 
exogenous variables in this equation. This study sought to correct this misnomer 
by analysing the role of EU political aid in democratisation in Kenya since the 
advent of plural politics in the early 1990s to the 2013 elections. I drew on both 
democracy support and foreign aid literatures, believing that these two streams of 
scholarship hold particular promise for a fruitful inquiry into the role that EU political 
aid has played in Kenya’s political development since the early 1990s.  
I couple and rely on the two streams of literatures because with the cold war over 
and democracy apparently in ascendance foreign aid became one of the main 
tools that developed countries deployed in their engagement with developing 
countries. True, the demise of the Cold War initially generated widespread 
optimism that the world would finally focus on pending problems. The optimism 
proved fleeting, however: the demise of the cold war was immediately followed by 
the outbreak of conflicts across the globe. Mostly intra-state in nature, majority of 
the conflicts stemmed from democratisation experiments gone sour. 
To grapple with this situation, the international community employed a graduated 
series of tactics—peace-enforcement, mediation, and finally the shift to the use of 
foreign aid as an instrument for the promotion/ or support of democracy—all aimed 
at responding to the chaos that followed what so` me had actually initially 
visualized as the beginning of a new dawn. The linking of foreign aid and 
democracy issued from   a growing acknowledgement that post-cold war 
democratization challenges stemmed from weak state institutions. This would see 
political aid—in terms of resources specifically focused on institution building 
assume unprecedented prominence in international affairs. A view developed that 
to consolidate democracy in the south, third world political institutions needed 
strengthening. Democratic Peace Theory provided the intellectual anchors for this 
shift, contending that the spread of democracy would provide conditions for 
replacing disorder, conflict and turmoil with peace, stability and order in the world. 
 
A number of themes have come to the fore in the foreign aid debate in general and 
democracy support in particular. One theme centres around the impact of foreign 
aid on sovereignty; specifically, the legitimacy of foreign intervention to promote 
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human rights, democracy and good governance versus the need to protect state 
sovereignty. The sovereignty versus intervention debate has manifested itself on 
several occasions in Kenya’s political development since the early 1990s.The 
issue first came to the fore during the Moi administration, 1990-2002. As he came 
under intense pressure to legalize multi-party politics, the president and his 
lieutenants unleashed febrile denunciations of the nascent democratic movement, 
consistent with vehement denunciations of pro-democracy campaigns by other 
African leaders, warning that multi-party politics was alien to Africa and that its 
adoption would augur ethnic divisions. Still, in the face of mounting pressure, in 
December 1991 the Moi government acceded to the demands and legalized 
pluralism. Interestingly, Moi went on to win the inaugural plural elections. 
The issue of sovereignty did not feature prominently under the NARC 
administration with the government, by and large, working harmoniously with the 
EU and others to advance its progressive agenda such as implementation of free 
primary education, for example. To the extent, then, that the ‘state sovereignty’ 
mantra did surface at all, it did so during the contested 2007 elections, with the EU 
and others insisting that Kibaki respect the will of the electorate. Those within the 
Kibaki orbit reacted by telling the EU and others not to interfere in Kenya’s internal 
affairs. However, the theme assumed saliency in EU-Kenya discourse after 
formation of the grand coalition government. 
The sovereignty theme was also salient during the 2013 presidential elections, 
thanks to the crimes against humanity cases stemming from the 2007-08 post-
election violence. Indeed, the Kenyatta-Ruto team posited the case as a neo-
colonial attempt to impose leaders on Kenyans. The international community 
appeared to play right into the two leaders’ hands on this issue just a few days to 
the elections. Perhaps sensing a shift in momentum in the Jubilee team’s direction, 
diplomatic representatives of key nations in Kenya—including those from the EU, 
led by then-US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs—and his country’s 
former ambassador to Kenya—John Carson issued a warning, cautioning Kenyans 
that there would be consequences if they elected indicted leaders. The EU then 
went ahead and stated that it would limit its dealings with the Kenya government 
and the two leaders were they even to win, pending conclusion of the case at the 
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ICC. The EU then indicated that until the case was concluded, it would in the 
interim continue its other activities in Kenya, but working in league with other 
players, such as civil society. 
These pronouncements drew instant protest and rebuke from both the Kibaki-wing 
of the grand coalition government and the Kenyatta-Ruto team, with the latter 
advising the diplomatic community to stick to its brief in the country and let Kenyans 
exercise their democratic right to choose their own leaders. 
However, and contrary to claims of external infringement of Kenya’s sovereignty, 
once the IEBC declared Kenyatta the overall winner of the first round of elections 
thereby obviating the need for a run-off with Odinga, the EU was in the forefront in 
calling for calm and advising any aggrieved party to seek redress through legal 
and constitutional means. In particular, cautioning against any action that would 
plunge Kenya into a crisis similar to that that attended the disputed 2007 elections, 
the EU encouraged Odinga and his team to pursue whatever grievances they 
might have through the legal system, now that the country had a reformed and 
credible judiciary. It, in the meantime, cautioned that the international community 
would look askance at any action likely to lead to violence. 
Similarly, and again contrary to accusations of external meddling, following the 
termination of the case first against Kenyatta, and then against Ruto, the EU 
moved to soften its hitherto tough stance towards the duo, arguing that with the 
cases over, the international community was now free to engage with the two 
leaders to tackle other outstanding issues such as the fight against extremism and 
regional instability. 
The link between foreign aid, security, and democracy has emerged as a major 
theme in the literature. However, critics caution that the current obsession with 
order and security poses a real threat to third world political development, as 
governments feel emboldened to repress pro-democracy forces. Donors 
supported civil society in Kenya in the 1990s as a major component in the struggle 
against the oppressive Moi regime. With the ouster of the KANU regime in 2002 
and the accession to power by NARC, donors decided to engage with the Kenyan 
state more directly—consistent with changed donor strategies more broadly—
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focused on aligning their aid with priorities and objectives of aid-recipient 
governments, as well as to better coordinate and harmonize bilateral aid. However, 
with the onset of the WoT and the designation of Kenya “‘an anchor state in the 
Horn of Africa’, and a ‘frontline in the Global War On Terror’ GWOT: 
It is more certain that there has been less diplomatic support for Kenyan 
Civil Society, democracy and governance groups, particularly those 
against Government’s counter-terrorism policies and planned 
legislation. (Lind et al 2009: 341) 
 
8.4 Key concepts revisited 
8.4.1 Election monitoring/observation 
The literature identifies assistance directed towards the preparation, conduct and 
monitoring of elections as a component of political aid. EU political aid to Kenya 
has mostly manifested itself in the form of assistance towards the preparation 
conduct and monitoring of elections.  
It is clear from this record that the EU has consistently supported the preparation, 
conduct and monitoring of elections in Kenya since the launch of plural politics in 
the early 1990s. The EU has done this, and as postulated in the literature, informed 
by the knowledge that while democracy is essential for development, on their own, 
however, developing countries lack the wherewithal, both political and economic, 
to undertake democratisation. This thinking has seen the EU fund the activities of 
Kenya’s EMB in preparation for general elections; the thinking has animated EU 
activities directed towards election monitoring in Kenya as well. 
It is, however, also clear from this record that, in most instances EU political 
assistance to Kenya lacked a certain level of seriousness; in most instances, the 
aid usually came with an election on the horizon. This would explain why most of 
the financial resources went to Kenya’s EMB. However, and perhaps not 
surprising—given that the focus was usually an impending election, with the 
election over, EU political aid to Kenya in this area would then pine. The EU would 
then ogle other areas for engagement with Kenya, especially in the economic and 
security arenas. For example, following what some saw as highly manipulated 
elections in 1992, and notwithstanding initial criticisms, by 1993 the EU had 
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already signaled its intent to parley with the Moi government, on the pretext that it 
could detect some reforms underway in the country. Adopting a business-as-usual 
attitude towards the strongman the EU now drained its glare squarely on economic 
development and political stability. 
In addition, in theory, election observation should guarantee the integrity of the 
electoral process. This was the case with the 2002 elections, with the EU’s 
observer team hailing the exercise as exemplary regionally. Indeed, the observer 
mission had even expressed hope that the 2002 elections might serve as a 
harbinger of much greater things for the region, an example worth emulating by 
other democratizing states. However, on a number of occasions in Kenya, but 
especially in 1992 and 1997, foreign observers took it upon themselves to 
suppress evidence indicating that Moi and his party had manipulated the vote. To 
EU’s credit, though, it was among those that denounced the elections as not free 
and fair. 
The EU’s position regarding the 2007 elections continued the aforesaid trend. Not 
only did the EU cast the elections as not free and fair; also, it warned of the 
consequences that forces out to derail Kenya’s democracy stood to incur. The 
hardline stance by the EU would see the bloc emerge as a major player in the 
negotiations that ended the crisis as well as in the implementation of the NARA. 
 
8.4.2 Technical assistance 
The literature identifies technical assistance as another major aspect of political 
aid. The political aid literature identifies civic education as one of the activities that 
fall under technical assistance. The EU and others have consistently supported 
this aspect of political aid to Kenya since the advent of plural politics in the early 
1990s, save for the stringent conditions this had to surmount during the Moi 
administration, with the president opposed to such activities as inimical to Kenya’ 
sovereignty. 
Indeed, the EU and other donors have also consistently supported voter education, 
especially after the 1997 elections. For example, in early 2012 the EU jointly with 
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the United Nations Development Programme-Kenya under the Joint Training 
Facility—a working arrangement on democracy support between the two entities—
organised a workshop for EMB officials from across the globe in Mombasa on the 
issue of ICT and elections.  In addition, the EU in collaboration with other donors 
have extended financial support to a number of national civil society initiatives to 
guarantee free and fair elections; this has been especially the case with regard to 
funding for Elections Observation Group (E-LOG). This is a consortium of civil 
society organisations and their stakeholders; it is to help monitor elections both 
nationally and regionally. 
 
8.4.3 Political aid 
The preceding discussion warrants a re-examination of the concept “political aid” 
itself. A critique of indiscriminate neo-liberal attacks on the southern state edifice 
as the epitome of Neopatrimonialism, the concept came to the fore in the early 
1990s. Critics responded that such a designation connoted states that were static. 
They instead argued that the problem in the South was one of lack of effective 
states. 
Focused on the institutional development of government (Hearn 2000), political aid 
takes two main forms: election observation, and technical assistance, with the 
former focused on guaranteeing the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring 
adherence to internationally accepted standards of democracy; the latter has its 
glare on long term institution-building, through the sharing of expertise, among 
others. 
However, the evidence from Kenya shows that prior to the eruption of post-election 
violence and then the launch of agenda number four reforms, EU political aid in 
the country tended to equate democracy with procedure alone; hence, the attempt 
to reduce democracy to elections. This explains the apparent obsession with 
electoral assistance and civil and political rights. By so overly focusing on the 
electoral process and political and civil rights, the EU thereby failed to see the 
process in a holistic fashion. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
229 
 
 
8.4.4 Theoretical issues 
Political aid and foreign aid are not ends in and of themselves; rather, these are 
mere means to an end. Properly understood, foreign aid and democracy support 
are means deployed towards development of the third world state. Indeed, the 
demise of the cold war and the attendant challenges that accompanied the third 
wave of democracy thrust the issue of the third world state- back onto the 
international policy agenda. Prominent on the international agenda during the 
1960s as part of the modernization drive, the theme had fallen into disrepute by 
the 1980s, with critics   lampooning the third world state as part of the problem. 
However, by the late 1980s the deleterious effects attendant this discriminate 
attacks on the third world state had become too glaring to ignore. This counter-
offensive received added impetus with the end of the cold war and the eruption of 
numerous conflicts around the globe, most of which stemmed from 
democratization gone awry. Increasingly practitioners and scholars identified lack 
of state capacity as the main issue. 
Understood this way, it is apparent that since the onset of pluralism in the early 
1990s up to the eruption of post-election violence, the EU and others are/were 
engaged in an attempt to construct a certain type of state in Kenya—a liberal 
democratic state. Liberal democracy draws on pluralist theory of democracy. 
Pluralist theory is focused on procedural democracy—that is, a number of 
procedural aspects; for example, elections, which facilitate pluralist interest group 
contestation, as a precondition for political stability. For example, in his book, A 
Preface to Democratic Theory Robert Dahl conceptualizes democracy in 
procedural terms.  
However, serious scholars have identified a multiplicity of possible historical 
trajectories in the development of the state (Badie et al 1983: 24). Cognizant of 
these critiques and a live to the multiplicity of factors at work, most historical work 
emphasizes the fact that the historical process of political differentiation that 
underlies the formation of the state is therefore exogenous just as much as it is 
endogenous, and it is characterized by discontinuity just as by continuity. 
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Myriad of challenges frame life in the third world. Democratisation there needs to 
pay attention to both legitimation and capacity.   This, in practice, means 
democracy support must go beyond support for elections and focus more on 
institution building, a development that calls for a serious commitment of 
resources. This understanding calls for some conceptual clarity, specifically a 
distinction between liberalization, on the one hand—a short-term, non-
encompassing phenomenon, and democratization—a far-reaching and institution-
building undertaking, on the other. With that understanding EU political aid would 
then focus on supporting good governance as well as the reform of political 
institutions, while also supporting independent organizations in society. This 
strategy should be informed by an acute understanding of the contextual setting 
within which political aid came to the fore. 
In Kenya, and back to EU political development, the reforms augured by the 
National Accord, and which were given expression through the enactment of a new 
constitution, would seem to provide a sound starting point for the EU and others—
both external and domestic—to  start the arduous, yet necessary process of 
constructing a state attuned to both procedural and substantive aspects of 
democracy—the surest guarantor of socio-economic prosperity and political 
stability in the country as well as for a post-cold war world that has yet to realize 
the full potential of the third wave of democracy. For according to the literature: 
… although the design of states is generally so historically rooted that 
the state’s organizational arrangement seems impervious to change, the 
extraordinary circumstances of war and its termination both compel and 
provide windows of opportunity for national elites, or external powers… 
involved, to revisit the state’s organization for better or worse. [Issues of 
state design or institutional arrangements usually trump that of state 
capacity] in the immediate aftermath of state or regime collapse. 
[However], once these constituting rounds of state design occur, 
capacity once again becomes the fundamental characteristic of 
stateness and state power in the eyes of international organizations.  
(Call 2009) 
 
8.5 Conclusion and recommendations 
As to what these activities have contributed to Kenya’s political development in the 
aggregate, the picture that emerges is a mixed one: initially, the EU and others 
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played a crucial role in Kenya’s transition to democracy. However, with the shift to 
security-matters EU political aid begins to assume a self-interested hue, with 
security and economic interests trumping those focused on governance, human 
rights, and democracy. In short, the study reveals that EU political aid has made 
some important contributions in Kenya, such as helping to end one-party rule and 
launch political pluralism. However, this aid has also been bedevilled by a warped 
view by the EU that technical solutions would suffice to fix what ails Kenya! To 
suffice such aid would have to ogle the political issues at play here—which agenda 
number four and the ensuing reforms correctly identify—such as ethnicity, 
structural inequalities, among others; this calls for long-term investment. 
Consequently, the EU must seek to understand the political implications of its 
political aid—namely, the long-term political development of Kenya. 
A number of recommendations propose themselves from this study on the use of 
political aid to support democracy: the Kenyan case reveals that: 
1. For political aid to support democratization, there needs to be proper 
Coordination/harmonization among aid providers; such a strategy would help 
guard against the ever present danger of aid providers working at cross-purposes. 
2. For political aid to work, there need to be clearly defined goals or policies that 
the aid in question seeks to support; such a strategy ensures that there are clear 
policy benchmarks against which the efficacy—or lack thereof—of the political aid 
in question can be assessed. 
3. Political aid must be designed to support, not to undermine, domestic players/ 
actors in the democratization process; such a strategy is essential in guaranteeing 
domestic ownership of the reform process and, by implication, its sustainability. 
4. Finally, and stemming from the previous point, for it to suffice as an agent of 
democratization political aid must be sustained over time. Because 
democratization is a process and not an event, episodic commitments of political 
aid would not suffice; rather, what is required is sustained commitment of political 
aid, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
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Therefore, for future research, others might want to more fully examine the role of 
EU political aid in agenda number four reforms; others could also interview EU 
officials in Nairobi—and even Brussels—to get their perceptions of the events 
discussed here; finally, others could also examine in more detail the role of other 
donors in the reform process; finally, other researchers could, for comparative 
purposes, focus on similar dynamics, but in other countries. 
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